Halacha
הלכה א
רְאוּבֵן שֶׁאָמַר לְשִׁמְעוֹן הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ חֵרֶם אוֹ הֲרֵי אַתָּה אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָתִי נֶאֱסַר עַל שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁיֵּהָנֶה בִּרְאוּבֵן. וְאִם עָבַר וְנֶהֱנָה אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא אָמַר שִׁמְעוֹן כְּלוּם. וּמֻתָּר לִרְאוּבֵן לֵהָנוֹת בְּשִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא אָסַר עַצְמוֹ בַּהֲנָיָתוֹ:
כסף משנה
1.
When Reuven tells Shimon: "I [am forbidden] to you like a dedication offering"1See Chapter 1, Halachah 14; Chapter 2, Halachah 8. or "You are forbidden to benefit from me," it is forbidden for Shimon to benefit from Reuven.2It is as if Reuven designated his property as consecrated with regard to Shimon (Or Sameach). If he transgresses and benefits from him, he is not liable for lashes, because Shimon did not say anything.3And the prohibition which Reuven established does not make Shimon liable. If, however, Shimon said Amen, he would be liable, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.See Chapter 10, Halachah 12, from which it is apparent that if Reuven voluntarily allows Shimon to benefit from his property, Reuven is liable for lashes, for he is desecrating his own vow.
As indicated by Hilchot Meilah 4:9, even though the person is not liable for lashes, he is liable to bring a sacrifice for atonement, since with regard to him, it is as if he benefited from consecrated property. Reuven is permitted to derive benefit from Shimon, because he did not forbid this to himself.
הלכה ב
אָמַר לְשִׁמְעוֹן הֲרֵי אַתָּה עָלַי חֵרֶם אוֹ הֲרֵינִי אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָתְךָ הֲרֵי נֶאֱסַר רְאוּבֵן מִלֵּהָנוֹת בְּשִׁמְעוֹן וְאִם נֶהֱנָה לוֹקֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי חִלֵּל דְּבָרוֹ וְשִׁמְעוֹן מֻתָּר בַּהֲנָיַת רְאוּבֵן. אָמַר לוֹ הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ חֵרֶם וְאַתָּה עָלַי אוֹ הֲרֵינִי אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָתְךָ וְאַתָּה אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָתִי שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִין זֶה בָּזֶה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
2.
If he tells Shimon: "You [are forbidden] to me like a dedication offering" or "I am forbidden to benefit from you," Reuven is forbidden to benefit from Shimon. If he derives benefit, he is liable for lashes, because he desecrated his word. Shimon is permitted to benefit from Reuven.If he tells him: "I [am forbidden] to you like a dedication offering and you are [forbidden] to me" or "I am forbidden to benefit from you and you are forbidden to benefit from me," they are both forbidden to benefit from each other. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
הלכה ג
רְאוּבֵן שֶׁאָמַר לְשִׁמְעוֹן הֲרֵי פֵּרוֹת פְּלוֹנִי אֲסוּרִין עָלֶיךָ. אוֹ הֲרֵי אַתָּה אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיַת פְּלוֹנִי אֵין זֶה כְּלוּם. שֶׁאֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר חֲבֵרוֹ בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן עָנָה שִׁמְעוֹן אָמֵן כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:
כסף משנה
3.
If Reuven tells Shimon: "So-and-so's produce is forbidden to you" or "You are forbidden to benefit from so-and-so," his words are of no consequence. For a person cannot cause his colleague to be prohibited with regard to a matter that is not his unless [that person] responds Amen, as we explained.4Chapter 2, Halachah 1.הלכה ד
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ כִּכָּרִי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה עָלֶיךָ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנְּתָנָהּ לוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו. מֵת וְנָפְלָה לוֹ בִּירֻשָּׁה אוֹ שֶׁנְּתָנָהּ לוֹ אַחֵר בְּמַתָּנָה הֲרֵי זוֹ מֻתֶּרֶת שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר לוֹ אֶלָּא כִּכָּרִי וַהֲרֵי אֵינָהּ עַתָּה שֶׁלּוֹ:
כסף משנה
4.
When a person tells a colleague: "This loaf [of bread] of mine is forbidden to you," it [remains] forbidden to him even if he gives it to him as a present.5For there is no way that he can acquire it in a permitted manner. If he dies, and [the other person] inherits it or [it is acquired by a third party] who gives it to him as a present, he is permitted. For [the one taking the vow said] "My loaf," and now it is not his.6I.e., once he dies, the loaf no longer belongs to him.הלכה ה
אָמַר לוֹ פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלֶיךָ וְלֹא אָמַר לוֹ פֵּרוֹתַי. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמְּכָרָן אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת וְנָפְלוּ לְאַחֵר הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלָיו. שֶׁהָאוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא שֶׁלּוֹ עַל חֲבֵרוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ הֲרֵי הוּא בְּאִסּוּרוֹ עוֹמֵד. אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן אָמַר נְכָסַי אוֹ בֵּיתִי אוֹ פֵּרוֹתַי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בִּלְשׁוֹנוֹת אֵלּוּ שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא אֲסָרָן אֶלָּא כָּל זְמַן שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ:
כסף משנה
5.
If he tells him: "This produce is forbidden to you," but does not say: "My produce," even if he sold it or died and it became the property of another person,7The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 216) states that this applies when the person taking the vow says: "During my lifetime and after my death." From the Rambam's words and a comparison to Halachah 6, it is apparent that he need not make such a specification. See Turei Zahav 216:10 which discusses these two perspectives. it [remains] forbidden to him. For when a person causes his property to be forbidden to a colleague, it remains forbidden unless he says: "my property," "my house," "my produce," or uses another similar term. For in those instances, he only forbade [using] the articles while they were in his possession.8For that is the implication of the term "my." Compare to Chapter 8, Halachah 11.הלכה ו
הָאוֹמֵר לִבְנוֹ הֲרֵי אַתְּ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָתִי. אוֹ שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה בּוֹ. אִם מֵת יִירָשֶׁנּוּ. שֶׁזֶּה כְּאוֹמֵר נְכָסַי עָלֶיךָ אֲסוּרִין. אָסַר עָלָיו הֲנָיָתוֹ וּפֵרֵשׁ בֵּין בְּחַיַּי בֵּין בְּמוֹתִי אִם מֵת לֹא יִירָשֶׁנּוּ. שֶׁזֶּה כְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ נְכָסִים אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלֶיךָ:
כסף משנה
6.
When a person tells his son: "You are forbidden to benefit from me" or he takes and oath that his son is forbidden to benefit from him, when he dies, the son may inherit his property. For this is as if he says: "My property is forbidden to you." If he forbade [the son] from benefiting from him and specified: "During my lifetime and after my death," if he dies, [the son] should not inherit his [estate].9See Halachah 8 which explains that the estate does become the son's property and he may use it in certain ways. For this is as if he said: "This property is forbidden to you."הלכה ז
אָסַר בְּנוֹ בַּהֲנָיָתוֹ וְאָמַר אִם יִהְיֶה בֶּן בְּנִי זֶה תַּלְמִיד חָכָם יִקְנֶה בְּנִי זֶה נְכָסַי כְּדֵי לְהַקְנוֹתָן לִבְנוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. וְיִהְיֶה הַבֵּן אָסוּר בְּנִכְסֵי הָאָב וּבֶן הַבֵּן מֻתָּר בָּהֶן אִם יִהְיֶה תַּלְמִיד חָכָם כְּמוֹ שֶׁהִתְנָה:
כסף משנה
7.
When a person forbids his son from benefiting from him10And specifies that this applies after his death as well, as in the previous halachah. and says: "If this son's son will be a Torah scholar,11This is speaking about a situation in which the grandson is not born yet or is still a minor in which instance, the grandfather cannot transfer the property to him directly Alternatively, he is not yet a Torah scholar (Radbaz). this son will acquire this property to transfer it to his son,"12The Ra'avad and others question the Rambam's ruling, for seemingly, it does not involve any new concept. The son becomes the owner of the estate regardless. Although he is forbidden to benefit from it, he has the right to give it to his son whether he is a Torah scholar or not as stated in the following halachah. The Kessef Mishneh explains that ordinarily, the son may use the estate to pay a debt or to give it to his brother as a present. If, however, the grandson is a Torah scholar, this is forbidden and it is as if the estate was transferred to him directly and the father cannot use it for other purposes. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation where the father had two sons and if this son's son was not a Torah scholar, he would give his entire estate to the other son. this is permissible. The son is forbidden [to benefit] from his father's estate and the grandson is permitted to derive such benefit13The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that the estate will be given to the grandson. The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 223) explains that implicit in the grandfather's statement is the stipulation that if the grandson is not a Torah scholar, he - like his father - will be forbidden to benefit from the estate. See Siftei Cohen 223:4. if he is a Torah scholar as was stipulated.הלכה ח
זֶה הַבֵּן הָאָסוּר בִּירֻשַּׁת אָבִיו אִם נָתַן יְרֻשַּׁת אָבִיו לְאֶחָיו אוֹ לְבָנָיו הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. וְכֵן אִם פְּרָעָם בְּחוֹבוֹ אוֹ בִּכְתֻבַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ. וְצָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעָן שֶׁאֵלּוּ נִכְסֵי אָבִי שֶׁאֲסָרָן עָלַי. שֶׁהַנִּשְׁבָּע שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה בּוֹ חֲבֵרוֹ מֻתָּר לוֹ לִפְרֹעַ אֶת חוֹבוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר:
כסף משנה
8.
If this son who is forbidden to benefit from his father's estate gives14Rabbenu Nissim explains that the intent is not that he actually gives the money to the recipients, but he informs them of where it is and allows them to take it. See Siftei Cohen 223:3. [the property] he inherits from his father to his brother or his sons, they are permitted to benefit from them.15Here also, the son must tell the recipients that they are receiving property that he is forbidden to benefit from. Implied is that the estate becomes the son's property. He is forbidden to benefit from it. Nevertheless, as indicated here, he may receive indirect benefit, for certainly the recipients of his gifts will be thankful to him and repay him in some way or other. This also applies if he paid a debt with them or paid [the money due] his wife [by virtue of] her ketubah.16For this also considered as another debt. He must tell [the recipients] that [the payment they receive] is from the estate of his father which was forbidden to him. [The rationale for this leniency is that] when a person takes an oath that a colleague will not benefit from his property, he may pay that colleague's debt, as will be explained.17Chapter 6, Halachah 4. The person is not considered to have received benefit from the payment of his debt, since holding back a creditor from pressing claim is not considered as benefit (Radbaz).The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 223) questions the Rambam's ruling, explaining that although the father would have been permitted to pay the son's debt, for the son to pay his own debt with the estate's money is considered as benefiting from the estate. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 223:4) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
הלכה ט
מִי שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר עָלָיו מִין מִמִּינֵי מַאֲכָל בֵּין בְּנֵדֶר בֵּין בִּשְׁבוּעָה וְנִתְבַּשֵּׁל עִם מִינִים אֲחֵרִים אוֹ נִתְעָרֵב עִמָּהֶן הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בַּמִּינִים הַמֻּתָּרִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן טַעַם הַמִּין הָאָסוּר. וְאִם נֶאֱסַר בְּפֵרוֹת אֵלּוּ וְנִתְעָרְבוּ בַּאֲחֵרִים אִם יֵשׁ בָּהֶן טַעַם דָּבָר הָאָסוּר אֲסוּרִין וְאִם לָאו מֻתָּרִין:
כסף משנה
9.
When a person was forbidden - either through a vow or an oath - to partake of a type of food, he is permitted to partake of other types of food that were cooked or mixed together with [the forbidden] food, even though it has [acquired] the flavor of the forbidden food.18For his vow involved only the food itself - i.e., something that people would have in mind when using that term - but not its flavor. It does not become like forbidden food, in which case, even the flavor is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh). If he was forbidden to partake of specific produce19That produce is considered as if it was inherently forbidden and hence, even its flavor is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh). and that produce became mixed with others, if they have the flavor of the forbidden food, [the other food] is forbidden. If not,20I.e., a person who had not taken the vow tasted the food and said that the flavor of the forbidden food could not be detected. Alternatively, there was more than 60 times the amount of the forbidden food. it is permitted.הלכה י
כֵּיצַד. נֶאֱסַר בְּבָשָׂר אוֹ בְּיַיִן הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לֶאֱכל מָרָק וִירָקוֹת שֶׁנִּתְבַּשְּׁלוּ עִם הַבָּשָׂר וְעִם הַיַּיִן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן טַעַם הַבָּשָׂר אוֹ טַעַם הַיַּיִן. וְאֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילַת בָּשָׂר בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ אוֹ לִשְׁתּוֹת יַיִן בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ:
כסף משנה
10.
What is implied? A person who is forbidden to partake of meat or wine may partake of soup or vegetables that were cooked with meat or wine. [This applies] even if they have the flavor of meat or wine. He is forbidden only to eat meat alone or drink wine alone.הלכה יא
נֶאֱסַר בְּבָשָׂר זֶה אוֹ בְּיַיִן זֶה וְנִתְבַּשֵּׁל עִם הַיָּרָק. אִם יֵשׁ בַּיְרָקוֹת טַעַם בָּשָׂר אוֹ טַעַם הַיַּיִן אֲסוּרִין וְאִם לָאו מֻתָּרִין. שֶׁזֶּה הַבָּשָׂר וְזֶה הַיַּיִן נַעֲשָׂה כְּמוֹ בְּשַׂר נְבֵלוֹת וּשְׁקָצִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. לְפִיכָךְ הָאוֹמֵר בָּשָׂר זֶה אָסוּר עָלַי הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר בּוֹ וּבַמָּרָק שֶׁבּוֹ וּבַתַּבְלִין שֶׁבּוֹ:
כסף משנה
11.
If, however, he forbade himself [to partake of] "this meat" or "this wine,"21I.e., designating a particular piece of meat or quantity of wine. if the vegetables have the flavor of meat or wine, they are forbidden. If not, they are permitted. For this meat or this wine become considered like the meat of nevelot, teeming animals, or the like. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Therefore if one says: "This meat is forbidden for me," he is forbidden to partake of it, its sauce, and the spices [cooked] with it.22For these other entities will derive the flavor of the meat.הלכה יב
נִתְעָרֵב יַיִן זֶה שֶׁאֲסָרוֹ עַל עַצְמוֹ בְּיַיִן אַחֵר אֲפִלּוּ טִפָּה בְּחָבִית נֶאֱסַר הַכּל. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ לְהִשָּׁאֵל עַל נִדְרוֹ נַעֲשָׂה כְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מַתִּירִין שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּטֵל בְּמִינוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בְּהִלְכוֹת מַאֲכָלוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת:
כסף משנה
12.
If the wine which he forbade himself23The Or Sameach emphasizes that the Rambam is speaking about a vow which a person made himself, for he can have such a vow released. If, however, he responds to another person, he cannot ask for the vow's release. became mixed with other wine,24If, however, the wine becomes mixed with a liquid of another type, its presence becomes nullified if its taste is no longer detectable (Turei Zahav 216:13). even one drop in an entire barrel, the entire quantity becomes forbidden. [The rationale is that] since he has the possibility to ask for the release of his vow, [the forbidden substance] is considered as an entity that can be permitted and hence, never becomes nullified in [a majority of permitted] substances of its own kind, as explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.25Chapter 15, Halachah 10. The rationale is that since the prohibition can be released, it is preferable to do that rather than have the prohibition nullified.הלכה יג
הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת הָאֵלּוּ קָרְבָּן עָלַי אוֹ קָרְבָּן הֵן לְפִי. אוֹ קָרְבָּן הֵן עַל פִּי. הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר בְּחִלּוּפֵיהֶן וּבְגִדּוּלֵיהֶם. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בַּמַּשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן:
כסף משנה
13.
When a person says: "This produce is like a sacrifice for me," "...a sacrifice to my mouth,"26I.e., just as he may not partake of a sacrifice with his mouth, he may not partake of this produce. or "...a sacrifice because of my mouth," he is forbidden to partake of anything exchanged for them or produce that grows from them.27I.e., if the produce forbidden because of the vow was sown and other produce grew from it, that produce is also forbidden.Since the produce forbidden by the vow is equated to a sacrifice, like a sacrifice, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from it (Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra'avad (in his gloss to Halachah 16) asks: Why is the produce that grows from the forbidden produce prohibited. Seemingly, we should follow the principle: Zeh vizeh goraim mutar, when an entity is produced by two factors, one permitted and one forbidden, it is permitted. Here as well, since the second generation produce was produced by the forbidden produce and also by the earth, it should be permitted.
The Radbaz explains that since a vow is involved, we follow the principle mentioned in Halachah 12, that since the prohibition involved can be released entirely, we do not consider it nullified because another factor is also involved. Needless to say, this applies to juices produced by them.
הלכה יד
נָדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע שֶׁאֵינִי אוֹכֵל אוֹתָם אוֹ שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם אוֹתָם. אִם הָיָה דָּבָר שֶׁזַּרְעוֹ כָּלֶה כְּשֶׁיִּזָּרַע כְּגוֹן חִטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בְּחִלּוּפֵיהֶן וּבְגִדּוּלֵיהֶן. וְאִם הָיָה הַדָּבָר שֶׁאֵין זַרְעוֹ כָּלֶה בָּאָרֶץ כְּשֶׁיִּזָּרַע כְּגוֹן בְּצָלִים וְשׁוּמִין אֲפִלּוּ גִּדּוּלֵי גִּדּוּלִין אֲסוּרִין. וּבֵין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן סָפֵק. לְפִיכָךְ אִם שָׁתָה מֵהֶן אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה:
כסף משנה
14.
[The following rules apply] if a person took a vow or an oath not to eat [produce] or not to taste it. If it is an entity whose seed decomposes when it is sown like wheat or barley, he is permitted [to partake of] the articles exchanged for it28For his vow specified only eating or tasting the produce, not benefiting from it. Nor is there any taste of the original produce in the produce that grows from its seeds. and the produce that grows from it.29For the second generation produce is not the same substance concerning which the vow was taken. If it was an entity whose seed does not decompose in the earth when it is sown, like onions or garlic,30The onion or the garlic head is put in the ground and a new plant grows from it. even the produce that grows from the produce that grows from it is forbidden.31For ultimately, even the third generation produce has the flavor of the first generation produce. As the Rambam explains at the conclusion of Halachah 15, we do not say that its flavor will be nullified because the greater portion of the substance of the new produce is permitted, because, as stated in Halachah 12, the forbidden fruit is an entity whose prohibition could be released. In all situations, there is a doubt [whether he is forbidden to drink] the juices they produce.32Nedarim 52b leaves unresolved the question whether in this context the juice produced from the fruit is considered as the fruit or not. Hence, because of the doubt, one is forbidden to partake of it, but cannot be held liable for punishment. This refers to fruits other than grapes or olives. In the latter instances, the liquid is considered as the fruit. Therefore, if he drinks them, he is not liable for lashes.הלכה טו
וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ עָלַי קָרְבָּן אוֹ קָרְבָּן הֵן לְפִי אוֹ קָרְבָּן הֵן עַל פִּי. אָסוּר בְּחִלּוּפֵיהֶן וּבְגִדּוּלֵיהֶן. שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם שֶׁאֵינִי אוֹכֵל אִם הָיוּ פֵּרוֹת מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ דָּבָר שֶׁזַּרְעוֹ כָּלֶה מֻתָּר בְּחִלּוּפֵיהֶן וּבְגִדּוּלֵיהֶן. וְאִם הָיָה דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין זַרְעוֹ כָּלֶה אֲפִלּוּ גִּדּוּלֵי גִּדּוּלִין אֲסוּרִין. וְלָמָּה לֹא יִבָּטֵל הָעִקָּר הָאָסוּר בַּגִּדּוּלִין שֶׁרַבּוּ עָלָיו. שֶׁהֲרֵי הֵן דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מַתִּירִין שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּטֵל בְּרֹב כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:
כסף משנה
15.
Similarly, if a person tells his wife: "The work produced by your hands33The Siftei Cohen 216:8 states that we are referring to an instance that the husband uses wording similar to that suggested in Chapter 3, Halachah 11; alternatively, that he is referring to work which his wife already performed. Otherwise, there would be a difficulty because a vow is not effective unless the object concerned already exists. is like a sacrifice to me," "...a sacrifice to my mouth," or "...a sacrifice because of my mouth," he is forbidden to partake of anything exchanged for [her earnings] or produce that grows from her work.34I.e., if she planted a tree, he is forbidden to partake of its fruit. The Rambam (based on Nedarim 57a) is restating the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah in a different context. If he says that he will not to eat [from the work of her hands], nor taste it, if the produce [that grew from] the work of her hands is an entity whose seed decomposes, he is permitted [to partake of] articles exchanged for it and the produce that grows from it. If it was an entity whose seed does not decompose, even the produce that grows from the produce that grows from them is forbidden.Why do we not consider the original produce that is forbidden insignificant because of the [new] growth that is larger than it? Because the original produce is an entity whose prohibition can be released, which is not nullified [when mixed] with a majority [of permitted substances], as explained.35See Halachah 12 which explains that he has the potential to have his vow released.
הלכה טז
הָאוֹסֵר פֵּרוֹתָיו עַל חֲבֵרוֹ בֵּין בְּנֵדֶר בֵּין בִּשְׁבוּעָה הֲרֵי גִּדּוּלֵיהֶן וְחִלּוּפֵיהֶן סָפֵק. לְפִיכָךְ חֲבֵרוֹ אָסוּר בְּגִדּוּלֵי פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ וּבְחִלּוּפֵיהֶן. וְאִם עָבַר וְנֶהֱנָה נֶהֱנָה:
כסף משנה