Halacha
הלכה א
מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם וְנוֹדֵר עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים וְכָל מִין שֶׁיִּרְצֶה מֵחֲמִשָּׁה מִינֵי מְנָחוֹת הַבָּאִין בְּנֵדֶר וּנְדָבָה. וּמִתְנַדֵּב אוֹ נוֹדֵר מִנְחָה מִמִּנְחַת נְסָכִים לְבַדָּהּ מֵאֵי זֶה מִין מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה מִינֵי מְנָחוֹת נְסָכִים כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וּמִתְנַדֵּב אוֹ נוֹדֵר יַיִן בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ אוֹ לְבוֹנָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ אוֹ שֶׁמֶן בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ אוֹ עֵצִים לַמַּעֲרָכָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן כְּקָרְבָּן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (נחמיה יג לא) "וּלְקֻרְבַּן הָעֵצִים":
כסף משנה
1.
A person may vow or pledge1See Halachah 4 for the distinction between the two terms. to bring a burnt-offering, a peace-offering, or any of the five types of meal-offerings2See Chapter 12, Halachah 4. that may be brought as vows or as pledges.3With regard to sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, see Halachah 8. And he may vow or pledge [to bring] a meal offering from one of the three types of meal-offerings that serve as the accompanying offerings, as we explained.4See Chapter 2, Halachah 1, 4. One may pledge or vow wine as an independent offering,5See Chapter 16, Halachah 14; Chapter 17, Halachah 12. frankincense as an independent offering,6See Chapter 16, Halachah 13. oil as an independent offering,7See Chapter 16, Halachah 14. or wood for the arrangement [of wood on the altar], for that is like a sacrifice,8See Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 6:9-10. as [Nechemiah 13:31] states: "for the sacrifice of wood."הלכה ב
שְׁנַיִם מִתְנַדְּבִין אוֹ נוֹדְרִין קָרְבָּן אֶחָד עוֹלָה אוֹ שְׁלָמִים אֲפִלּוּ פְּרֵדָה אַחַת שֶׁל תּוֹרִים אוֹ בְּנֵי יוֹנָה מְבִיאִין אוֹתָהּ בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת. אֲבָל הַמִּנְחָה אֵינָהּ בָּאָה בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת. וּדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ הֵן דִּבְרֵי קַבָּלָה:
כסף משנה
2.
Two people may pledge or vow one sacrifice, a burnt-offering or a peace-offering, even one turtle-dove and large ordinary dove in partnership. A meal-offering, by contrast, may not be brought in partnership. These matters were conveyed by the Oral Tradition.הלכה ג
הֵנִיחַ מִנְחָה לִשְׁנֵי בָּנָיו וּמֵת הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מְבִיאִין אוֹתָהּ:
כסף משנה
3.
When a person set aside a meal-offering for [the merit of] his two sons and died,9Before bringing it. they may both bring it.10This is not considered as bringing an offering in partnership.הלכה ד
אֵי זֶה הוּא נֵדֶר וְאֵי זוֹ הִיא נְדָבָה. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה אוֹ הֲרֵי עָלַי שְׁלָמִים אוֹ הֲרֵי עָלַי מִנְחָה אוֹ הֲרֵי דְּמֵי בְּהֵמָה זוֹ עָלַי עוֹלָה אוֹ שְׁלָמִים זֶהוּ הַנֵּדֶר. אֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי בְּהֵמָה זוֹ אוֹ דְּמֵי בְּהֵמָה זוֹ עוֹלָה אוֹ שְׁלָמִים אוֹ הֲרֵי הָעִשָּׂרוֹן הַזֶּה מִנְחָה הֲרֵי זוֹ נְדָבָה:
כסף משנה
4.
What is meant by a vow and what is meant by a pledge? When one says: "I promise to bring a burnt-offering," "I promise to bring a peace-offering," "I promise to bring a meal-offering," or "I promise to bring the value of this animal11Even though he mentions a specific animal, since his promise focuses on the animal's value and not the animal itself, it is considered as a vow and not a pledge. Moreover, he made a promise incumbent on himself - that he bring the value of the animal as a sacrifice - and did not designate the animal's worth itself. See also Halachah 6. as a burnt-offering" or "...as a peace-offering," this is considered a vow.12The obligation is on him; he has made a commitment to bring the sacrifice. If, however, he said: "This animal..." or "The value of this animal is [designated as] a burnt-offering,"13I.e., pledging that the animal would be sold and the money received be designated for the purchase of a sacrifice. or "...a peace-offering," or "This isaron [of flour] as a meal-offering," this is a pledge.14I.e., the animal or its worth is designated as a sacrifice.הלכה ה
מַה בֵּין נְדָרִים לִנְדָבוֹת. שֶׁהַנּוֹדֵר אִם הִפְרִישׁ קָרְבָּנוֹ וְאָבַד אוֹ נִגְנַב חַיָּב בְּאַחֲרָיוּתוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב כְּמוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר. וְהַמִּתְנַדֵּב וְאוֹמֵר זוֹ אִם מֵת אוֹ נִגְנַב אֵינוֹ חַיָּב בְּאַחֲרָיוּתוֹ:
כסף משנה
5.
What is the difference between vows and pledges? If a person took a vow and separated a sacrifice and then it was lost or stolen, he is obligated to replace it15For the obligation is incumbent on him and it was not fulfilled. until he offers the sacrifice he vowed.16Moreover, the sacrifice must be offered in an acceptable manner. If it was disqualified, he is still obligated to fulfill his vow. If a person made a pledge and said: "This [animal] is a sacrifice," he is not obligated to replace it if it died or was stolen.17Because he personally is under no further responsibility. He fulfilled his obligation by designating the animal.הלכה ו
הָאוֹמֵר דְּמֵי שׁוֹר זֶה עָלַי עוֹלָה וּדְמֵי בַּיִת זֶה עָלַי קָרְבָּן וּמֵת הַשּׁוֹר וְנָפַל הַבַּיִת חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם. אָמַר הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא אֶתְחַיֵּב בְּאַחֲרָיוּתָהּ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב בְּאַחֲרָיוּתָהּ:
כסף משנה
6.
When one says: "I promise to bring the value of this ox as a burnt-offering" or "I promise to bring the value of this house as a sacrifice," if the ox dies and the house falls, he is obligated to pay.18As stated in Halachah 4, this is considered a vow. The rationale is that he said: elai, "I promise to bring." That expression indicated his willingness to accept responsibility.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 5:5), the Rambam states that he is obligated to pay only the value of the dead ox, not its value when it was alive. If one says: "I promise to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that I am not obligated to replace it," he is not obligated to replace it.19Since he made an explicit stipulation freeing himself of responsibility, he is not considered as liable.
הלכה ז
כְּבָר בֵּאַרְנוּ שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה בַּיִת חוּץ לַמִּקְדָּשׁ לְהַקְרִיב בּוֹ קָרְבָּנוֹת אֵינוֹ כְּבֵית עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְהָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה שֶׁאַקְרִיבֶנָּה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ וְהִקְרִיבָהּ בְּבַיִת זֶה לֹא יָצָא. שֶׁאַקְרִיבֶנָּה בְּבַיִת זֶה וְהִקְרִיבָהּ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ יָצָא. וְאִם הִקְרִיבָהּ בְּאוֹתוֹ הַבַּיִת יָצָא. הֲרֵי הוּא כְּמִי שֶׁנָּדַר עוֹלָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יִתְחַיֵּב בְּאַחֲרָיוּתָהּ וְעָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת עַל הַעֲלָיָתָהּ בַּחוּץ. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲגַלֵּחַ בְּבַיִת זֶה. אִם גִּלֵּחַ שָׁם יָצָא. הֲרֵי הוּא כְּמִי שֶׁנָּדַר לְצַעֵר עַצְמוֹ וַהֲרֵי צִעֵר עַצְמוֹ וְאֵינָהּ נְזִירוּת:
כסף משנה
7.
We already explained20See Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 9:14 and the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 13:10) which refers to the temple constructed in Alexandria by Chonio, the son of Shimon the Just. that one who constructs a temple to offer sacrifices within, outside the Temple is not considered as [having built] a temple to a false divinity. If one says: "I promise to bring a burnt-offering to sacrifice in the Temple [in Jerusalem]," and he brings it in [such] a temple, does not fulfill his vow.21The Mishnah (Menachot 13:10) states merely "a burnt offering," omitting the words "to sacrifice in the Temple." The commentaries question why the Rambam felt it necessary to add them. If he vowed to offer it in such a temple and he offers it in the Temple [in Jerusalem], he fulfills his vow.22Since he promised to bring a burnt-offering, it is necessary that it be brought to Jerusalem. The fact that he added that he would bring it elsewhere is not significant. If he offers in such a temple, he fulfills his vow. He is like someone who vowed to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that he is not obligated to replace it.23I.e., according to the Rambam, the animal set aside is considered as designated as a burnt-offering and the person is liable for offering a sacrifice outside the Temple. Nevertheless, he is considered to have fulfilled his vow for the reason stated by the Rambam. He is liable for karet for offering [the sacrifice] outside [the Temple Courtyard].Similarly, if one takes a vow saying that he is a nazirite on the condition that he shave24As is done at the conclusion of one's nazirite vow. in such a temple, he fulfills his obligation if he shaves there. He is considered as one who vowed to abstain from wine and he did so abstain. This is not considered as a nazirite vow.
הלכה ח
חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם אֵינָן בָּאִין אֶלָּא עַל חֵטְא. וְאֵינָן בָּאִין בְּנֵדֶר וּנְדָבָה. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי חַטָּאת אוֹ אָשָׁם אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הֲרֵי זוֹ חַטָּאת אוֹ אָשָׁם לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. הָיָה מְחֻיָּב חַטָּאת אוֹ אָשָׁם וְאָמַר הֲרֵי זוֹ לְחַטָּאתִי אוֹ לַאֲשָׁמִי אוֹ הֲרֵי הַמָּעוֹת הָאֵלּוּ לְחַטָּאתִי אוֹ לַאֲשָׁמִי דְּבָרָיו קַיָּמִים:
כסף משנה
8.
A sin-offering and a guilt-offering may be brought only for a sin.25Thus when Leviticus 5:1 introduces the obligation to bring a sin-offering, it states: "If a person will sin...." They may not be brought because of a pledge or a vow. [Hence,] if one26I.e., one who is not obligated to bring such a sacrifice. says: "I promise to bring a sin-offering" or "...a guilt-offering," his statements are of no consequence. [Similarly,] if he said: "This animal is [designated as] a sin-offering" or "...a guilt-offering," his statements are of no consequence.If he was obligated to bring a sin-offering or a guilt-offering and he said: "This [animal] is for my sin-offering" or "...for my guilt-offering" or "This money is for my sin-offering" or "...my guilt-offering," his statements are binding.
הלכה ט
הָאוֹמֵר קָרְבַּן מְצֹרָע זֶה אוֹ יוֹלֶדֶת זוֹ עָלַי. אִם הָיָה אוֹתוֹ מְצֹרָע אוֹ הַיּוֹלֶדֶת עֲנִיִּים מֵבִיא הַנּוֹדֵר קָרְבַּן עָנִי. וְאִם הָיוּ עֲשִׁירִים מֵבִיא הַנּוֹדֵר קָרְבַּן עָשִׁיר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַנּוֹדֵר עָנִי:
כסף משנה
9.
When a person says: "I promise to bring the sacrifices of this person afflicted by tzara'at" or "...this women who gave birth," if the afflicted person or the women are poor, the one who took the vow should bring the sacrifices of a poor person.27The types of sacrifices these individuals are obligated to bring vary dependent on the person's financial standing, as explained in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:3. Accordingly, one might think that regardless of the financial status of the person who pledged to bring the sacrifice, the type of sacrifice to be brought is determined by the financial status of the person who is obligated to offer it. Nevertheless, as stated in Arachin 13a (and quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 5:11), this is not the case. If a wealthy person vows to bring the sacrifices of a poor person afflicted by tzara'at, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man. Hence, we are forced to say that here the Rambam is speaking of a poor person who took such a vow. If they were wealthy, the person who took the vow must bring the sacrifice of a wealthy person even though he is poor.הלכה י
הָאוֹמֵר חַטָּאתוֹ וְעוֹלָתוֹ וַאֲשָׁמוֹ וּשְׁלָמָיו שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי עָלַי. אִם רָצָה אוֹתוֹ פְּלוֹנִי הֲרֵי זֶה מְנִיחוֹ לְהַקְרִיבָן עַל יָדוֹ וּמִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ. רָצָה בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה וְלֹא רָצָה בִּשְׁעַת הַקְרָבָה אֶלָּא חָזַר בּוֹ. בְּעוֹלָה וּבִשְׁלָמִים מַקְרִיבִין וּמִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בָּהֶן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה עַתָּה שֶׁהֲרֵי רָצָה בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה. אֲבָל בְּחַטָּאת וּבְאָשָׁם לֹא נִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּרְצֶה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף:
כסף משנה
10.
[The following laws apply when] one says: "I promise to bring the sin-offering, burnt-offering, guilt-offering, and peace-offering of so-and-so." If that person agrees, he may allow him to bring those sacrifices for him and he receives atonement thereby. If he agreed at the time [the sacrificial animals] were set aside, but reneged and did not agree at the time they were offered,28Rashi (Arachin 21a) interprets the passage as referring to an instance where the person obligated to bring the sacrifice did not know it was being offered on his behalf. If he did know, however, he must consent. The Rambam differs and maintains that since he gave his consent originally and the atonement associated with these sacrifices is achieved immediately, it is not necessary that he consent at the time the sacrifice was offered (Rav Yosef Corcus; see Halachah 17). with regard to a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, they should be sacrificed and he receives atonement through them even if he does not consent at this time, because he agreed at the time [the sacrificial animals] were set aside. With regard to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering,29Since the atonement associated with these sacrifices is more encompassing, it requires not only his initial consent, but also continuous willful activity (ibid.). by contrast, he does not receive atonement unless he consented from the beginning until the end.הלכה יא
הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּנִדְרֵי רְשָׁעִים שֶׁמִּנִּדְרֵיהֶן נָזִיר וְקָרְבָּן וּשְׁבוּעָה חַיָּב בְּכֻלָּן. כְּנִדְרֵי כְּשֵׁרִין לֹא נִתְחַיֵּב כְּלוּם. הֲרֵי עָלַי כִּנְדָבוֹת כְּשֵׁרִין הֲרֵי זֶה נָדַר בְּנָזִיר וּבְקָרְבָּן. וְכָל כִּנּוּיֵי קָרְבָּן כְּקָרְבָּן:
כסף משנה
11.
One who says: "I promise to bring vows like the vows of the wicked who take upon themselves nazirite vows, sacrifices, and oaths," he is obligated in all [of his statements].30The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The intent of the Mishnah is that the wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person that they will not necessarily be able to fulfill. As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Nedarim 13:25 and in his commentary to the above mishnah, it is preferable not to take vows, for it is possible one will not be able to fulfill them. See also ibid. 1:25. If he says: "...as the vows of the upright," he is not obligated in anything.31For the upright do not take vows for the reason stated in the previous note (ibid.:26). If he says: "as the pledges of the upright," his vow is binding32For the upright do make pledges, for a pledge involves the sanctification of an article at hand and if the upright wish to take such action, there is nothing preventing them from fulfilling their vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that the upright would bring their sacrificial animals to the Temple Mount and only then, pledge to bring them. In this way, there would be no question of them keeping their word. with regard to nazirite vows and sacrifices.33The Rambam does not mention oaths, because the upright try to avoid taking oaths entirely. All terms used to refer to sacrifices are considered as sacrifices.34See Hilchot Nizirut 1:16 which states:There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.
What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban.
הלכה יב
אֵין הַנּוֹדֵר וְלֹא הַמִּתְנַדֵּב חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא פִּיו וְלִבּוֹ שָׁוִין. כֵּיצַד. הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לוֹמַר הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה וְאָמַר שְׁלָמִים. אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לוֹמַר הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹלָה וְאָמַר שְׁלָמִים לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. נִתְכַּוֵּן לִנְדֹּר בְּעוֹלָה וְאָמַר קָרְבָּן. לִנְדֹּר בְּחֵרֶם וְאָמַר הֶקְדֵּשׁ דְּבָרָיו קַיָּמִים. שֶׁהָעוֹלָה קָרְבָּן וְהַחֵרֶם הֶקְדֵּשׁ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. בִּנְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו כְּלוּם אֶלָּא אִם גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ וְלֹא הוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו כְּלוּם חַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ שֶׁזּוֹ עוֹלָה אוֹ שֶׁיָּבִיא עוֹלָה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב לְהָבִיא שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות לה ה) "כּל נְדִיב לֵב יְבִיאָהּ" בִּנְדִיבוּת לֵב יִתְחַיֵּב לְהָבִיא. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה מִנִּדְרֵי קָדָשִׁים וְנִדְבוּתָן:
כסף משנה
12.
Neither one who takes a vow or one who makes a pledge is liable unless his statements match his intent.35This is a general principle applying with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12) and vows (Hilchot Nedarim 2:2).In the continuation of the halachah, the Rambam describes a situation in which one is liable for a sacrifice he intended to give even though he does not say anything. That, however, is not a contradiction to the statements here, because here, the person's statements contradict his intent.
What is implied? If one had the intent of saying: "I promise to bring a burnt-offering," but he said "...a peace-offering" or he had the intent of saying: "I promise to bring a peace-offering," but he said "...a burnt-offering," his words are of no substance. If, [however,] he intended to take a vow to bring a burnt-offering and said: "a sacrifice," or he intended to say devotion offerings36Which is consecrated to the Temple treasury. and he said: "consecrated property," his statements are binding, for a burnt-offering is a sacrifice, and something designated as devotion offerings is consecrated. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
With regard to vows and pledges, it is not necessary for him to make any verbal statements. He is obligated even if he made a firm resolve in his heart without saying anything. What is implied? If one made a resolve in his heart that an animal should be designated as a burnt-offering or that he should bring a burnt-offering, he is obligated. [This is derived from Exodus 35:5]: "All those generous of heart shall bring it." Generosity in the heart [alone is sufficient to] establish an obligation to bring. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations involving vows and pledges for the consecration [of sacrifices].
הלכה יג
אֶחָד נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת עִם שְׁאָר הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁאָדָם חַיָּב בָּהֶן מֵעֲרָכִין וְדָמִים וּמַעַשְׂרוֹת וּמַתְּנוֹת עֲנִיִּים מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה מִן הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁיָּבִיא הַכּל בָּרֶגֶל שֶׁפָּגַע בּוֹ תְּחִלָּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יב ה) "וּבָאתָ שָּׁמָּה" (דברים יב ו) "וַהֲבֵאתֶם שָׁמָּה" וְגוֹ' כְּלוֹמַר בְּעֵת שֶׁתָּבוֹא לָחֹג תָּבִיא כָּל מַה שֶׁאַתָּה חַיָּב בּוֹ וְתִתֵּן כָּל חוֹב שֶׁעָלֶיךָ לְשָׁם. הִגִּיעַ הָרֶגֶל וְלֹא הֵבִיא הֲרֵי זֶה בִּטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה. עָבְרוּ עָלָיו שְׁלֹשָׁה רְגָלִים וְלֹא הֵבִיא קָרְבְּנוֹתָיו שֶׁנָּדַר אוֹ הִתְנַדֵּב אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן הָעֲרָכִים וְהַחֲרָמִים וְהַדָּמִים הֲרֵי זֶה עָבַר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כג כב) "לֹא תְאַחֵר לְשַׁלְּמוֹ" אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה עַד שֶׁיַּעַבְרוּ עָלָיו רַגְלֵי הַשָּׁנָה כֻּלָּהּ. וְאֵין לוֹקִין עַל לָאו זֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה:
כסף משנה
13.
With regard to vows and pledges and other commitments that a person makes that obligated him, endowment obligations, pledges for worth,37Both of these terms refer to commitments to make donations to the Temple treasury. See Hilchot Arachin, ch. 1, for a more complete description. tithes.38I.e. the tithes (including the second tithe and the tithe for the poor) separated from one's crops (see Hilchot Ma'aser and Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni). Also, implied are the tithe offerings. See Hilchot Bechorot, ch. 4. and the presents to the poor,39Leket, pe'ah, ollelot, etc., as described in Hilchot Matanot Aniyim. it is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin to bring everything on the festival of immediate proximity,40Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 83) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 438) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. as [Deuteronomy 12:5-6] states: "And you shall come there and you shall bring your burnt-offerings, your sacrifices, your tithes,... your vows, your pledges..."], as if to say: When you come [to Jerusalem] to celebrate a festival bring there everything that you are obligated and satisfy every obligation upon you.If the festival arrived and he did not bring [the gifts in which he is obligated], he has negated the observance of a positive commandment. If three festivals pass without him bringing the sacrifices he vowed or pledged to bring or without giving the endowment obligations, devotion offerings, and pledges for worth, he violates a negative commandment,41Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 155) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 574) count this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. as [ibid. 23:22] states: "Do not delay in paying it." He does not violate the negative commandment until all of the three pilgrimage festivals of the year pass. Lashes are not given for the violation of this negative commandment, because it does not involve a deed.42As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, lashes are only given for the violation of a prohibition that involves a deed.
הלכה יד
הִקְדִּישׁ בְּהֵמָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְעָבְרוּ עָלָיו שְׁנֵי רְגָלִים וְנָפַל בָּהּ מוּם וּפְדָאָהּ עַל גַּב בְּהֵמָה אַחֶרֶת אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה עַד שֶׁיַּעַבְרוּ עַל הָאַחֶרֶת שְׁלֹשָׁה רְגָלִים. וְאֶחָד הָאִישׁ וְאֶחָד הָאִשָּׁה עוֹבֵר בְּבַל תְּאַחֵר. אֲבָל הַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּבַל תְּאַחֵר:
כסף משנה
14.
If one consecrated an animal [to be offered] on the altar and [after] two festivals passed [without it being offered], it became blemished and it was redeemed for another animal, the person does not violate the negative commandment until three festivals pass without the second [animal being sacrificed].43For the calculation begins anew with the consecration of the second animal.Both a man and a woman44Rosh HaShanah 6b explains that since a woman is not obligated to bring a burnt-offering (olat re'i'ah) for the pilgrimage festival, one might think that the entire concept of a pilgrimage festival - and hence, this commandment - does not apply to her. This supposition is, however, negated, for she is obligated in bringing the peace-offering of rejoicing (shalmei simchah) that are sacrificed on festivals. are liable for the transgression [the prohibition against] delaying [the offering of a sacrifice]. An heir, however, does not violate this prohibition.45The prohibition is not to delay paying one's vow. Since the heir did not make the vow himself, he does not violate this prohibition if he does not carry out the vow at the appropriate time. He is, however, to bring the sacrifice. See Rosh HaShanah 6b.
הלכה טו
כָּל הַקָּרְבָּנוֹת שֶׁעָבְרוּ עֲלֵיהֶן שְׁלֹשָׁה רְגָלִים לֹא נִפְסְלוּ. אֶלָּא מַקְרִיבָן וּכְשֵׁרִים. וּבְכָל יוֹם וְיוֹם אַחַר הַשְּׁלֹשָׁה רְגָלִים הוּא עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תְּאַחֵר. וּבֵית דִּין מְצַוִּין לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ מִיָּד עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב קָרְבְּנוֹתָיו בָּרֶגֶל שֶׁפָּגַע בּוֹ תְּחִלָּה:
כסף משנה
15.
Despite the fact that three festivals passed, no [animal consecrated as] a sacrifice is disqualified. Instead, [such animals should be] sacrificed and they are acceptable. Each and every day that passes after the three pilgrimage festivals involves a violation of [the above] prohibition. The [Jewish] court is commanded to apply physical coercion to the person46As Ketubot 86a-b explains, the court is obligated to compel every individual to observe every positive commandment incumbent upon him, even if it requires beating him to the point of death. immediately until he offers his sacrifices on the first festival that presents itself.47The Rambam's wording appears to imply that if the court sees the person acting indolently with regard to the sacrifice, it is obligated to subject him to compulsion even if the first festival has not passed. This point is not, however, accepted by all authorities (Rav Yosef Corcus).הלכה טז
אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא א ג) "לִרְצוֹנוֹ" כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי. בֵּין שֶׁנָּדַר וְלֹא הִפְרִישׁ בֵּין שֶׁהִפְרִישׁ וְלֹא הִקְרִיב כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב:
כסף משנה
16.
Even though [Leviticus 1:3] states that [a burnt-offering must be sacrificed] "willfully," he may be compelled until he says: "I desire."48In Hilchot Gerushin 2:20, the Rambam explains why acting under compulsion in such circumstances can be considered willful activity. [For there also, a bill of divorce must be written with the husband's consent and yet he can be compelled to consent.]The concept of being compelled against one's will applies only when speaking about a person who is being compelled and forced to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do - e.g., a person who was beaten until he consented to a sale, or to give a present. If, however, a person's evil inclination presses him to negate [the observance of] a mitzvah or to commit a transgression, and he was beaten until he performed the action he was obligated to perform, or he dissociated himself from the forbidden action, he is not considered to have been forced against his will. On the contrary, it is he himself who is forcing [his own conduct to become debased].
With regard to this person who [outwardly] refuses to divorce [his wife] - he wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him [to act otherwise]. Therefore, when he is beaten, until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents [to the divorce], he is considered to have performed the divorce willfully.
The Rambam's statements have implications far beyond their immediate halachic context. The Rambam is saying that the fundamental desire of every Jew is to affirm his Jewishness and observe the Torah and its mitzvot. Even when a person's conscious mind does not necessarily consent to this inner motivation, it is at work, molding his character without his knowledge. And at times, either because of undesirable circumstances - being compelled against his will as above - or because of desirable ones - an expression of Divine favor - this inner drive will surface. Whether he vowed [to bring a sacrifice] and did not set it aside or set it aside, but did not offer it, he may be compelled until he sacrifices it.
הלכה יז
כָּל חַיָּבֵי עוֹלוֹת וּשְׁלָמִים מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָם. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּרְצֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא א ג) "לִרְצֹנוֹ" כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי. אֲבָל חַיָּבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן הוֹאִיל וְהֵם מְעֻכְּבֵי כַּפָּרָה אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לָהֶם שֶׁמָּא יִפְשְׁעוּ וְיַשְׁהוּ קָרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶן. חוּץ מֵחַטַּאת נָזִיר הוֹאִיל וְאֵינָהּ מְעַכַּבְתּוֹ מִלִּשְׁתּוֹת יַיִן שֶׁמָּא יְאַחֵר אוֹתָהּ לְפִיכָךְ מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתוֹ עָלֶיהָ:
כסף משנה
17.
[The court] seizes collateral from all of those obligated to bring burnt-offerings or peace-offerings [to compel them to offer them]. Even though [the sacrifice] will not bring him atonement unless he desires to offer it, as [implied by] the term "willfully," he is compelled until he says: "I desire."49As stated in Hilchot Arachin 3:14:They take... [from the persons obligated] against their will. They are not required to return the collateral by day or by night. They sell all the landed property and movable property in [those person's] possession including their clothing, household articles, servants, and livestock, taking their payment from everything.
Collateral is not seized from those obligated to bring sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, by contrast. [The rationale is that] since [the failure to bring these sacrifices] prevents [the people] from receiving atonement,50Burnt-offerings also feature in bringing atonement for the failure to fulfill positive commandments. Nevertheless, in that instance the atonement is achieved through the person's repentance and the offering is considered merely as a present. In contrast, a sin-offering is required to bring about the atonement itself. we are not concerned that they will be sinful and delay [bringing] their sacrifices. [The only] exception is the sin-offering brought by a nazirite. Since [the failure to bring] it does not prevent him from drinking wine,51See Hilchot Nazirut 8:10. he is compelled [to bring the offering], lest he delay it.