Halacha

הלכה א
הַבַּעַל קוֹדֵם לְכָל אָדָם בִּירֻשַּׁת אִשְׁתּוֹ. וּמֵאֵימָתַי יִזְכֶּה בִּירֻשָּׁתָהּ מִשֶּׁתֵּצֵא מֵרְשׁוּת הָאָב. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא נִכְנְסָה לַחֻפָּה הוֹאִיל וְנַעֲשֵׂית בִּרְשׁוּת בַּעְלָהּ יִירָשֶׁנָּה:
כסף משנה
1.
The husband takes precedence over any other person with regard to the inheritance of his wife's estate.1As explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 3 and notes, this is one of the four privileges our Sages granted a husband as part of the marriage contract. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 1:8.)
When does the husband acquire this right? When his wife leaves her father's domain, even though she has not entered the chuppah.2The second phase of marriage, nisu'in, does not start until the woman enters the chuppah, and it is only at that time that the marriage contract takes effect. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, as explained in the following halachot and notes. Since the woman has entered her husband's domain, he [has the right] to inherit [her estate].

הלכה ב
כֵּיצַד. הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וּמְסָרָהּ אָבִיהָ לְבַעְלָהּ אוֹ לִשְׁלוּחֵי בַּעְלָהּ. אוֹ מְסָרוּהָ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב לְבַעְלָהּ אוֹ לִשְׁלוּחָיו וּמֵתָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לַחֻפָּה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּתֻבָּתָהּ עֲדַיִן בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ בַּעְלָהּ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. וְכֵן אִם הָלַךְ הָאָב אוֹ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב עִם הַבַּעַל וְנִכְנַס עִמָּהּ בַּעְלָהּ בַּדֶּרֶךְ לֶחָצֵר וְנִתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ שָׁם לְשֵׁם נִשּׂוּאִין וּמֵתָה הֲרֵי זֶה יִירָשֶׁנָּה בַּעְלָהּ. אֲבָל אִם עֲדַיִן הָאָב עִם הַבַּעַל לְהוֹלִיכָהּ לְבֵית בַּעְלָהּ אוֹ שֶׁהָלְכוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל אוֹ עִם הַבַּעַל אֲפִלּוּ נִכְנַס הַבַּעַל עִמָּהּ לֶחָצֵר לָלוּן כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁלָּנִין עוֹבְרֵי דְּרָכִים בְּפֻנְדָּק אֶחָד הוֹאִיל וְהָאָב אוֹ שְׁלוּחָיו עִמָּהּ וַעֲדַיִן לֹא נִתְיַחֵד עִמָּהּ לְשֵׁם נִשּׂוּאִין אִם מֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה אָבִיהָ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּתֻבָּתָהּ בְּבֵית בַּעְלָהּ:
כסף משנה
2.
What is implied? When a woman has been consecrated and her father hands her over to her husband or to his agents, or the agents of the woman's father hand her over to her husband or to his agents, and the woman dies on the way, before she enters the chuppah, her husband inherits her estate, even though her dowry is still in her father's home.3The Ramah (Even HaEzer 57:1) cites the opinion of the Tur and other Ashkenazic authorities, which is that the husband does not have a right to inherit his wife's dowry until it enters his possession.
Similarly, if the father or his agents went together with the husband, and the husband entered into privacy in a courtyard together with [his bride] with the intent of marriage,4Moreover, if the courtyard belongs to the husband, it is assumed that the couple entered for the sake of marriage, even when they do not explicitly state so. This is the view of all authorities, and the Maggid Mishneh explains that it is also shared by the Rambam. and afterwards she dies, her husband inherits [her estate].
If, however, [the woman and] her husband or his agents are still accompanied by her father or his agents on their journey to the husband's house, her father inherits [her estate] if she dies, even if her dowry is already in her husband's home. [This law applies even if the woman] and her husband entered a courtyard together to spend the night, as travelers lodge together in one inn.5If the courtyard belonged to her, this intent is understood even when it is not explicitly stated. [The rationale is that] she is accompanied by her father or his agents, and [her husband] has not entered into privacy with her for the sake of marriage.

הלכה ג
וְכֵן אִם הָיְתָה בּוֹגֶרֶת אוֹ יְתוֹמָה אוֹ אַלְמָנָה וְהָלְכָה הִיא בְּעַצְמָהּ מִבֵּית אָבִיהָ לְבֵית בַּעְלָהּ וְאֵין עִמָּהּ לֹא בַּעְלָהּ וְלֹא שְׁלוּחָיו וּמֵתָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ אֵין הַבַּעַל יוֹרֵשׁ אוֹתָהּ:
כסף משנה
3.
Similarly, when a bogeret, an orphan, or a widow6This law applies even if the widow is still a minor, as reflected in Chapter 3, Halachah 12. goes from her father's house to her husband's home on her own initiative without being accompanied by her husband or his agents, and dies on the way, her husband does not inherit [her estate].7Once she is met by her husband or his agents, however, he is entitled to inherit her estate.

הלכה ד
הַנּוֹשֵׂא אִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא אֲסוּרָה לוֹ הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ לוֹ בָּהּ קִדּוּשִׁין אִם מֵתָה תַּחְתָּיו יִירָשֶׁנָּה. וְכֵן הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין קִדּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשִׁין גְּמוּרִים אִם מֵתָה תַּחְתָּיו יִירָשֶׁנָּה. אֲבָל הַפִּקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא חֵרֶשֶׁת אִם מֵתָה לֹא יִירָשֶׁנָּה. וְהַחֵרֵשׁ שֶׁנָּשָׂא פִּקַּחַת וּמֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה שֶׁהֲרֵי הִיא בַּת דַּעַת וּלְדַעְתָּהּ נִשֵּׂאת וְזִכְּתָה לוֹ מָמוֹנָהּ:
כסף משנה
4.
Although a man marries a woman with whom he is forbidden [to have relations], if she dies [during his lifetime], he inherits her estate when his consecration of her is binding.8See Chapter 1, Halachot 6 and 7; Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Similarly, a man who marries a k'tanah [after her father's death]9Or after she becomes divorced or widowed in her father's lifetime (Chapter 4, Halachot 7 and 8). inherits her estate if she dies in his lifetime, even though his consecration of her is not binding entirely.
When, by contrast, a mentally capable man marries a deaf mute, he is not entitled to inherit her estate when she dies.10The rationale is that she is not entitled to a ketubah (Chapter 11, Halachah 4). Moreover, since she is not responsible for her actions, she has no right to transfer her property. When, however, a deaf mute marries a mentally capable woman and dies, he should inherit her estate. For she is capable of understanding and married him voluntarily. [In doing so,] she gave him a right to her property.11Although the Ra'avad objects to this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:3) quotes the Rambam's view.

הלכה ה
קְטַנָּה שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה לְדַעַת אָבִיהָ וְנִשֵּׂאת שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת אָבִיהָ בֵּין בְּפָנָיו בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו יָכוֹל הָאָב לִמְחוֹת כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וַאֲפִלּוּ שָׁתַק הָאָב אִם מֵתָה אֵין הַבַּעַל יוֹרְשָׁהּ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן רָצָה הָאָב בְּנִשּׂוּאֶיהָ:
כסף משנה
5.
When a k'tanah was consecrated with her father's consent, but married without his consent - whether in his presence or outside his presence - her father has a right to object, as we have explained.12Chapter 3, Halachah 13. [In such a situation,] if the girl dies, her husband should not inherit her estate, even if the father remains silent, unless he expressed his consent to her marriage.

הלכה ו
הוֹרוּ הַגְּאוֹנִים שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה שֶׁחָלְתָה וּבִקְּשָׁה מִבַּעְלָהּ שֶׁיְּגָרְשֶׁנָּה וְתֵצֵא בְּלֹא כְּתֻבָּה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִירָשֶׁנָּה אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ. וַאֲפִלּוּ אָמְרָה אֲנִי שׂוֹנְאָה אוֹתוֹ וְאֵינִי רוֹצָה לַעֲמֹד עִמּוֹ אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ. וְאֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָהּ כְּדִין מוֹרֶדֶת. וְדִין יָפֶה הוּא זֶה:
כסף משנה
6.
The geonim ruled that when a woman falls sick and asks her husband to divorce her so that he will not inherit her estate, her words are of no consequence, [even if] she [agrees to] forfeit her ketubah. Even if she says: "I hate him and no longer desire to live with him," her words are not heeded, and she is not judged as a woman who rebels against her husband.13See Chapter 14, Halachah 8. This is a desirable ruling.

הלכה ז
כָּל נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָאִשָּׁה בֵּין נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל בֵּין נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל כָּל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן בְּחַיֶּיהָ וְאִם מֵתָה בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ יוֹרֵשׁ בַּעְלָהּ הַכּל. לְפִיכָךְ אִם מָכְרָה הָאִשָּׁה נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג אַחַר שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאוֹתָן הַנְּכָסִים נָפְלוּ לָהּ קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּתְאָרֵס הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא הַפֵּרוֹת מִיָּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת כָּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיהָ. אֲבָל לֹא גּוּף הַקַּרְקַע שֶׁאֵין לוֹ כְּלוּם בְּגוּף נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג עַד שֶׁתָּמוּת. מֵתָה בְּחַיָּיו מוֹצִיא הַגּוּף מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת בְּלֹא דָּמִים. וְאִם הַדָּמִים שֶׁלָּקְחָה מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת קַיָּמִין בְּעַצְמָן מַחֲזִירָן לַלָּקוֹחוֹת. וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לוֹמַר שֶׁמָּא מְצִיאָה הֵן:
כסף משנה
7.
During a woman's lifetime, her husband enjoys the benefits of all the property she owns, regardless of whether it is classified as nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log. If she dies in her husband's lifetime, her husband inherits everything.
Therefore, if the woman sold property classified as nichsei m'log after she married, even if she became the owner of that property before she became consecrated, her husband may expropriate the income from that property from the purchasers throughout his wife's lifetime. He may not, however, expropriate the land itself, for he has no right to the land itself, if it is classified as nichsei m'log, until his wife dies.14The advantage in the purchaser's continuing to own the land itself is that if the husband dies before his wife, her sale is binding, and the land becomes the purchaser's property. From this time onward, he is entitled to benefit from the land as well.
Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam on this issue and maintains that the husband has the right to take the property from the purchaser, even during his wife's lifetime. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:9) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah quotes that of Rabbenu Asher.

If she dies in his lifetime, he may expropriate the land from the purchasers15Even the Ramah and Rabbenu Asher accept this ruling. without paying them for it.16There is a difference of opinion with regard to this matter among the geonim, but all the later authorities accept this view. The rationale is that the husband's right to the land supersedes that of the purchaser. The money that the purchaser paid is considered to have become a debt owed him by the woman's estate, and the husband is not required to pay his wife's debts. If the actual money that [the woman] took from the purchasers still exists, however, it must be returned to the purchasers. The husband cannot say: "Perhaps this money was found [by my wife]" [and on that basis take it as his own].17A husband is entitled to any ownerless object discovered by his wife. His claim is not accepted, however, if he states that money that appears to have come from the sale of property came from the discovery of a lost object. There is no need for witnesses to testify that this is the money from the sale. It is sufficient that it appears to be so. If, however, the money has been changed into a different coinage or currency, the husband is not required to return it (Maggid Mishneh).

הלכה ח
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּנְכָסִים הַיְדוּעִין לַבַּעַל אֲבָל אִם נָפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים בִּמְדִינָה אַחֶרֶת וְלֹא יָדַע בָּהֶן הַבַּעַל וּמָכְרָה אוֹתָן מִכְרָהּ קַיָּם. וְכֵן אֲרוּסָה שֶׁמָּכְרָה קֹדֶם הַנִּשּׂוּאִין מִכְרָהּ קַיָּם שֶׁאֵין לַבַּעַל בְּנִכְסֵי אֲרוּסָתוֹ כְּלוּם עַד שֶׁיִּכְנֹס:
כסף משנה
8.
When does the above apply? With regard to property about which the husband knew.18In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 8:2), the Rambam states that this refers to property located in the bride and groom's city or the surrounding locale, as opposed to property owned by her in more distant locales. It is questionable, however, if the same geographic restrictions apply in today's global village. When, however, a woman inherits property in another country without her husband's knowledge and sells it, the sale is binding.19The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:11) states that preferably, a woman should not sell this property, because her husband is entitled to inherit it.
The commentaries explain that when the husband knows of his wife's financial holdings, it is an implicit part of the marriage contract - and perhaps part of his intent in entering into the marriage relationship - that he will inherit this property. When, however, he is unaware of her ownership of property, this motive cannot be given as the reason for his desire to enter this relationship.
It must be added that as soon as the husband becomes aware of this property, it is considered to be part of the woman's nichsei m'log and is bound by all the laws pertaining to such property (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12). Moreover, if the woman dies without selling this property, her husband is entitled to inherit it, although he was never aware of his wife's ownership of it during her lifetime.

Similarly, if a woman sells [property]20The Tur (Even HaEzer 90) states that the woman has the full right to sell any property that she owned before she was consecrated. With regard to property that she acquired after she was consecrated, it is preferable that she not sell it - but if she sells it, the husband has no claim to it. between her consecration and the consummation of the marriage bond, the sale is binding. For the husband has no right to his wife's property until their marriage is consummated.

הלכה ט
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁכָּתְבָה כָּל נְכָסֶיהָ לְאַחֵר בֵּין קָרוֹב בֵּין רָחוֹק קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּנָּשֵׂא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאִם נִתְגָּרְשָׁה אוֹ נִתְאַלְמְנָה תְּבֻטַּל הַמַּתָּנָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּהִלְכוֹת מַתָּנָה אֵין הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן. וְאִם מֵתָה בְּחַיָּיו אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁן. שֶׁהֲרֵי נָתְנָה אוֹתָן קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּנָּשֵׂא. וּכְשֶׁתָּמוּת בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ יִקְנֶה מְקַבֵּל הַמַּתָּנָה מַתְּנָתוֹ קִנְיָן גָּמוּר. וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא אֲפִלּוּ נָתְנָה מִקְצָת נְכָסֶיהָ אוֹ כֻּלָּם קֹדֶם נִשּׂוּאֶיהָ וְכָתְבָה לַמְקַבֵּל קְנֵה מֵהַיּוֹם וְלִכְשֶׁאֶרְצֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא קָנָה קִנְיָן גָּמוּר עַד שֶׁתִּרְצֶה אֵין הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת אוֹתָהּ הַמַּתָּנָה וְאִם מֵתָה אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ:
כסף משנה
9.
When a woman signs over all21As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, slightly different rules apply if the woman signed over only a portion of her property. of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if she becomes a widow, this present is nullified - as will be explained in Hilchot Matanah22Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:12. It is clearly obvious that the woman's intent in giving the present is to protect her holdings from being inherited by her husband. - her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.
[The rationale is] that she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband's lifetime, the recipient of the present acquires full title to it.
Moreover, [the same laws apply] even if she gave away a portion of her property - or all her holdings - before she married and wrote [in the deed of transfer] to the recipient: "Acquire the property from this time onward, [dependent] on my consent."23In his gloss on Ketubot 79a, Rabbenu Nissim explains that the Rambam equates this provision with the one mentioned in the previous clause. The only difference between the two is one of tact. The provision in this clause is more gently worded, so that the intent to free the woman's holdings from her husband is less obvious. [Although] the recipient does not acquire complete ownership until the woman expresses her consent,24Unlike the Rambam, Rabbenu Asher and other authorities maintain that the woman need not explicitly mention her consent to the present. All that is necessary is that she refrain from nullifying it. her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.25Rabbenu Nissim asks, according to the approach of the Rambam (in contrast to the approach of Rabbenu Asher mentioned in the previous note): If the woman did not explicitly mention her consent to the present before her death, why does her husband have no right to inherit her property? The provision on which the present was based was never fulfilled.
Seemingly, this property can be compared to a woman's property of which her husband was unaware. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the husband has the right to inherit such property, and thus he should also inherit the property mentioned in this clause.
Rabbenu Nissim explains that since the Rambam maintains that a husband's right to inherit his wife's property is a Rabbinical ordinance, there is room for leniency when, as in the present case, it is obvious that the woman did not desire her husband to inherit her estate. Obviously motivated by the same question, but unwilling to offer such a resolution, Rav David Arameah explains that the Rambam's ruling applies in an instance when the woman in fact expressed her consent to the present before her death.

הלכה י
שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם יֵשׁ לָהּ לִמְכֹּר וְלִתֵּן בְּמַתָּנָה נְכָסִים שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם. וְאֵין לַיָּבָם פֵּרוֹת אֲפִלּוּ בְּנִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל שֶׁהִכְנִיסָה לְאָחִיו עַד שֶׁיִּכְנֹס. מֵתָה כְּשֶׁהִיא שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ מֵאָבִיהָ יוֹרְשִׁין בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג שֶׁלָּהּ וַחֲצִי נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל וְיוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל יוֹרְשִׁים כְּתֻבָּתָהּ וַחֲצִי נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל. וְיוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל חַיָּבִין בִּקְבוּרָתָהּ:
כסף משנה
10.
While a woman is waiting for her yavam [to marry her according to the rite of yibbum], she may sell or give as a present property that she acquires during the time she is in this status.26As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 8, preferably a woman should not sell property she acquires after her consecration. One might think that the same principle applies to a yevamah, for she also shares a bond to her yavam. There is, however, a distinction between the two: a woman who is consecrated will most likely be married, while a yevamah may be freed from her obligation through chalitzah. Hence, there are no restrictions placed upon her with regard to the sale of her holdings. Until he marries the yevamah, the yavam has no right to benefit from the property, even the nichsei tzon barzel,27The difference between nichsei m'log and nichsei tzon barzel is that with regard to nichsei m'log, the object itself belongs to the woman, while the property regarded as nichsei tzon barzel is considered to belong to her late husband. He was, however, obligated to pay his wife for the value designated at the time of marriage (Chapter 16, Halachah 1).
Since the nichsei tzon barzel are considered to belong to the yevamah's late husband's estate, one might think that the yavam would have a right to them. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that he is given this right only after marriage.
As mentioned by the Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh, most authorities differ with the Rambam on this point. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the yavam is entitled to half of the benefit that accrues from the nichsei tzon barzel. This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 160:6). (The Rambam's opinion is also quoted, but it appears that the other opinion is favored.) The Ramah mentions the opinion of the Ra'avad which goes even further and gives the yavam rights to half the benefits of nichsei m'log that the yevamah acquired while she was married to her deceased husband.
that she brought to his [deceased] brother's household.
If the yevamah dies in this status, her heirs from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log28For this property belongs to her outright. and half of her nichsei tzon barzel.29A division is necessary because this property is considered to belong to the yevamah's late husband, as explained above. Therefore, his heirs have a claim to it. Nevertheless, since he died in his wife's lifetime, and she did not receive payment for this property, her own heirs also have a claim.
This ruling is also disputed by other authorities, who maintain that all the nichsei tzon barzel are considered the property of the husband's heirs, together with the woman's ketubah. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah quotes that of the other authorities.
The Ramah also adds that these laws do not apply in the Ashkenazic community in the present era - or in other communities - where the rite of yibbum is not practiced, and instead, the yevamah is freed from her obligation through the rite of chalitzah. Since the yevamah will not marry the yavam, he has no rights with regard to her property.
Her husband's heirs inherit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah30I.e., both the essential requirement of the ketubah and any additional amount added by her deceased husband. and the remaining half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and they are responsible for her burial.31For our Sages associated a woman's burial with the inheritance of her ketubah (Chapter 12, Halachah 14).

הלכה יא
שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם כְּתֻבָּתָהּ עַל כָּל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין הַיָּבָם יָכוֹל לִמְכֹּר בְּנִכְסֵי אָחִיו בֵּין קֹדֶם יִבּוּם בֵּין אַחַר יִבּוּם. וְאִם מָכַר אוֹ נָתַן מַתָּנָה אוֹ חָלַק עִם אֶחָיו בְּנִכְסֵי הַמֵּת בֵּין קֹדֶם יִבּוּם בֵּין אַחַר יִבּוּם לֹא עָשָׂה כְּלוּם שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיְּבוּ נְכָסִים אֵלּוּ לָאַלְמָנָה לִגְבּוֹת מֵהֶן כְּתֻבָּתָהּ:
כסף משנה
11.
The money due a yevamah by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a lien on her [late] husband's estate. Therefore, a yavam is not entitled to sell any of his brother's property32Even if the value of the property left by the deceased brother is many times the value of the woman's ketubah, none of the property may be sold, lest the remaining property be destroyed and the woman have difficulty collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the purchasers (Ketubot 81b). - neither before yibbum nor after yibbum.
If he sells the deceased's property, gives it away as a present, divides it with his brothers - whether before yibbum or after yibbum - his actions are of no consequence. For it is already obligatory to make this property available to the widow so that she can collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from it.

הלכה יב
כָּנַס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ וְהִנִּיחַ אָחִיו פֵּרוֹת מְחֻבָּרִין לַקַּרְקַע יִמָּכְרוּ וְיִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהַיָּבָם אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן:
כסף משנה
12.
When a man marries his yevamah at a time when there is produce growing on the land left by her husband, this produce should be sold,33I.e., since the produce requires the land, it is considered as if it were landed property, and the money received from the sale has the same status as the landed property mentioned in the previous halachah. and the proceeds used to purchase land from which the yavam will derive the benefit that accrues.

הלכה יג
הִנִּיחַ פֵּרוֹת תְּלוּשִׁין מִן הַקַּרְקַע וְכֵן אִם הִנִּיחַ מָעוֹת וּמִטַּלְטְלִין הַכּל שֶׁל יָבָם. וּמִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּרְצֶה וְאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לְעַכֵּב. שֶׁהַמִּטַּלְטְלִין אֵין הַכְּתֻבָּה נִגְבֵּית מֵהֶן אֶלָּא בְּתַקָּנַת הַגְּאוֹנִים וְאֵין כֹּחַ בְּתַקָּנָה זוֹ לְמָנְעוֹ מִנִּכְסֵי אֶחָיו וּלְאָסְרָן עָלָיו בְּאַחֲרָיוּת זוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׂא וְיִתֵּן בָּהֶם:
כסף משנה
13.
When, [by contrast, the deceased] left produce that was already harvested, money or movable property, it becomes the property of the yavam. He may use it as he sees fit, and [the yevamah's] objections are of no consequence.
[The rationale is that the woman's right] to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from movable property stems only from an enactment of the geonim, and this enactment does not have the power to prevent [the yavam from taking possession] of his brother's property,34The Maggid Mishneh, the Rivash (Responsa 365 and 366), and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 168:5) emphasize that the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the husband did not follow the suggestion (Chapter 16, Halachah 8) of stating explicitly in the ketubah that the woman may collect from movable property the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (There are other authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that even if the provision is not stated explicitly in the woman's ketubah, the movable property should be sold and land purchased.) and cause him to be restrained from dealing with them because of this lien.

הלכה יד
יְבָמָה שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה אוֹ שֶׁמָּחֲלָה כְּתֻבָּתָהּ זָכָה בְּנִכְסֵי אָחִיו וּמוֹכֵר וְנוֹתֵן כְּחֶפְצוֹ. וּכְשֶׁיִּכְנֹס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ יִכְתֹּב לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה מֵאָה וְיִהְיוּ כָּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין לִכְתֻבָּתָהּ כִּשְׁאָר כָּל הַנָּשִׁים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן כְּתֻבָּה:
כסף משנה
14.
[The following rules apply when] a yevamah's [first husband was not obligated to] grant her a ketubah35E.g., he died after he consecrated her, but before he consummated the marriage - in which instance, the woman is obligated to undergo either yibbum or chalitzah, and yet her deceased husband was not obligated to grant her a ketubah. or [when] she waived her ketubah in his favor. The yavam acquires his brother's estate and may sell [portions of it] or give them away as he desires. When he marries his yevamah, he is obligated to compose a ketubah for 100 [zuz]. All of his property will be considered as being on lien for the ketubah, [i.e., the same laws apply to her] as apply to other women who have a ketubah.36Since she has no claim to her deceased husband's property, she is not judged by the laws pertaining to a yevamah, but rather by those pertaining to other women.

הלכה טו
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה אוֹ שֶׁנָּתְנָה אַחַר שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת בְּנִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל בֵּין לְבַעְלָהּ בֵּין לַאֲחֵרִים לֹא עָשְׂתָה כְּלוּם. וְכֵן בַּעַל שֶׁמָּכַר קַרְקַע בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּין נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל בֵּין נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג לֹא עָשָׂה כְּלוּם:
כסף משנה
15.
When a woman sells nichsei tzon barzel - whether to her husband or to others - after she marries, her act is of no consequence.37If she sells the land to her husband, the sale is rescinded because she can claim that she did not sell it willingly; she did so only to appease her husband (Bava Batra 49b). If she sells the land to others, the sale is rescinded because her husband has a right to benefit from her property, and she cannot take away this right from him without his consent. If, however, the husband agrees to her sale, it is binding, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3).
Note the ruling of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 90:13), who writes that if the husband dies, the sale made by the woman is effective retroactively. (But see also the gloss of the Beit Shmuel 90:46.)

Similarly, if her husband sells landed property belonging to his wife - whether it be nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log - his act is of no consequence.38With regard to nichsei m'log, it is obvious that the husband's sale is of no consequence, for the woman owns this type of property. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, which are considered to be the husband's property, there are authorities (e.g., the Ra'avad) who differ with the Rambam and maintain that the sale is valid until the time comes when the woman desires to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
The commentaries support the Rambam's opinion, explaining that even though the woman has the potential to expropriate the property afterwards by force of law, the sale should be nullified. For women are not comfortable presenting claims in court. If the sale were allowed to remain binding, the only way the woman could receive her due would be by lodging a legal claim. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:13) quotes the Rambam's view.

הלכה טז
מָכַר מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁל נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי אִם מָכַר מִמִכָּרוֹ מִמְכָּר. מָכְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בֵּין שֶׁלָּקַח מִן הָאִישׁ תְּחִלָּה וְחָזַר וְלָקַח מִן הָאִשָּׁה בֵּין שֶׁלָּקַח מִן הָאִשָּׁה וְחָזַר וְלָקַח מִן הָאִישׁ מִכְרָן קַיָּם:
כסף משנה
16.
[Should the husband] sell movable property that is classified as nichsei tzon barzel39If the woman is divorced, she is entitled to this property. Hence, the husband does not have the prerogative of selling it. - although he is not allowed to make such a sale - the sale is binding.40The husband is allowed to destroy this property through frequent use. Therefore, the woman does not rely on receiving this property, and thus if he sells it the sale is binding (Maggid Mishneh, gloss on Hilchot Mechirah 30:5; Chelkat Mechokek 90:45).
This is the opinion of the Rambam and Rabbenu Tam, and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:14). Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba and others differ and maintain that the sale is of no consequence. Their view is quoted by the Ramah.

If both [the husband and the wife] sell nichsei m'log, the sale is binding,41Although both the husband and his wife have a share in the property, since the purchaser dealt with both of them, the sale is binding. regardless of whether the purchaser purchased the property from the husband first and then from the wife, or if he first purchased it from the wife and then from the husband.

הלכה יז
וְכֵן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה אוֹ נָתְנָה נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג לְבַעְלָהּ מִמְכָּרָהּ וּמַתְּנָתָהּ קַיָּמִין וְאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לוֹמַר בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי. אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר נְכָסִים יֵשׁ לָהּ לוֹמַר:
כסף משנה
17.
Similarly, when a woman sells her nichsei m'log to her husband or gives them to him as a present, the sale or the gift is binding. She cannot rationalize her actions by saying, "[This was not my true intent.] I did it [only] to appease my husband."42Since this property itself belongs to her, there is no reason for her husband to become upset if she does not desire to sell it to him. With regard to other property, however, she may offer such a rationalization.

הלכה יח
כֵּיצַד. הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה אוֹ נָתְנָה לְבַעְלָהּ מִנִּכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל בֵּין קַרְקַע בֵּין מִטַּלְטְלִין אוֹ שָׂדֶה שֶׁיִּחֵד לָהּ בִּכְתֻבָּתָהּ אוֹ שָׂדֶה שֶׁכָּתַב לָהּ בִּכְתֻבָּתָהּ אוֹ שָׂדֶה שֶׁהִכְנִיס לָהּ שׁוּם מִשֶּׁלּוֹ לֹא קָנָה בַּעְלָהּ. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁקָּנוּ מִיַּד הָאִשָּׁה בִּרְצוֹנָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת בְּכָל עֵת שֶׁתִּרְצֶה. שֶׁלֹּא נָתְנָה וְלֹא מָכְרָה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שְׁלוֹם בֵּיתָהּ. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין לַבַּעַל רְאָיָה בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ כְּלָל חוּץ מִנִּכְסֵי מְלוֹג כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:
כסף משנה
18.
What is implied? When a woman sells her nichsei tzon barzel to her husband or gives them to him as a present, her husband does not acquire this property. [This applies to] landed property and movable property [in this category], to a field that was designated for her from which [she could collect the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, a field belonging to her that was specifically mentioned in her ketubah or a field that [her husband mentioned in her ketubah] as his present to her [to be included in her dowry].43See Chapter 23, Halachah 11; Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if similar laws apply when a woman waives her claim to property mentioned in her ketubah in favor of her husband. The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher maintain that her deed is of consequence, while the Rashba and the Ramban state that it is not. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam subscribes to the latter view.

[In all the above instances,] even though [the husband] formalized the transaction with his wife through an act of contract that she voluntarily agreed to, she has the prerogative of recanting whenever she desires.44The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that until the woman recants, the transaction is binding. The Beit Meir, however, objects, explaining that the Rambam's wording in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3 does not indicate such a distinction. [We assume that] she gave the present or made the sale only for the sake of maintaining peace in her home.45Her husband will pressure her by saying, "You are either planning my death or considering a divorce. Otherwise, you would not hesitate to sell this property to me" (Bava Batra 49b, 50a).
Accordingly, a husband has no way of substantiating his claim to his wife's property46Even if he has a deed or witnesses that testify to the claim, his wife may also negate his claim based on the above rationale. except with regard to nichsei m'log, as explained [in the previous halachah].47The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:16) states that if the woman explicitly accepts responsibility for the field if expropriated from the husband, then the transaction is binding.

הלכה יט
נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל שֶׁאָבְדוּ אוֹ שֶׁנִּגְנְבוּ וּמָחֲלָה הָאִשָּׁה אוֹתָם לְבַעֲלָהּ וְקָנוּ מִמֶּנָּה בְּעֵדִים יֵרָאֶה לִי שֶׁאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לוֹמַר נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי. הָא לְמָה זֶה דּוֹמֶה לְמִי שֶׁקָּנוּ מִדָּה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ אַחֲרָיוּת שֶׁהֶחֱזִירָה נְכָסִים אֵלּוּ נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג. שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין הַבַּעַל מֵבִיא רְאָיָה לִטּל כְּלוּם וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בַּנְּכָסִים אֶלָּא לְהִפָּטֵר מִתְּבִיעָתָהּ מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. אֲבָל אִם נָתְנָה לוֹ מַתָּנָה מִטַּלְטְלֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל הַקַּיָּמִין לֹא קָנָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ לוֹמַר נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי:
כסף משנה
19.
It appears to me that a woman is not entitled [to nullify her statements, based on the rationale]: "I did it [only] to appease my husband," when her nichsei tzon barzel were lost or stolen, and she waived the debt in favor of her husband. [This applies even when the commitment] is formalized in the presence of witnesses.48Based on the Rambam's statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, it is questionable why witnesses are necessary. See Chelkat Mechokek 90:1, Beit Shmuel 90:6.
To what can this be compared? To a man and a woman who formalized an agreement in which she forgoes the responsibility [he had taken for property that had been classified as nichsei tzon barzel] and considers it instead nichsei m'log.49A husband is not obligated to pay for nichsei m'log that have been destroyed, lost or stolen, while in such situations, he is obligated to pay the original value for nichsei tzon barzel. Thus, by changing the status of her property, the woman is in effect waiving a financial obligation due her from her husband.
There is reason to say that just as a woman can say that she was forced to give or sell this property to her husband to appease him, she could also say that she was also forced to waive her husband's obligation in the loss or theft of this property. The Rambam, however, does not accept this rationale. Since this obligation is due only after the husband's death or divorce, there is nothing pressuring her husband to pay it. If he demands that his wife waive this obligation, she may refuse, asking him: "Is it because you want to divorce me that you are asking me to waive this obligation?" (Maggid Mishneh).
For the husband is not bringing a proof for the sake of taking possession or maintaining possession of property, merely to free himself of the obligation to pay a claim [his wife will issue].50The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling. Nevertheless, it is the Rambam's decision which is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:18).
If, by contrast, she gives him movable property that exists and was considered to be nichsei tzon barzel, the husband does not acquire it. For the wife may rationalize her conduct saying: "I did this to appease my husband."

הלכה כ
בַּעַל שֶׁמָּכַר קַרְקַע לְפֵרוֹת לֹא עָשָׂה כְּלוּם. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הִתְקִינוּ פֵּרוֹת לָאִישׁ אֶלָּא כְּדֵי לְהַרְוִיחַ בְּהוֹצָאַת הַבַּיִת. לְפִיכָךְ אִם מָכַר לְפֵרוֹת וְלָקַח אוֹתָן הַמָּעוֹת לִסְחוֹרָה שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ:
כסף משנה
20.
When a husband sells [the right to] the benefits from landed property [that belongs to his wife, to another person, while the legal owner of the property remains his wife, the sale] is of no consequence. [The rationale is that] the reason our Sages granted a man [the right to] the benefit that accrues from his wife's property is [to afford him additional income] so that he will spend more generously on the household expenses.51If, at the outset, the husband sold the rights to benefit from the property for a lump sum, it is possible that all that money would be spent in a short period of time and that afterwards, there would be nothing left for household expenses (Chelkat Mechokek 85:41).
[Based on that rationale,] if he sells the benefit to be derived [from the landed property to another person] and takes the money and invests it in a business [which offers profit], he is given that prerogative.

הלכה כא
הָיוּ לָאִשָּׁה כְּסָפִים. אִם נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל הֵן הֲרֵי זֶה נוֹשֵׂא וְנוֹתֵן בָּהֶן. וְאִם נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג הֵן בֵּין שֶׁהִכְנִיסָה אוֹתָן לוֹ בֵּין שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ בִּירֻשָּׁה אוֹ נִתְּנוּ לָהּ בְּמַתָּנָה אוֹ נָפְלוּ לָהּ מִטַּלְטְלִין אוֹ נִתְּנוּ לָהּ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִמָּכְרוּ וְיִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן:
כסף משנה
21.
[The following laws apply if] the woman possesses financial resources [that she brings to the household]. If they are nichsei tzon barzel, her husband may use them for commercial enterprises.52For their value is explicitly stated in the woman's ketubah and will be returned to her in the event of divorce or her husband's death.
If they are nichsei m'log - regardless of whether she brought them to the household at the time of marriage or she inherited them or received them as a present53For money that a woman acquires while married is automatically considered to be nichsei m'log. [- landed property should be purchased with them, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues].54In this way, the woman is assured that the principal will remain hers. If the husband desires to use the money for commercial enterprises, he may afterwards sell the right to benefit from the property, as mentioned in the previous halachah. [Similarly,] if she inherited or was given movable property, it should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

הלכה כב
וְכֵן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁחָבְלוּ בָּהּ אֲחֵרִים כָּל הַמָּעוֹת הָרְאוּיוֹת לָתֵת לָהּ יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּהִלְכוֹת חוֹבֵל:
כסף משנה
22.
Similarly, if a woman was injured by others,55E.g., people other than her husband. If her husband himself injures her, he is not entitled to benefit from the proceeds of her property, as mentioned in Halachah 28. all the money that is ordained to be given to her should be used to purchase land, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues, as stated in Hilchot Chovel.56Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:15. As stated in that source, the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds to which his wife has no right.

הלכה כג
נָפְלוּ לָהּ עֲבָדִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵן זְקֵנִים לֹא יִמָּכְרוּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ. נָפְלוּ לָהּ זֵיתִים וּגְפָנִים וְלֹא הָיָה לָהּ בְּגוּף הַקַּרְקַע שֶׁהָאִילָנוֹת בָּהּ כְּלוּם. אִם עוֹשִׂין כְּדֵי טִפּוּלָן לֹא יִמָּכְרוּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ וְאִם לָאו הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִמָּכְרוּ לְעֵצִים וְיִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת:
כסף משנה
23.
[The following law applies when] a woman inherits servants [while she is married]. Even if they are old, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household.
[The following law applies when] she inherits olive trees or vines, but did not [inherit] the land on which these trees were planted. If they produce enough to pay for their upkeep, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. If they do not, they should be sold as firewood, land should be purchased with the proceeds, from which the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

הלכה כד
נָפְלוּ לָהּ פֵּרוֹת מְחֻבָּרִין לַקַּרְקַע הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁל בַּעַל. תְּלוּשִׁין מִן הַקַּרְקַע שֶׁלָּהּ וְיִמָּכְרוּ וְיִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת. אֲבָל הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְהָיוּ לָהּ פֵּרוֹת מְחֻבָּרִין לַקַּרְקַע בִּשְׁעַת גֵּרוּשִׁין הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלָּהּ. וְאִם הָיוּ תְּלוּשִׁין הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ:
כסף משנה
24.
When [a married woman] inherits produce that is still attached to the land [on which it is growing], it becomes her husband's [property].57Although in most instances, produce that is still attached to land is considered equivalent to landed property, an exception is made in this case, because the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from his wife's property. When the produce has been uprooted from the land, it should be sold and used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
When, however, a husband divorces his wife, and there was produce that was still attached to the ground, it belongs to the woman. If it has already been reaped, it belongs to the man.58For he is entitled to receive all the benefit from her property throughout the duration of their marriage.

הלכה כה
עַבְדֵי נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג וּבֶהֱמַת נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג הַבַּעַל חַיָּב בִּמְזוֹנוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶן וּבְכָל צָרְכֵיהֶם וְהֵן עוֹשִׂין לוֹ וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶם. לְפִיכָךְ וְלַד שִׁפְחַת מְלוֹג לַבַּעַל. וְלַד בֶּהֱמַת מְלוֹג לַבַּעַל. וְאִם גֵּרְשָׁהּ וְרָצְתָה הָאִשָּׁה לִתֵּן דָּמִים וְלִטּל וְלַד הַשִּׁפְחָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ:
כסף משנה
25.
A husband is obligated to provide for the sustenance and all the needs of the servants59See Hilchot Avadim 9:7, which states that a husband does not have the prerogative of telling a servant: "Work for me, but I will not provide for your sustenance." and livestock that belong to his wife and are classified as nichsei m'log. They must work for him, and he is entitled to the benefit that accrues. Therefore, a baby born to a maid classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband. And a calf born to a cow that is classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband.
If, however, the husband divorces his wife and she desires to pay the worth of a child born from a maidservant who is classified as nichsei m'log and take the child as her property because this brings honor to her family's household, she is given that prerogative.60The Rambam's wording implies that the concept of maintaining the honor of one's household applies only with regard to the children of one's servants, and not to the offspring of one's livestock. See the Beit Shmuel 85:38, which quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis on this issue.

הלכה כו
הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ שְׁנֵי כֵּלִים אוֹ שְׁתֵּי שְׁפָחוֹת בְּתוֹרַת נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל וְשָׁמוּ אוֹתָן עָלָיו בְּאֶלֶף זוּז וְהוּקְרוּ וְעָמְדוּ בְּאַלְפַּיִם וְגֵרְשָׁהּ נוֹטֶלֶת אֶחָד בְּאֶלֶף שֶׁלָּהּ. וְהַשֵּׁנִי אִם רָצְתָה שֶׁתִּתֵּן דָּמָיו וְתִטּל מִשּׁוּם שֶׁבַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ:
כסף משנה
26.
[The following laws apply when] a woman brings two utensils or two maidservants to the household and has them classified as nichsei tzon barzel. They were [originally] evaluated at 1000 zuz; afterwards, their value increased and they were evaluated at 2000 zuz. If the woman's husband divorces her, she is entitled to one [utensil or maidservant] for the 1000 zuz that she is owed. With regard to the other - if she desires to pay its value and take it because of the honor it brings to her father's household, she has that prerogative.

הלכה כז
הַנּוֹתֵן מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּין שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ קַרְקַע בֵּין שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ מָעוֹת וְלָקְחָה בָּהֶן קַרְקַע אֵין לַבַּעַל פֵּרוֹת בְּמַתָּנָה זוֹ. וְכֵן הַנּוֹתֵן מַתָּנָה לְאִשָּׁה עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֶיהָ אֶלָּא יִהְיוּ פֵּרוֹתֶיהָ לָאִשָּׁה לְמַה שֶּׁתִּרְצֶה אֵין הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת מַתָּנָה זוֹ. וְכֵן הַמּוֹכֶרֶת כְּתֻבָּתָהּ בְּטוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אוֹתָן הַדָּמִים לָאִשָּׁה וְאֵין הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן:
כסף משנה
27.
When a man gives a present to his wife - regardless of whether he gave her landed property, or he gave her money and she bought landed property - her husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from the present [that was given].61Bava Batra 51b states that a person who gives a present gives with a generous spirit. Therefore, we may assume that the husband gives the gift to his wife without wanting to restrict her in any way.
Similarly, when a man gives a woman a present on the condition that her husband not be entitled to derive the benefits from it, but rather the benefits that accrue will belong to the wife to be used for whatever she desires,62The specific wording of the provision that the giver must make is discussed in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13. [the provision is binding, and] the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from this present.
Similarly, if a woman sells the rights to her ketubah [in the event of her divorce or her husband's death],63The person purchasing the rights to the woman's ketubah is taking a risk, because it is possible that she will die in her husband's lifetime and then he will not receive anything. the money she receives belongs to her, and her husband is not entitled to derive the benefit that accrues from it.

הלכה כח
וְלַד בֶּהֱמַת מְלוֹג שֶׁנִּגְנַב וְנִמְצָא הַגַּנָּב וְשִׁלֵּם שְׁנַיִם הַכֶּפֶל לָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאֵין זֶה פְּרִי שֶׁתִּקְּנוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים. הַחוֹבֵל בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ כָּל הַנֵּזֶק וְהַצַּעַר וְהַבּשֶׁת שֶׁלָּהּ וְאֵין הַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּהִלְכוֹת חוֹבֵל:
כסף משנה
28.
When a calf born from cattle that was classified as nichsei m'log is stolen, and the thief is apprehended and forced to pay twice the amount, the woman receives the extra payment. [The rationale is that] this is not the benefit that our Sages granted [the husband].64Our Sages entitled a husband to derive the benefit that would ordinarily accrue from property belonging to his wife - e.g., produce that grows on a field, rent from a home, labor from a servant. They did not grant him rights to benefits that arise from abnormal circumstances.
When a man injures his wife, the entire [amount he must pay] - the damages and the restitution for the pain and the embarrassment - belongs to the woman,65The Rambam does not mention two other payments that a person who inflicts an injury would ordinarily pay: shevet - reimbursement for the wages that were not earned during the period of convalescence, because the husband is entitled to his wife's wages - and ripui - payment for the medical treatment required, because a husband is always required to pay for his wife's medical care. and the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from [property purchased with this money], as explained in Hilchot Chovel.66Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:16. This differs from instances in which the injury is inflicted by other parties, in which case the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds, to which his wife has no right.

הלכה כט
הַמּוֹכֵר קַרְקַע לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. אִם הָיוּ הַמָּעוֹת שֶׁלָּקְחָה בָּהֶן אֶת הַקַּרְקַע מִבַּעַל גְּלוּיִין וִידוּעִין לַבַּעַל קָנְתָה וְהַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת אוֹתָהּ הַקַּרְקַע. וְאִם הָיוּ מָעוֹת טְמוּנִין לֹא קָנְתָה שֶׁהַבַּעַל אוֹמֵר לֹא מָכַרְתִּי אֶלָּא כְּדֵי לְהַרְאוֹת הַמָּעוֹת שֶׁטָּמְנָה. וְאוֹתָן הַמָּעוֹת שֶׁנִּרְאוּ יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת:
כסף משנה
29.
[The following rules apply when] a husband sells landed property [that he owns] to his wife. If the husband knew about the funds with which she purchased the land previously, the sale is binding,67The husband cannot claim that the funds belonged to him, but since he could not take them from his wife in any other way, he sold the property to her as a ruse. This applies even if he makes a definite claim (ta'anat bari) that the funds belong to him (Chelkat Mechokek 85:22,24). and the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from that land.
If, however, [the existence of] these funds was concealed, she does not acquire the land. For the husband may [explain that he did not really intend to complete the sale]. [His intent was] to reveal the existence of funds that his wife had hidden. The funds that were revealed should be used to purchase landed property,68This ruling depends on the halachah to follow, which states that a woman's claim is accepted with regard to money found in her possession. from which the husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue.69The Rambam's ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 85:9). The Ramah mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the husband makes a definite claim that the hidden funds belong to him, his claim is accepted.

הלכה ל
הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּמְצְאוּ מָעוֹת אוֹ מִטַּלְטְלִין בְּיַד הָאִשָּׁה הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת בְּמַתָּנָה נִתְּנוּ לִי וְהוּא אוֹמֵר מִמַּעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ הֵם שֶׁהֵם שֶׁלִּי הֲרֵי זוֹ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְהַחֲרִים עַל מִי שֶׁטּוֹעֶנֶת דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ כֵן. וְיִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת. וְאִם אָמְרָה עַל מְנָת כֵּן נִתְּנוּ לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה לְבַעְלִי רְשׁוּת בָּהֶן אֶלָּא אֶעֱשֶׂה בָּהֶן כָּל מַה שֶּׁאֶרְצֶה עָלֶיהָ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה. שֶׁכָּל מָמוֹן שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּיַד הָאִשָּׁה בְּחֶזְקַת הַבַּעַל הוּא שֶׁיֹּאכַל פֵּרוֹתָיו עַד שֶׁתָּבִיא רְאָיָה:
כסף משנה
30.
When funds or movable property are discovered in a woman's possession, and she claims that they were given her as a present, while her husband claims that they stem from the fruits of her labor and hence belong to him, it is the woman's claim that is accepted.70The Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 6:1) states that a present will be spoken about. Therefore, the woman will be afraid to claim that she was given a present unless the claim was true. [The husband] may, however, have a ban of ostracism [conditionally] issued against anyone who makes false statements.71He cannot, however, require his wife to take an oath unless he lodges a definite claim against her (Maggid Mishneh). [The funds should be used] to purchase landed property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefit that accrues.72If, however, a woman was given responsibility to deal freely with the property belonging to her husband's household, and she claims that funds discovered in her possession belong to her privately, her claim is not accepted (Bava Batra 52b; Ramah, Even HaEzer 85:12).
If the woman claims that the funds were given to her with the provision that her husband have no control over them, but rather that they be used for whatever purpose she desires, she must bring proof [that such a provision was made].73Although the giving of a present will become public knowledge, the details of the present might not. Therefore, the woman is required to substantiate her statements. Otherwise, we assume that this present was given without any extraordinary conditions (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
The Maggid Mishneh mentions the opinion of the Rashba, who differs and maintains that the woman's claim is also accepted in this instance as well. This opinion is mentioned by the later authorities.
[The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that a husband has the right to the benefits from all the funds found in a woman's possession, unless she brings proof otherwise.

הלכה לא
אָמְרָה לוֹ אַתָּה נָתַתָּ לִי בְּמַתָּנָה נִשְׁבַּעַת שְׁבוּעַת הֶסֵּת שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ הַבַּעַל וְאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן:
כסף משנה
31.
If [a wife] tells [her husband]: "You gave me [these funds] as a present," she is required to take a Rabbinic oath that her husband gave her [the funds]. [After she takes that oath,] her husband is not entitled to the benefit [from the property purchased with these funds].74The rationale is that a woman will not be brazen enough to make false statements in her husband's presence with regard to a matter that he knows to be true (Maggid Mishneh).

הלכה לב
אֵין מְקַבְּלִין פִּקְדוֹנוֹת לֹא מִן הַנָּשִׁים וְלֹא מִן הָעֲבָדִים וְלֹא מִן הַקְּטַנִּים. וְאִם עָבַר וְקִבֵּל מִן הָאִשָּׁה יַחֲזִיר לְאִשָּׁה. מֵתָה יַחֲזִיר לְבַעְלָהּ. קִבֵּל מִן הָעֶבֶד יַחֲזִיר לָעֶבֶד וְאִם מֵת יַחֲזִיר לְרַבּוֹ. קִבֵּל מִן הַקָּטָן יִקְנֶה לוֹ בּוֹ סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה אוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁאוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶם. וְכֻלָּם שֶׁאָמְרוּ בִּשְׁעַת מִיתָתָן פִּקָּדוֹן זֶה שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי הוּא אִם הָיוּ בְּחֶזְקַת נֶאֱמָנִין אֵצֶל זֶה שֶׁהַפִּקָּדוֹן אֶצְלוֹ יַעֲשֶׂה כְּמוֹ שֶׁצִּוּוּ וְאִם לָאו יִתֵּן לְיוֹרְשֵׁיהֶם:
כסף משנה
32.
One should not accept an article for safekeeping that was given by a wife, a servant or a minor.75For the likelihood is that the article belongs to the husband, master or father, respectively. It is forbidden to assist a person who takes property that is not his or her own. Moreover, if no one accepts the article for safekeeping, it is likely that it will be returned (Bava Batra 51b). If one transgressed and accepted [an article given by] a woman, one should return it to the woman.76For there is no proof that the article was stolen. If she dies, one should return it to her husband.77For even if the article is rightfully hers, he inherits her property.
If one accepted [an article given by] a servant, one should return it to the servant. If he dies, one should return it to his master. If one accepted [an article given by] a minor, one should purchase a Torah scroll with the proceeds or an article that will provide [the minor] with benefit.78The entrusted article should not be given to the minor, for it is possible that he will not care for it properly and it will be destroyed (Rashbam, Bava Batra 52a).
[The following rules apply] with regard to all [the abovementioned individuals], if at the time of their death, they say: "The article I gave for safekeeping belongs to so and so." If the person caring for the article operates under the presumption that the person who entrusted it to him is true to his word, he should carry out the command he was given. If not, he should give [the article] to the person's heirs.

הלכה לג
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָיוּ לָהּ כְּסָפִים הָרְאוּיוֹת לַבַּעַל לֶאֱכל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶם הוּא אוֹמֵר כָּךְ וְכָךְ יִלָּקַח בָּהֶם וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת אֵינִי לוֹקַחַת בָּהֶן אֶלָּא כָּךְ וְכָךְ לוֹקְחִים דָּבָר שֶׁפֵּרוֹתָיו מְרֻבִּים וִיצִיאָתוֹ מְעוּטָה. בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה הַדָּבָר כִּרְצוֹנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה כִּרְצוֹנָהּ. וְאֵין לוֹקְחִין אֶלָּא דָּבָר שֶׁגִּזְעוֹ מַחֲלִיף שֶׁמָּא יֹאכַל הַכּל וְנִמְצָא הַקֶּרֶן אָבֵד:
כסף משנה
33.
[The following rules apply when] a woman has financial resources sufficient [to purchase property] from which the husband would derive the benefits [but they disagree with regard to the property fit to purchase]; he suggests that this type of property be purchased, and she desires that another type be purchased. A property should be purchased that brings a large revenue and requires little upkeep,79In every society, the nature of the type of article purchased depends on the conditions prevalent at that time (Chelkat Mechokek 85:33). regardless of whether this is the article desired by [the husband] or by [the wife]. We do not purchase any article that does not renew itself,80The Hebrew literally means "whose bark is renewed" - i.e., reaping the benefits one year will not prevent them from being reaped in the future. lest the entire property be used and the principal lost.

הלכה לד
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִכְנִיסָה לְבַעְלָהּ עֵז לַחֲלָבָהּ וְרָחֵל לְגִזָּתָהּ וְדֶקֶל לְפֵרוֹתָיו אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ בִּלְבַד הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל וְהוֹלֵךְ עַד שֶׁתִּכְלֶה הַקֶּרֶן. וְכֵן אִם הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ כְּלֵי תַּשְׁמִישׁ בְּתוֹרַת נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג הֲרֵי זֶה מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן וְלוֹבֵשׁ וּמַצִּיעַ וּמְכַסֶּה עַד שֶׁיִּכְלֶה הַקֶּרֶן. וּכְשֶׁיְּגָרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם הַבְּלָאוֹת שֶׁל נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג:
כסף משנה
34.
[The following rule applies when] a woman brings to her husband's household a goat [that she is entitled] to milk, a sheep [that she is entitled] to shear or a date palm whose fruit [she is entitled to take], although she is entitled only to these benefits [and not to the principal]. [Her husband] is entitled to [these benefits] although the principal is dwindling.81I.e., in this instance, the goat's milk is not sold and the money used to purchase property that produces benefit, but rather the goat's milk is used for the household.
Similarly, if she brought utensils or articles of clothing to his household that were classified as nichsei m'log, he may use them, wearing them or using them as spreads or as covers until the articles themselves are destroyed. If he divorces [his wife], he is not required to pay for any nichsei m'log that became worn out.

הלכה לה
הוֹרוּ הַגְּאוֹנִים שֶׁנִּכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁפְּחִיתָתָן עַל הַבַּעַל אִם הָיוּ הַבְּלָאוֹת קַיָּמִין וְהָיוּ עוֹשִׂין מֵעֵין מְלַאכְתָּן נוֹטֶלֶת כֵּלֶיהָ כְּמָה שֶׁהֵן. וְאִם לֹא הָיוּ עוֹשִׂין מֵעֵין מְלַאכְתָּן הֲרֵי הֵן כְּמוֹ שֶׁנִּגְנְבוּ אוֹ אָבְדוּ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם בִּדְמֵיהֶם שֶׁשָּׁמוּ אוֹתָן עָלָיו בִּשְׁעַת נִשּׂוּאִין. וּמִנְהָג פָּשׁוּט הוּא זֶה. וְכָל הַנּוֹשֵׂא עַל מִנְהָג זֶה קִבֵּל עָלָיו אַחֲרָיוּת הַנְּדוּנְיָא. וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם הַפְּחָת כָּךְ אֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל אֶת הַשֶּׁבַח אִם הוֹתִירוּ דְּמֵיהֶן לְפִי מִנְהָג זֶה. יֵשׁ לַבַּעַל לָכוֹף מִקְצָת עַבְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאַמְּהוֹתֶיהָ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מְשַׁמְּשִׁין אוֹתוֹ בְּבֵית אִשָּׁה אַחֶרֶת שֶׁנָּשָׂא בֵּין שֶׁהָיוּ עַבְדֵי מְלוֹג בֵּין שֶׁהָיוּ עַבְדֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל. אֲבָל אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹלִיכָן לְעִיר אַחֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת אִשְׁתּוֹ:
כסף משנה
35.
The geonim [issued the following] ruling. A husband takes responsibility for the diminished value of nichsei tzon barzel. Nevertheless, if [such property] exists [at the time a woman's ketubah is due for payment,] and still serves its initial purpose, the woman must take it regardless of its condition at that time.82Even if they are worth substantially less than they were originally.
If they are no longer fit to serve their initial purpose, it is as if they were stolen or lost, and the husband is obligated to pay the value appraised originally at the time of the marriage.
This is the common custom. Whenever a man marries, he accepts responsibility for [the woman's] dowry as contingent on this custom.83As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, at different times and in different countries, other customs have prevailed. It is the prevalent custom in one's own locale that is binding. On the basis of this custom, just as the husband does not pay for the depreciation of the article, so too, he does not take the appreciation of the property if it increases in value.
A husband has the right to compel some of the servants and maidservants who belong to his wife to serve him84The servants may be compelled to serve the husband; they may not, however, be compelled to serve his second wife (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 85). in the home of another woman he has married.85For having the woman's servants serve her husband in his other wife's home, also elevates the woman's own standard of living (Ketubot 80b). [This applies] regardless of whether the servants are classified as nichsei m'log or nichsei tzon barzel. The husband may not, however, take these servants to another city without his wife's consent.

נשים הלכות אישות פרק כב
Nashim Ishus Chapter 22