Halacha
הלכה א
הַמַּבְעִיר כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהֵא צָרִיךְ לָאֵפֶר. אֲבָל אִם הִבְעִיר דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה פָּטוּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מְקַלְקֵל. וְהַמַּבְעִיר גְּדִישׁוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ הַשּׂוֹרֵף דִּירָתוֹ חַיָּב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מַשְׁחִית. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכַּוָּנָתוֹ לְהִנָּקֵם מִשּׂוֹנְאוֹ וַהֲרֵי נִתְקָרְרָה דַּעְתּוֹ וְשָׁכְכָה חֲמָתוֹ וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּקוֹרֵעַ עַל מֵתוֹ אוֹ בַּחֲמָתוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב וּבְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ בִּשְׁעַת מְרִיבָה שֶׁכָּל אֵלּוּ מְתַקְּנִים הֵן אֵצֶל יִצְרָן הָרַע. וְכֵן הַמַּדְלִיק אֶת הַנֵּר אוֹ אֶת הָעֵצִים בֵּין לְהִתְחַמֵּם בֵּין לְהָאִיר הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. הַמְחַמֵּם אֶת הַבַּרְזֶל כְּדֵי לְצָרְפוֹ בְּמַיִם הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מַבְעִיר וְחַיָּב:
כסף משנה
1.
A person who kindles even the smallest fire is liable,1This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. provided he needs the ash that it creates.2In the construction of the Sanctuary, it was necessary to kindle a fire in order to cook the herbs used for the dyes. Similarly, much of the metal work was perfomed after the metals were heated in a fire. However, should a person kindle a fire with a destructive intent, he is not liable, for he is causing ruin.3See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.Nevertheless, a person who sets fire to a heap of produce or a dwelling belonging to a colleague is liable, because his intent is to take revenge on his enemies. [Through this act,] he calms his feelings and vents his rage. He is comparable to a person who rends his garments over a deceased person or in rage [on the Sabbath],4See Chapter 8, Halachah 8. or a person who injures a colleague in an argument.5See Chapter 10, Halachah 10. These individuals are all considered to be performing a constructive activity, because of their evil inclinations.
Similarly, a person who lights a candle or wood, whether to generate warmth or light, is liable.6Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Kuntres Acharon 495, which explains that in this halachah, the Rambam outlines two types of fires for which one is liable. He begins the halachah with the statement that a person is liable for kindling a fire, "provided he needs the ash that it creates." This refers to a fire kindled for no purpose other than the production of ash.
Afterwards, the Rambam begins to describe when a person is liable for kindling fires that are used for constructive activity. e.g., to generate warmth or to cook. In these instances, there is no requirement that one require the ash.
A person who heats iron in order to strengthen it by submerging it in water is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of kindling.7The commentaries have raised many questions concerning this ruling and have also noted the apparent contradiction to the ruling in Chapter 9, Halachah 6, which holds a person who heats metal liable for cooking.
There are three positions among the Rishonim in this regard:
a) That of the Rambam, mentioned in this and the following halachah, which holds one liable for heating and extinguishing iron in order to strengthen it;
b) That of the Ra'avad, which exempts a person for both kindling and extinguishing metal. He maintains, however, that a person who performs these actvities is liable, the liability stemming from other categories of forbidden labors;
c) That of Rashi (Shabbat 42a, 134a), which holds a person liable for kindling metal, but exempts him for extinguishing. (See also the Sefer Yereim, which explains that, in the construction of the Sanctuary, the heating of metal and its refinement was necessary for the goldsmiths and silversmiths.)
Rav Kapach explains the Rambam's position, emphasizing that there is a difference between iron and other metals. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. In contrast, as iron is made into steel, it becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, just as the labors of kindling and extinguishing are associated with making charcoal - a new entity - so, too, it is these categories of labor that relate to the process of making steel. (See also the responsum of Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentioned in the notes on the following halachah.)
הלכה ב
הַמְכַבֶּה כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב. אֶחָד הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַנֵּר וְאֶחָד הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַגַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל עֵץ. אֲבָל הַמְכַבֶּה גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת פָּטוּר. וְאִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְצָרֵף חַיָּב. שֶׁכֵּן לוֹטְשֵׁי הַבַּרְזֶל עוֹשִׂים מְחִמִּים אֶת הַבַּרְזֶל עַד שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה גַּחֶלֶת וּמְכַבִּין אוֹתוֹ בְּמַיִם כְּדֵי לְחַסְּמוֹ. וְזֶהוּ לְצָרֵף שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ חַיָּב וְהוּא תּוֹלֶדֶת מְכַבֶּה. וּמֻתָּר לְכַבּוֹת גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהּ רַבִּים. הַנּוֹתֵן שֶׁמֶן לְתוֹךְ הַנֵּר הַדּוֹלֵק חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר. וְהַמִּסְתַּפֵּק מִן הַשֶּׁמֶן שֶׁבַּנֵּר חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מְכַבֶּה:
כסף משנה
2.
A person who extinguishes [a fire]8This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. Extinguishing was necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary, because it was used to create coals that were needed for the fires used to cook the herbs used for dye. Although these fires could also have been heated with wood, a fire heated with coals burns better (Kiryat Sefer).See also the Sefer Yereim which mentions that extinguishing was necessary for the work of the goldsmiths and silversmiths. of even the smallest size is liable.9Regardless of the size of the fire, a piece of charcoal is created. [This includes both] one who extinguishes a candle and one who extinguishes a coal that comes from wood.10As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 7, this ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that one is liable for the performance of a [forbidden] labor even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed (a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה).
As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 27:1, 334:27, differ and do not hold a person liable in such an instance. According to these authorities, a person is liable for extinguishing only when he requires the coals produced. In contrast, a person who extinguishes a glowing piece of metal is not liable.11In one of his responsa, Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentions the difference between a glowing piece of metal and a coal that comes from wood. When a fire fueled with wood is extinguished, a new entity - charcoal - is produced. Hence, one is liable for performing a forbidden labor. In contrast, when a glowing piece of metal is extinguished, no change is made in the metal itself unless the metal was heated with the intent of purifying it.
It must be noted that there are authorities who preceded the Rambam - Rav Yehudai Gaon, Rav Hai Gaon, and Rabbenu Chanan'el - who hold a person liable for extinguishing a glowing piece of metal. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, most of the authorities in the Rambam's era, and surely those in the subsequent eras, exempt a person for such an activity.
It also must be noted that different rulings apply with regard to extinguishing an electric light or heater. In this instance, there are recent authorities who maintain that one is surely liable for kindling and extinguishing glowing metal. (See Achiezer, Vol. III, Responsum 60 and Tzafenat Paneach, Responsum 273.)
If, however, the person's intent is to purify the metal, he is liable. This indeed is the practice of blacksmiths; they heat the iron until it glows like a coal, and extinguish it in water to seal it. This is the process of purification for which one is liable. It is a derivative [of the category of forbidden labor] of extinguishing.
It is permissible to extinguish a glowing piece of metal12According to the Rambam, this applies only with regard to a glowing piece of metal and not to a burning coal. The authorities who maintain that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, however, would allow one to extinguish a burning coal in this instance. Because of the danger involved, the Rabbinic prohibition against performing such an activity is waived (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:27). in the public domain so that many people will not be injured by it.13As mentioned above, although there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, it is waived because of the danger.
A person who pours oil into a burning lamp is liable for kindling. [Similarly,] a person who takes oil from a lamp is liable for extinguishing.14The Maggid Mishneh states that seemingly the opinions that do not accept Rabbi Yehudah's view regarding a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה would not hold the person liable unless his intent in extinguishing the candle was for the charcoal produced. See the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:1).
הלכה ג
דְּלֵקָה שֶׁנָּפְלָה בְּשַׁבָּת הַמְכַבֶּה אוֹתָהּ מִפְּנֵי אִבּוּד מָמוֹן חַיָּב שֶׁאֵין אִבּוּד מָמוֹן דּוֹחֶה שַׁבָּת אֶלָּא אִבּוּד נְפָשׁוֹת. לְפִיכָךְ יֵצְאוּ בְּנֵי אָדָם כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יָמוּתוּ וְיַנִּיחוּ הָאֵשׁ תְּלַהֵט וַאֲפִלּוּ שׂוֹרֶפֶת כָּל דִּירָתוֹ כֻּלָּהּ:
כסף משנה
3.
Should a fire break out on the Sabbath, a person is liable if he extinguishes it because of fear of monetary loss.15As the Ra'avad emphasizes, this ruling follows those views which maintain that a person is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. According to the view which differs, even though it is forbidden to extinguish a fire to save one's money, one would not be liable. This allows for greater leniencies, as will be explained. It is only the threat of loss of life,16Needless to say, if there is a threat to life the fire may be extinguished. and not monetary loss, that supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions.17See Chapter 2, Halachah 23.Therefore, all people should leave [the area of the blaze] so they do not die. They should let the fire continue to burn, even if it consumes the entire city.18The Ramah (Orach Chayim 334:26) follows the view that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צ ריכה לגופה, and the prohibition against extinguishing a fire is merely Rabbinic in nature. Accordingly, he states that in the present time, it is permissible to extinguish a fire that has begun to blaze in a city.
In his time, it was common for the commotion caused by a fire to serve as an invitation for the gentiles to raid the Jewish quarters of the city, rampaging, pillaging, and creating havoc. In such a situation, it was very possible that Jewish lives would be threatened. Hence, he maintains that it is preferable for the fire to be extinguished than for such a situation to be created. Furthermore, in the cramped conditions of the ghettos, it was highly possible that the lives of the children, the elderly, and the disabled would be threatened by a fire.
Nevertheless, even the Ramah did not grant wholesale leniency on this matter and stated that, in practice, the ruling must be determined on the basis of our appreciation of whether there is a threat to life according to the circumstances at hand. Contemporary authorities add that because of the threat of electrical fires, gas explosions, and the like, a fire constitutes a real danger and should not be allowed to spread.
הלכה ד
מֻתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת מְחִצָּה בְּכָל הַכֵּלִים בֵּין מְלֵאִים בֵּין רֵיקָנִים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תַּעֲבֹר הַדְּלֵקָה. אֲפִלּוּ כְּלִי חֶרֶשׂ חֲדָשִׁים מְלֵאִים מַיִם עוֹשִׂין מֵהֶן מְחִצָּה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁוַּדַּאי מִתְבַּקְּעִין וּמְכַבִּים. שֶׁגְּרַם כִּבּוּי מֻתָּר. וְכוֹפִין קְעָרָה עַל גַּבֵּי הַנֵּר בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא תֵּאָחֵז בַּקּוֹרָה:
כסף משנה
4.
It is permissible to construct a barrier using any type of container - whether full or empty - so that a fire will not spread. One may even construct a barrier using new earthen vessels filled with water, although they will surely break and extinguish [the fire].19Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against even indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished, this prohibition is waived in the face of property loss (Ramah, Orach Chayim 334:22). It is permissible to cause [a fire to be] extinguished [indirectly].20The printed text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2) states "It is forbidden to cause [indirectly] a fire to be extinguished." Rav Kapach notes, however, that in authoritative manuscripts of that text, this line is erased. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 13.This equivocation in the Rambam's mind is also reflected in a difference of opinion between the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:22) quotes the Rambam's ruling that it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly. The Ramah, however, states that this is permitted lest a loss occur. This implies that there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, but that the prohibition is waived because of the possibility of property loss.
One may place a bowl21This act is permitted on the Sabbath itself. Although the bowl is being used for the sake of the beam, an article which may not be moved on the Sabbath, there is no prohibition involved (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 277:8; Mishnah Berurah 277:23). over a candle22Needless to say, the bowl must be suspended in a manner that allows enough ventilation for the lamp to continue burning. so that [the light] will not catch on the beams [of the roof].
הלכה ה
תֵּבָה שִׁדָּה וּמִגְדָּל שֶׁאָחַז בָּהֶן הָאוּר מֵבִיא עוֹר גְּדִי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ מִדְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין הָאוּר מְלַהֶטֶת אוֹתָן וּפוֹרְשׂוֹ עַל הַקָּצֶה שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא נִשְׂרַף כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תַּעֲבֹר שָׁם הָאֵשׁ:
כסף משנה
5.
When a fire catches on to a perfume box,23Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's version of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:5). a chest, or a [wooden] cabinet, one may bring a goat's skin24In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that a goat skin will become singed by a fire, but will not burst into flames. or another substance that will not catch fire and spread it over the portion that has not been consumed, so that the fire will not reach there.הלכה ו
טַלִּית שֶׁאָחַז בָּהּ הָאוּר פּוֹשְׁטָהּ וּמִתְכַּסֶּה בָּהּ וְאִם כָּבְתָה כָּבְתָה. וְכֵן סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁאָחַז בּוֹ הָאוּר פּוֹשְׁטוֹ וְקוֹרֵא בּוֹ וְאִם כָּבָה כָּבָה. וְנוֹתֵן מַיִם מִן הַצַּד שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא נִתְלָה בּוֹ הָאוּר וְאִם כָּבְתָה כָּבְתָה. שָׁכַח נֵר דָּלוּק עַל גַּבֵּי טַבְלָא מְנַעֵר אֶת הַטַּבְלָא וְהוּא נוֹפֵל וְאִם כָּבָה כָּבָה. אֲבָל הִנִּיחוֹ מִבָּעֶרֶב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכָּבָה אָסוּר לְטַלְטְלוֹ:
כסף משנה
6.
When a garment [that is folded] catches on fire, one may spread it out and don it; if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant.25I.e., one is not liable. Furthermore, it is permissible to do so. Since it is not a certainty (פסיק רישא, see Chapter 1, Halachah 6) that the fire will be extinguished, this was not forbidden.The Tur (Orach Chayim 334) states that one may not have the intention of extinguishing the fire, but merely of preventing it from spreading further. Note the difference of opinion between the Magen Avraham and the Turei Zahav if that ruling is accepted. Similarly, if a Torah scroll has caught fire, one may unroll it and read from it, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant. One may place water26Tosafot, Shabbat 120a, accept the basis of the ruling cited by the Rambam, but maintain that one must use liquids other than water. Pouring water over a garment resembles the forbidden activity of laundering and is not permitted on the Sabbath, even in this situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:24) favors Tosafot's opinion. on the portion that has not yet caught fire, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant.27Based on Shabbat (loc. cit.), Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Ra'avad differ and forbid this leniency. They maintain that although it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly, placing water in such proximity to the fire is no longer considered an indirect activity. As obvious from the previous note, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this opinion.
If a person left a burning candle on a board,28I.e., it was not placed there with the intention that it remain there on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 277:12). one may shake the board, causing the candle to fall. If it is extinguished, it is not significant.29The commentaries have raised many questions about this ruling, since it is almost certain that the candle will be extinguished when it falls. Although the person does not intend to extinguish the candle, since this is an inevitable result of his actions (פסיק רישא), seemingly, it should be forbidden, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6. (Note, however, Mishnah Berurah 277:14). For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:3) states that this applies only with regard to a wax candle or an oil lamp if the oil has already burned out. In this instance, it is possible that the candle will continue burning even if it falls. In contrast, an oil lamp that contains oil may not be moved in this manner.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that the Rambam's ruling can be accepted even with regard to an oil lamp which contains oil. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). To apply that concept to the present situation, although spilling the oil from the lamp is considered as extinguishing the lamp, since th person did not intentionally desire to spill it and he regrets the loss of the oil, he should not be held liable. The commentaries also point to several other rulings that indicate that the Rambam accepts this principle. If he [intentionally] placed it down [before] nightfall, it is forbidden to move [the board]30Our translation is a slight extension of the actual text of the Mishneh Torah, which states לטלטלו, concluding with a masculine suffix that seemingly refers to the candle, rather than the board. Nevertheless, as the commentaries point out, it is self-evident that the candle is forbidden to be moved. The new concept brought out by this law is that since the candle was intentionally left on the board before the commencement of the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 25, Halachah 17, the board is considered a base for a forbidden object and is also muktzeh, forbidden to be moved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). even after the candle is extinguished.
הלכה ז
נָכְרִי שֶׁבָּא לְכַבּוֹת אֵין אוֹמְרִים לוֹ כַּבֵּה וְאַל תְּכַבֶּה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין שְׁבִיתָתוֹ עָלֵינוּ. אֲבָל קָטָן שֶׁבָּא לְכַבּוֹת אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְהוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה עוֹשֶׂה עַל דַּעַת אָבִיו. אֲבָל מִדַּעַת עַצְמוֹ אֵין בֵּית דִּין מְצֻוִּין לְהַפְרִישׁוֹ. וּבִדְלֵקָה הִתִּירוּ לוֹמַר כָּל הַמְכַבֶּה אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד:
כסף משנה
7.
If a fire broke out on the Sabbath and a gentile comes to extinguish it, we may not tell him, "Extinguish it," nor [must we tell him,] "Do not extinguish it," for his resting is not our responsibility.31As explained in Chapter 6, our Sages forbade a Jew to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Jew's behalf on the Sabbath. We are not, however, obligated to prevent the gentile from performing a forbidden labor for his own sake. Thus, we cannot tell him to extinguish the fire, nor are we required to tell him to refrain from doing so. Indeed, this portion of the halachah is quoted in Halachah 4 of that chapter.In contrast, should a child desire to extinguish [the fire], he should not be allowed if he is acting on his father's behalf.32Exodus 20:10 states, "Do not perform any work, neither you, your son, your daughter,..." implying that a father is responsible for seeing that his children rest on the Sabbath. For this reason, any forbidden labor that will benefit his father may not be performed by a child (Maggid Mishneh). If he is acting on his own initiative, the court is not obligated to restrain him.33The expression "the court" refers to the communal authorities of the Jewish people. In a larger sense, it refers to the community as a whole.
From Chapter 24, Halachah 11, it would appear that the Jewish court is required to restrain a child from performing any violation of the Sabbath laws that originates in the Torah itself. This contradicts the Rambam's statements here and in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27. Among the resolutions of this difficulty is that in the halachah cited, the Rambam is speaking about an activity that will benefit the child's father. See the notes on that halachah.
In the instance of a fire, [our Sages34Shabbat 121a, Ketubot 70b.] permitted a person to say, "Anyone who extinguishes the fire will not suffer a loss."35I.e., as long as one does not instruct a gentile to extinguish the fire, one may indirectly encourage him to do so. Since the gentile has not been promised anything specific, he is considered to be working on his own behalf.
הלכה ח
הוֹצָאָה וְהַכְנָסָה מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת מְלָאכָה מֵאֲבוֹת מְלָאכוֹת הִיא. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדָּבָר זֶה עִם כָּל גּוּפֵי תּוֹרָה מִפִּי משֶׁה מִסִּינַי נֶאֶמְרוּ. הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר בַּתּוֹרָה (שמות לו ו) "אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה אַל יַעֲשׂוּ עוֹד מְלָאכָה לִתְרוּמַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ וַיִּכָּלֵא הָעָם מֵהָבִיא". הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁהַהֲבָאָה מְלָאכָה קוֹרֵא אוֹתָהּ. וְכֵן לָמְדוּ מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה שֶׁהַמַּעֲבִיר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע הֲרֵי הוּא כְּמוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת וְחַיָּב:
כסף משנה
8.
Transferring36Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The translation of the standard printed version of the text would be "Bringing articles or removing articles from...." Whether one is bringing an article in or removing it, one is transferring it. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1).The wording of the manuscripts avoids the difficulties mentioned by the Lechem Mishneh and others that arise from Shabbat 96b. objects from one domain to another is one of the categories of labor [forbidden on the Sabbath].
Although this [prohibition], as all other elements of the body of Torah law, was communicated orally by Moses [as he received them] from Sinai, it is also [alluded to within] the Torah itself. [Exodus 36:6] relates: "[Moses ordered that an announcement be made:] 'No man or woman should do any further work concerning the donations to the Sanctuary.' And the people stopped bringing [their gifts]." From this, one can infer that bringing [an article from one domain to another] is [also] referred to as "labor."37Tosafot, Shabbat 2a, explain that this verse is necessary because, in contrast to the other activities classified as forbidden labors, transferring articles is "an inferior labor" - i.e., we would not ordinarily conceive of it as being forbidden. (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, which states that transferring articles does not appear to be an activity fit to be considered a forbidden labor.)
Eruvin 17b derives the prohibition against the transfer of articles from one domain to another from the exegesis of Exodus 16:29. Tosafot (Eruvin, loc. cit.; Shabbat, loc. cit.) explain that both verses are necessary: one to teach that bringing an article in from the public domain to a private domain is forbidden, and the other to teach the converse, that it is forbidden to take an article out from the private domain to the public domain.
The Rambam (particularly according to the version of the Mishneh Torah we have quoted) appears to view the concept of transferring as one activity which is prohibited on the basis of the oral tradition. Nevertheless, unlike the other categories of forbidden labor, in this instance there are allusions within the Torah itself. To make this point, he quotes the most obvious allusion, leaving the one in Eruvin for the scholars.
Similarly, we have learned according to the oral tradition38Shabbat 96b. that a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square39The bracketed additions are based on Halachot 15 and 18.] four cubits long to the end [of that square] is comparable to a person who transfers an article from one domain to another and is liable.
הלכה ט
אֵין הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא כַּשִּׁעוּר הַמּוֹעִיל. מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אוֹ מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד. וְיַעֲקֹר מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ וְיַנִּיחַ בִּרְשׁוּת שְׁנִיָּה. אֲבָל אִם עָקַר וְלֹא הִנִּיחַ אוֹ הִנִּיחַ וְלֹא עָקַר אוֹ שֶׁהוֹצִיא פָּחוֹת מִכַּשִּׁעוּר פָּטוּר. וְכֵן הַמַּעֲבִיר מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲקֹר כַּשִּׁעוּר מִצַּד זֶה וְיַנִּיחֶנּוּ מִצַּד אַחֶרֶת:
כסף משנה
9.
A person who transfers an object from one domain to another is not liable until1his act meets the following three criteria: he transfers an object of sufficient size to be useful2As explained in the notes on Chapter 1, it is "purposeful work," מלאכת מחשבת, which the Torah has forbidden. Accordingly, if an object is not of sufficient size to be useful, transferring it on the Sabbath is not considered labor. This minimum amount is referred to with the term שיעור. In Chapter 18, the Rambam lists the minimum amounts of specific substances that are considered useful. from a private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to a private domain.3One is not liable for transferring an article from one private domain to another, nor is one liable for transferring an article from a private domain into a carmelit, a domain which is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The definitions of the various domains with regard to the Sabbath laws are found in Chapter 14.Similarly, one must remove the article from one domain4This is referred to as עקירה. and place it down in the second domain.5This is referred to as הנחה. Unless a person performs both these actions himself, he is not liable. A person is not liable if he merely:
removed the article and did not place it down [and another person took it from his hand and placed it down],
placed6This situation is described in the opening Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. If a homeowner picked something up to give to a poor man standing outside, and the poor man took it from his hand - since the homeowner did not place the article down (הנחה), he is not liable. it down [after taking it from the hand of the person who removed it], but did not remove it [himself], or
transferred7In the example cited above, since the poor man did not pick the article up (עקירה), he is not liable. As the above-mentioned mishnah elaborates, there are several different possibilities for two people to combine in transferring an object, one performing the עקירה, and the other the הנחה. less than an amount [that is useful].8Since carrying in the public domain is a derivative of transferring from one domain to another
Similarly, a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is not liable unless he removes9performing the עקירה himself an article of significant size10so that his act is of value from one side [of the square] and places it down on the other side [of the square].11performing the הנחה himself.
הלכה י
הַזּוֹרֵק מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת אוֹ הַמּוֹשִׁיט הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מוֹצִיא וְחַיָּב. וְכֵן הַזּוֹרֵק אוֹ הַמּוֹשִׁיט בְּיָדוֹ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מוֹצִיא וְחַיָּב. וְהַזּוֹרֵק כִּלְאַחַר יָד פָּטוּר:
כסף משנה
10.
A person who throws an article from one domain40Rashi (Shabbat 8a) states that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the craftsmen would throw their needles to each other. to another or who hands41The Maggid Mishneh defines passing over as dragging an article along the ground. The Merkevet HaMishneh and others interpret it as passing an article from hand to hand. It appears that the Maggid Mishneh does not accept that interpretation, because the opening passage of Shabbat describes the transfer of objects from hand to hand as transfer (הוצ אה) and not handing over (הושטה). (See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to this halachah.) [an article from one domain to a person in another domain]42In the construction of the Sanctuary, the beams for the walls of the Sanctuary were passed from the public domain to the storage wagons, which were considered as private domains (Shabbat 11:2). Tosafot, Shabbat 2a explain that, in contrast to the other categories of forbidden labor, the consequence of the fact that the status of transferring is "an inferior labor," is that if the derivatives had not been found in the construction of the Sanctuary, they would not had been forbidden. is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.Similarly a person who throws or passes an article by hand from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.
A person who throws in an abnormal manner is not liable.43As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 14, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath unless he performs it in an ordinary manner.
הלכה יא
הַמּוֹצִיא מִקְצָת הַחֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת מִשְּׁתֵּי רְשׁוּיוֹת אֵלּוּ לִרְשׁוּת שְׁנִיָּה פָּטוּר. עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַחֵפֶץ כֻּלּוֹ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ לִרְשׁוּת זוֹ. קֻפָּה שֶׁהִיא מְלֵאָה חֲפָצִים אֲפִלּוּ מְלֵאָה חַרְדָּל וְהוֹצִיא רֻבָּהּ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ לִרְשׁוּת זוֹ פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַקֻּפָּה וְכֵן כָּל הַדּוֹמֶה לָזֶה שֶׁהַכְּלִי מֵשִׂים כָּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּחֵפֶץ אֶחָד:
כסף משנה
11.
A person who transfers part of an object from one of these two domains [a private domain or a public domain] to the other is not liable until he transfers the entire object from one domain into the other.[For example,] if a container is filled with articles, even if it is filled with mustard [seed],44Mustard seed is very small. The Rambam chooses this example for certainly a sufficient quantity of mustard seed will have been transferred to the other domain if the majority of the container has been transferred. In contrast, were the container to hold larger articles, it is possible that no one article would have been transferred. Nevertheless, even when the contents are mustard seed, the person is not liable for the reasons stated by the Rambam. and a person transferred the majority of it from one domain to the other, the person is not liable unless he transfers the entire container.45Based on Shabbat 91b, the Merkevet HaMishneh draws attention to an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's decision here and in Hilchot Geneivah 3:2. The same applies in other similar situations. [The rationale is that] the container causes all the articles within it to be considered a single entity.46This reflects the Rambam's interpretation of the expression, Shabbat, loc. cit., אגד כלי שמיה אגד. Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan'el interpret this phrase slightly differently.
In this context, it is worthy to note Rabbi Akiva Eiger's reference to Tosafot, Pesachim 85b. There it is explained that this principle applies only to a container that has a receptacle. If, however, an entity is suspended from a stave, different rules apply.
הלכה יב
הַמּוֹצִיא בֵּין בִּימִינוֹ בֵּין בִּשְׂמֹאלוֹ בֵּין בְּתוֹךְ חֵיקוֹ אוֹ שֶׁיָּצָא בְּמָעוֹת צְרוּרִין לוֹ בִּסְדִינוֹ חַיָּב מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין. וְכֵן הַמּוֹצִיא עַל כְּתֵפוֹ חַיָּב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַמַּשּׂאוֹי לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. שֶׁכֵּן הָיָה מַשָּׂא בְּנֵי קְהָת בַּמִּשְׁכָּן לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ז ט) "בַּכָּתֵף יִשָּׂאוּ". וְכָל הַמְּלָאכוֹת מִמִּשְׁכָּן לוֹמְדִין אוֹתָן:
כסף משנה
12.
A person who transfers an article in the ordinary fashion in which the article is transferred is liable, whether he transferred it [by carrying it] in his right hand, in his left hand,47As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 14, usually a right-handed person is not liable if he performs a labor with his left hand. With regard to carrying, however, this is not the case, since a person will frequently carry an object with his weaker hand. or in his bosom, or whether he transfers money bound up in a cloth.48Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:39 interprets this as referring to a cloth that one is wearing. Even though the person is not holding the money in his hand, he is liable for transferring it. From this ruling, it is clear that a person who transfers objects in his pockets is liable just as if he transferred them by hand.Similarly, one is liable if one transferred the articles on one's shoulder. [This applies] although the article is [being carried] more than ten handbreadths high in the public domain,49As the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7, the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying an object on his shoulders, for surely it would be held above that height. for this was the manner in which the sons of Kehat would carry50When the Jews broke camp in their journeys through the desert, the Sanctuary was taken down, and erected again at the site of the new encampment. The boards, coverings, and curtains of the Sanctuary would be transported by the other Levite families on wagons. The sons of Kehat would carry the ark, the table, the menorah, and the altars on their shoulders. [the sacred articles] of the Sanctuary above ten handbreadths high as [Numbers 7:9] states, "They shall carry them on their shoulders."51More specifically, the verse cited states, "the labor of the Sanctuary is upon them." Since the Torah specifically refers to carrying in this fashion as "labor," although, as explained above, there is reason to exempt a person who carries an object on his shoulder, the person is held liable. As mentioned, all [the obligations for Sabbath] labors are derived from the Sanctuary.
הלכה יג
אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא לְאַחַר יָדוֹ בְּרַגְלוֹ בְּפִיו וּבְמַרְפֵּקוֹ בְּאָזְנוֹ וּבִשְׂעָרוֹ וּבְכִיס שֶׁתָּפוּר בְּבִגְדוֹ וּפִי הַכִּיס לְמַטָּה בֵּין בֶּגֶד לְבֶגֶד, בְּפִי בִּגְדוֹ בְּמִנְעָלוֹ וּבְסַנְדָּלוֹ פָּטוּר שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין:
כסף משנה
13.
In contrast, a person is not liable for transferring an article on the back of his hand,52Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:3). Others render this term as "in an abnormal manner." with his foot, in his mouth,53The Maggid Mishneh explains that this does not refer to food. If a person walks from one domain to another while eating, he is liable for carrying the food he is holding in his mouth. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 3.) in the crook of his arm,54Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.). in his ear, in a pocket sewn into his garment when the opening of the garment is facing downward,55With this phrase, the Rambam explains the term אפנדתו, Shabbat, loc. cit., according to his Commentary on the Mishnah. Others render this term as "money belt." between one garment and another,56But not in a pocket. in the hem of one's garment,57Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.). in his shoe, and in his sandal. [The rationale is that] he did not transfer the articles as people usually do.הלכה יד
הַמּוֹצִיא מַשּׂאוֹי עַל רֹאשׁוֹ. אִם הָיָה מַשּׂאוֹי כָּבֵד כְּגוֹן שַׂק מָלֵא אוֹ תֵּבָה וּמִגְדָּל וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן שֶׁהוּא מֵשִׂים עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וְתוֹפֵשׂ בְּיָדוֹ חַיָּב. שֶׁכֵּן דֶּרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין וְנִמְצָא כְּמוֹצִיא עַל כְּתֵפוֹ אוֹ בְּיָדוֹ. אֲבָל אִם לָקַח חֵפֶץ קַל כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִנִּיחַ בֶּגֶד אוֹ סֵפֶר אוֹ סַכִּין עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ וְהוּא אֵינוֹ אוֹחֵז בְּיָדוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין. שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ רֹב הָעוֹלָם לְהוֹצִיא הַחֲפָצִין מֻנָּחִין עַל רָאשֵׁיהֶם. הַמַּעֲבִיר חֵפֶץ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶעֱבִירוֹ לְמַעְלָה מֵרֹאשׁוֹ חַיָּב:
כסף משנה
14.
[The following rules apply when] a person transfers a burden, carrying it on his head: If the burden was heavy58Bava Metzia 105b relates that it was customary to carry a burden weighing four kabbim or more on one's head. In contemporary measure, this figure is approximately five and a half kilograms or twelve pounds. - e.g., a full sack, a chest, a cabinet, or the like - and the person places it on his head and holds it with his hands,59The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that a person who does not hold the article with his hand is not liable. Balancing a heavy article on one's head is a skilled task that only few individuals are capable of performing. Hence, it is not considered an ordinary manner of transferring an article. he is liable. This is the normal manner in which these articles are transferred, and this is thus equivalent to a person carrying an article on his shoulder or in his hand.If, however, the person placed a light article - e.g., a garment, a book, or a knife - on his head and transferred them without holding them in his hand,60The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that in this instance, even if one holds the article in one's hands, one is not liable, since this is not the ordinary way in which an article is transferred. he is not liable. He did not transfer them in the ordinary manner, for most people do not transfer articles by placing them on their heads.61This law applies universally, even in places where it is common to carry articles on one's head. See Shabbat 92a regarding the practice of the inhabitants of Hotzel, a city in Babylon (Maggid Mishneh).
A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head.62As mentioned above, the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7 that the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying if he lifts an object above that height while transferring it in the public domain. Nevertheless, since the article does not come to rest in the makom patur, one is held liable (Shabbat 8b,9a).
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's interpretation of that Talmudic passage and offers an alternative, which is accepted by the Rashba and Tosafot. The Rambam's interpretation is also offered by Rashi. (Alternatively, it is possible to explain that the Rambam's intent is that this is an ordinary, and not an abnormal, manner of carrying.
הלכה טו
מֻתָּר לְאָדָם לְטַלְטֵל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בְּתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁהוּא עוֹמֵד בְּצִדָּן. וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְטַלְטֵל בְּכָל הַמְרֻבָּע הַזֶּה. וּבְאַמָּה שֶׁלּוֹ מוֹדְדִין. וְאִם הָיָה נַנָּס בְּאֵיבָרָיו נוֹתְנִין לוֹ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת כְּבֵינוֹנִיּוֹת שֶׁל כָּל אָדָם. וּמִפִּי הַקַּבָּלָה אָמְרוּ שֶׁזֶּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּתּוֹרָה (שמות טז כט) "שְׁבוּ אִישׁ תַּחְתָּיו" שֶׁלֹּא יְטַלְטֵל חוּץ לִמְרֻבָּע זֶה אֶלָּא בִּמְרֻבָּע זֶה שֶׁהוּא כְּמִדַּת אֹרֶךְ אָדָם כְּשֶׁיִּפְשֹׁט יָדָיו וְרַגְלָיו בּוֹ בִּלְבַד יֵשׁ לְטַלְטֵל:
כסף משנה
15.
It is permissible for a person to move objects in the public within a square four cubits by four cubits adjacent to the place where he is standing. He is allowed to move articles [freely] throughout this square.63As reflected in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and Chapter 20, Halachah 7, the Rambam does not place any restrictions on carrying within a square of four cubits in the public domain.In contrast, the Ra'avad maintains that the leniency to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits in the public domain was granted a person only in abnormal situations - e.g., when one established this portion of the public domain as the place where he would spend the Sabbath or when he left the Sabbath limits. Under ordinary circumstances, one is not permitted to carry in the public domain at all. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:1) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
These cubits are measured according to the size of the person's arm.64I.e., the distance from his elbow to the tip of his middle finger. This measure is adapted to each individual instead of establishing a single uniform figure to allow every individual the opportunity of moving articles from his head to his feet when he is lying down (Eiruvin 48a). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). If, however, his arms are dwarf-sized,65But his body is of ordinary size (Rashi, Eiruvin 48a, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:1). he is granted four cubits according to the size of an average person's arms.66According to Shiurei Torah, a cubit is 48 centimeters; according to Chazon Ish, it is 57.7 centimeters
According to the oral tradition,67Eruvin 48a, Mechilta, Beshalach 5, and other sources. this is the interpretation of the Torah's statement [Exodus 16:29]: "Every person should remain in his place," that every person should not move an article outside this square, only within it. [This square] represents the length of a human body when one extends one's hands and feet; only within it is one allowed to move objects.68The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to a difference of opinion among the Sages, Eruvin 48a, regarding the extent to which one is allowed to carry in the public domain. Although the prevailing view is that one is allowed to carry in a square four cubits long, there are interpretations that state that one may carry four cubits in any direction. This means that although one may not carry an object eight cubits, one may carry an object four cubits on one side and four cubits on the other side.
The view that the Rambam appears to accept, however, maintains that one may carry only in a single square four cubits long. (See also Chapter 27, Halachah 11.)
הלכה טז
הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם מִקְצָת אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל זֶה לְתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל זֶה מְבִיאִין וְאוֹכְלִין בָּאֶמְצַע. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא זֶה מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ לְתוֹךְ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ. וְאִם הָיוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה וְהָאֶמְצָעִי מֻבְלָע בֵּינְתַיִם. הוּא מֻתָּר עִמָּהֶן וְהֵן מֻתָּרִין עִמּוֹ וּשְׁנַיִם הַחִיצוֹנִים אֲסוּרִים זֶה עִם זֶה:
כסף משנה
16.
When two people [are standing near each other] and a portion of the four cubits [in which one may carry] extends into the four cubits [in which the other may carry],69I.e., they are less than eight cubits apart. There was no Rabbinic prohibition instituted lest one carry beyond the permitted space. they may both bring [food] and eat in the center, provided one does not take something from [the area which is solely] his and bring it into [the area which is solely] his colleague's.If three people [are standing near each other] and the middle individual's [space] is enclosed within their space,70I.e., the individuals on the extremes are standing between eight cubits and twelve cubits from each other. Thus the squares four cubits long of those on the extremes do not overlap, yet each share a certain portion with the person in the center. he is permitted [to share] with them and they are permitted [to share] with him. The two individuals on the extremes, however, are forbidden [to share] with each other.71Although they are forbidden to share with each other directly, as explained in the following halachah, each of them may pass an article to the person in the center, who may pass it to the other.
הלכה יז
לְפִיכָךְ מֻתָּר לְאָדָם לַעֲקֹר חֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְלִתְּנוֹ לַחֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁעִמּוֹ בְּתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. וְכֵן חֲבֵרוֹ לַחֲבֵרוֹ הָאַחֵר שֶׁבְּצִדּוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הֵן מֵאָה. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַחֵפֶץ הוֹלֵךְ כַּמָּה מִילִין בְּשַׁבָּת מֻתָּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכָּל אֶחָד מֵהֶן לֹא טִלְטֵל אֶלָּא בְּתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ:
כסף משנה
17.
Based on the above, it is permitted for a person to lift up an article from the public domain and give it to a colleague who is near him, within his four cubits.72As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the transfer must take place within the four cubits, the colleague may be standing slightly further removed. The colleague may give it to another colleague standing at his side [who may pass it further]. Even if the article changes hands hundreds of times or is transferred several millim73A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure. on the Sabbath, this is permissible,74The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, noting that this leniency was mentioned in Eruvin 95b only with regard to an extreme situation - i.e., an instance where tefillin or other sacred articles might be desecrated. He contends that it should not be extended beyond that context.Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:3) quotes the Rambam's ruling, some of the later authorities (see Turei Zahav 349:1) raise questions about this leniency. because each individual moved it only within the four cubits [granted] him.
הלכה יח
הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְאָדָם לְטַלְטֵל בְּכָל הַמְרֻבָּע שֶׁהוּא אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת נִמְצָא מְטַלְטֵל בְּאֹרֶךְ אֲלַכְסוֹנוֹ שֶׁל מְרֻבָּע זֶה חָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין הַמַּעֲבִיר אוֹ הַזּוֹרֵק בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲבִיר חוּץ לְחָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה. וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַרְנוּ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע אוֹ הַמַּעֲבִיר אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת חַיָּב הוּא מִתְּחִלַּת הָאֲלַכְסוֹן שֶׁל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַד סוֹפוֹ וְאִם הֶעֱבִיר פָּחוֹת מִזֶּה פָּטוּר:
כסף משנה
18.
Since each person is allowed to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits, he is permitted to carry along the diagonal of this square which is five and three-fifths cubits long.75The Rambam is not speaking in exact figures; the actual length of the diagonal is a fraction larger. Accordingly, a person who carries or throws an article in the public domain is not liable unless he moves it beyond five and three-fifths cubits [from its original place].76The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there were earlier authorities who maintain that one is liable for moving an article a measure of four cubits. Nevertheless, all the later authorities accept the law stated by the Rambam.Whenever we have mentioned [the phrases], "from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square]" or "one who carries an object four cubits is liable," the intent was [the distance] from the beginning of the diagonal of a four cubit [square] until its end. If a person carries an object for a shorter distance, he is not liable.
הלכה יט
נִמְצָא כָּאן שָׁלֹשׁ מִדּוֹת. כֵּיצַד. הָעוֹקֵר חֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מִמָּקוֹם זֶה וְהִנִּיחוֹ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אִם הָיָה בֵּין שְׁנֵי הַמְּקוֹמוֹת עַד אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. הָיָה בֵּינֵיהֶן יֶתֶר מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וַעֲדַיִן הֵן בְּתוֹךְ חָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה פָּטוּר. הָיָה בֵּינֵיהֶן חָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה בְּשָׁוֶה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי הֶעֱבִיר הַחֵפֶץ חוּץ לַאֲלַכְסוֹנוֹ שֶׁל מְרֻבָּע:
כסף משנה
19.
Thus, there are three [levels of responsibility that apply when] a person lifts up an object from one place in the public domain and places it down in another place in the public domain: If there are less than four cubits between these two places, the act is permitted.If there are more than four cubits but less than five and three-fifths cubits between the two places, [the act is forbidden, but the person] is not liable.77Based on Eruvin 98b, Rashi, Tosafot, and Rabbenu Asher (see also the gloss of the Ra'avad) do not accept the Rambam's ruling and place no restrictions on carrying within five and three-fifths cubits. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:2) mentions the Rambam's view, it accepts the decision of the other authorities. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:2, however, states that at the outset, the Rambam's view should be followed. If there are more than five and three-fifths cubits, the person is liable, because he moved an article beyond the diagonal of a square [four cubits long].