Halacha

הלכה א
מִי שֶׁנָּדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע וּפֵרֵשׁ בִּשְׁעַת נִדְרוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁנָּדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע בִּגְלָלוֹ. הֲרֵי זֶה כְּמִי שֶׁתָּלָה נִדְרוֹ אוֹ שְׁבוּעָתוֹ בְּאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר. וְאִם לֹא נִתְקַיֵּם אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע בִּגְלָלוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר:
כסף משנה
1.
When a person takes a vow or an oath and at the time of the vow or the oath specifies a stipulation for which he is making the vow, it is as if he made the vow or the oath dependent on that matter. If the stipulation for which he took the oath is not fulfilled, he is permitted [to act as if the oath had never been taken].1He need not seek the release of the oath (Radbaz). This law applies with regard to vows as well.

הלכה ב
כֵּיצַד. נָדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע שֶׁאֵינִי נוֹשֵׂא אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית שֶׁאָבִיהָ רַע. שֶׁאֵינִי נִכְנָס לְבַיִת זֶה שֶׁכֶּלֶב רַע בְּתוֹכוֹ. מֵתוּ אוֹ שֶׁעָשָׂה הָאָב תְּשׁוּבָה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. שֶׁזֶּה כְּמִי שֶׁנָּדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע וְאָמַר שֶׁלֹּא אֶשָּׂא פְּלוֹנִית וְלֹא אֶכָּנֵס לְבַיִת זֶה אֶלָּא אִם נִסְתַּלֵּק הַהֵזֶּק. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
2.
What is implied? If he took an oath or vow saying: "I will not marry this-and-this woman whose father is evil" or "I will not enter this house, because there is a harmful dog within it," if they died or the father repented, he may [do so]. This is comparable to someone who says "I will not marry so-and-so..." or "...not enter this house unless the harmful factor is removed."2Even though the father dies or repents after the vow was taken, with his death or repentance, the vow is nullified, because the conditions under which it was taken no longer apply. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה ג
אֲבָל הַנּוֹדֵר אוֹ הַנִּשְׁבָּע שֶׁאֵינִי נוֹשֵׂא פְּלוֹנִית הַכְּעוּרָה וְנִמְצֵאת נָאָה. שְׁחוֹרָה וְנִמְצֵאת לְבָנָה. קְצָרָה וְנִמְצֵאת אֲרֻכָּה. קוֹנָם שֶׁאֵין אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי שֶׁגָּנְבָה אֶת כִּיסִי וְשֶׁהִכְּתָה אֶת בְּנִי וְנוֹדַע שֶׁלֹּא גָּנְבָה וְשֶׁלֹּא הִכְּתָה. הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא נֵדֶר טָעוּת וְהוּא בִּכְלַל נִדְרֵי שְׁגָגוֹת שֶׁהֵן מֻתָּרִין. וְאֵין זֶה כְּתוֹלֶה נִדְרוֹ בְּדָבָר וְלֹא נִתְקַיֵּם הַדָּבָר. שֶׁהֲרֵי הַסִּבָּה שֶׁבִּגְלָלָהּ נָדַר לֹא הָיְתָה מְצוּיָה וְטָעוּת הָיָה:
כסף משנה
3.
[A different rationale applies] when one takes a vow or an oath: "I will not marry so-and-so who is ugly," and it is discovered that she is beautiful,3If, however, she was ugly at the time the vow was taken, but was made beautiful, the vow takes effect [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 232:6)]. "...who is dark-skinned," and it is discovered that she is light-skinned, "...who is short," and it is discovered that she is tall, or "I am taking a vow that my wife shall not benefit from me, because she took my wallet and beat my son," and it was discovered that she did not take it or beat him. He is permitted, because the vow was taken in error. It is included among the category of inadvertent vows that are permitted.4See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, which states that such vows are not binding. This does not resemble an instance where the vow was made dependent on a stipulation and that stipulation was not kept.5As described in the first two halachot. For the reason for which the vow was taken never applied. Instead, it was an error [of perception].

הלכה ד
וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא מִי שֶׁרָאָה אֲנָשִׁים מֵרָחוֹק אוֹכְלִים תְּאֵנִים שֶׁלּוֹ. וְאָמַר לָהֶן הֲרֵי הֵן עֲלֵיכֶם קָרְבָּן. כֵּיוָן שֶׁקָּרַב אֲלֵיהֶם וְהִבִּיט וַהֲרֵי הֵן אָבִיו וְאָחִיו הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִין. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא פֵּרֵשׁ הַסִּבָּה שֶׁהִדִּירָן בִּגְלָלָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה כְּמוֹ שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ. שֶׁהַדָּבָר מוֹכִיחַ שֶׁלֹּא אָסַר עֲלֵיהֶם אֶלָּא שֶׁהָיָה בְּדַעְתּוֹ שֶׁהֵן זָרִים. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
4.
Moreover,6I.e., the previous halachah describes an instance where one explicitly stated the condition under which he took the vow. This halachah, by contrast, describes a situation where the condition is not stated, but is self-apparent. even if a person saw from a distance that people were partaking of his figs and he said [concerning] them: "They are like a sacrifice for you,"7Which would cause them to be forbidden to eat the figs. but when he came close to them and looked [at them], he saw that they were his father and his brothers, they are permitted [to partake of them]. Even though he did not explicitly state the reason why he took a vow [forbidding] them, it is as if he did. For it is obvious that he forbade his produce to them only because he thought they were people at large.8And thus the vow was taken in error. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה ה
מִי שֶׁנָּדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע וְנוֹלַד לוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּלִבּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַשְּׁבוּעָה אוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַנֵּדֶר הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁאַל לְחָכָם וְיַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ. כֵּיצַד. אָסַר אֶת עַצְמוֹ בַּהֲנָיַת פְּלוֹנִי אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יִכָּנֵס לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. וְנַעֲשָׂה אוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ סוֹפֵר וְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר אִלּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה נַעֲשָׂה סוֹפֵר וּבְמָקוֹם זֶה יֵעָשֶׂה בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לֵהָנוֹת וּלְהִכָּנֵס עַד שֶׁיַּתִּיר נִדְרוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
5.
When a person took a vow or an oath and then a factor came up that was not in his mind at the time he took the oath or the vow, he is forbidden [in the matter] until he requests a sage to release his vow.
What is implied? A person forbade himself from benefiting from so-and-so or from entering this-and-this place and that person became the city scribe9And everyone in the city needs the scribe to compose legal documents for him. Hence, he no longer desires to be forbidden to benefit from him. or a synagogue was made at that place.10And everyone desires to be able to enter the local synagogue. Even though he said "If I knew that this person would become the scribe or that in this place a synagogue would be made, I would not have taken the vow or the oath," he is forbidden to benefit [from the person] or enter the place until he has his vow released, as we explained.11Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:5, 12. As stated there, the vow was not made initially in error, for at the outset, he did not desire that the person become the scribe. Hence, the oath takes effect.
The Ra'avad suggests that the statement from Halachah 3: "This does not resemble an instance where the vow was made dependent on a stipulation and that stipulation was not kept" should be included here, for this is a different category of vows than those mentioned in the previous halachot.
Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה ו
כָּל נֵדֶר שֶׁהֻתַּר מִקְצָתוֹ הֻתַּר כֻּלּוֹ וְהוּא הַדִּין בִּשְׁבוּעָה. כֵּיצַד. רָאָה אֲנָשִׁים מֵרָחוֹק אוֹכְלִין פֵּרוֹתָיו וְאָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן עֲלֵיכֶם קָרְבָּן. וּכְשֶׁהִגִּיעַ אֲלֵיהֶם וְהִנֵּה הֵם אָבִיו וַאֲנָשִׁים זָרִים הוֹאִיל וְאָבִיו מֻתָּר כֻּלָּן מֻתָּרִין. וַאֲפִלּוּ אָמַר אִלּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ כֵּן הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי אֲסוּרִין וְאָבִי מֻתָּר הֲרֵי כֻּלָּן מֻתָּרִין. אֲבָל אִם אוֹמֵר כְּשֶׁהִגִּיעַ אֲלֵיהֶן אִלּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאָבִי בֵּינֵיכֶם הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר כֻּלְּכֶם אֲסוּרִין חוּץ מֵאָבִי הֲרֵי כֻּלָּן אֲסוּרִין חוּץ מֵאָבִיו. שֶׁהֲרֵי גִּלָּה דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּיר מִקְצָת הַנֵּדֶר אֶלָּא כְּמוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר הָיָה נוֹדֵר וּמַתְנֶה עַל אָבִיו:
כסף משנה
6.
Whenever a portion of a vow is nullified, the entire vow is nullified.12The Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 1:1 derives this from the exegesis of Numbers 30:3: "He shall do all that he utters from his mouth." Implied is that everything that he utters must be fulfilled or the vow does not take effect. Rabbenu Nissim gives a logical explanation for this concept. At the outset, his intent was that the vow would be kept in its entirety. If a factor arose that prevented that from taking place, it is as if the vow was taken in error. This law also applies with regard to oaths.
What is implied? A person saw from a distance that people were partaking of his figs and he said [concerning] them: "They are like a sacrifice for you," but when he came close to them and looked [at them], he saw that they were his father and people at large. Since his father is permitted [to partake of them],13As explained in Halachah 4. they are all permitted.14Because the prohibition against them was mentioned in the same vow. Even if he said: "So-and-so and so-and-so are forbidden and my father is permitted, they are all permitted.15Because the vow was taken against all of the persons together. Hence, it cannot be nullified only in part.
If, however, when he reached them he said: "If I would have known that my father is with you, I would have said: 'You are all forbidden [to partake of my produce], except my father,' they are all forbidden except his father. For he revealed his intent was not to release a portion of his vow,16For even when qualifying his statement, he still says that all of the individuals are forbidden, indicating that he did not desire to retract his original statement (Kessef Mishneh). In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 232:8), Rav Yosef Caro appears to follow a slightly different rationale. but to make a vow as he did, but to make a stipulation concerning his father.17I.e., that the prohibition would not include his father.

הלכה ז
וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר הַיַּיִן קָרְבָּן עָלַי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַיַּיִן רַע לִבְנֵי מֵעַיִם. וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ הֲרֵי הַמְיֻשָּׁן יָפֶה לִבְנֵי מֵעַיִם. אִם אָמַר אִלּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר. וַאֲפִלּוּ אָמַר אִלּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר הֶחָדָשׁ אָסוּר וְהַיָּשָׁן מֻתָּר. מֻתָּר בַּיָּשָׁן וּבֶחָדָשׁ. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר אִלּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר כָּל הַיֵּינוֹת אֲסוּרִין עָלַי חוּץ מִן הַמְיֻשָּׁן הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בַּמְיֻשָּׁן בִּלְבַד. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
7.
Similar [laws apply] when one says: "Wine is like a sacrifice18I.e., forbidden. for me, because wine is bad for digestion," but he was told: "Aged wine is good for digestion." If he said: "Had I known, I would not have taken the vow" or even: "Had I known, I would have said: 'Fresh wine is forbidden, but aged wine is permitted,' he is permitted [to drink] both fresh wine and aged wine.19The portion of the vow involving aged wine is nullified, because it was taken in error. And accordingly, the portion involving fresh wine is also nullified, based on the principle stated in the previous halachah. If, however, he said: "Had I known, I would have said: 'All wine is forbidden for me except aged wine,' he is permitted [to drink] only aged wine.20For he did not seek to nullify his former vow, merely to qualify it, as stated in the conclusion of the previous halachah. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה ח
כָּל הַנּוֹדֵר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּע רוֹאִין דְּבָרִים שֶׁבִּגְלָלָן נִשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר וּלְמֵדִין מֵהֶן לְאֵי זֶה נִתְכַּוֵּן וְהוֹלְכִין אַחַר הָעִנְיָן לֹא אַחַר כָּל מַשְׁמַע הַדִּבּוּר. כֵּיצַד. הָיָה טָעוּן מַשָּׂא שֶׁל צֶמֶר אוֹ שֶׁל פִּשְׁתִּים וְהִזִּיעַ וְהָיָה רֵיחוֹ קָשֶׁה וְנִשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲלֶה עָלָיו צֶמֶר אוֹ פִּשְׁתִּים לְעוֹלָם. הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לִלְבּשׁ בִּגְדֵי צֶמֶר אוֹ פִּשְׁתִּים וּלְכַסּוֹתָן. וְאֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא לְהַפְשִׁילָן לַאֲחוֹרָיו. הָיָה לָבוּשׁ בִּגְדֵי צֶמֶר וְנִצְטַעֵר בִּלְבִישָׁתָן וְנִשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲלֶה עָלָיו צֶמֶר לְעוֹלָם אָסוּר לִלְבּשׁ וּמֻתָּר לִטְעֹן עָלָיו וּמֻתָּר לְהִתְכַּסּוֹת בְּגִזֵּי צֶמֶר. שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן זֶה אֶלָּא לְבֶגֶד צֶמֶר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
8.
Whenever a person takes a vow or an oath, we consider the motivating factor for the oath or the vow and extrapolate from it what the person's intent was. We follow his intent, not the literal meaning of his words.21The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 218:1) emphasizes that this applies when a person takes a vow on his own initiative. If, however, he takes a vow in response to wording chosen by a colleague, we follow the meaning of that wording.
What is implied? He was carrying a load of wool or of linen and was perspiring, causing a foul odor. If he took an oath or a vow that he would never have wool or linen upon him again, he is permitted to wear woolen or linen clothes and cover himself with them. He is only forbidden to carry them on his back like a burden.
If he was wearing woolen clothing and became aggravated because of these garments and took an oath or a vow that he would never have wool upon him again, he is forbidden to wear [woolen clothes], but is permitted to carry wool and to cover himself with woolen spreads. For he intended only [to forbid] woolen clothes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה ט
הָיוּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיִּשָּׂא קְרוֹבָתוֹ וְהוּא מְמָאֵן וּפָצְרוּ בּוֹ וְנָדַר אוֹ נִשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא תֶּהֱנֶה בּוֹ לְעוֹלָם. וְכֵן הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְנִשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר שֶׁלֹּא תֶּהֱנֶה בּוֹ לְעוֹלָם. הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרוֹת לֵהָנוֹת לוֹ. שֶׁאֵין כַּוָּנָתוֹ אֶלָּא לְשֵׁם אִישׁוּת:
כסף משנה
9.
[Similar laws apply if] people were asking him to marry his relative,22For it is desirable that a person marry his relatives (see Yevamot 62b). but he refused and they pressured him, so he took a vow or an oath that she could not benefit from him forever. Alternatively, a person divorced his wife and took an oath that she would never benefit from him. These women are permitted to derive [ordinary] benefit from him. His intent was that only [to prevent himself from] marrying them.

הלכה י
וְכֵן הַקּוֹרֵא לַחֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁיִּסְעֹד אֶצְלוֹ וּמֵאֵן וְנִשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר שֶׁלֹּא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁתֶּה לוֹ טִפַּת צוֹנֵן הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ וְלִשְׁתּוֹת לוֹ צוֹנֵן. שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן זֶה אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל וְיִשְׁתֶּה עִמּוֹ בִּסְעֻדָּה זוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
10.
Similarly, if a person called to his friend, [inviting him] to eat at his [home] and he took an oath or a vow not to enter his home or even drink cold water of his, he is permitted to enter his home and drink his water. His intent was only that he would not eat and drink with him at that feast.23The Radbaz states that he is even permitted to enter his home at the time of the feast. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה יא
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ קוֹנָם לְבֵיתְךָ אֲנִי נִכְנָס וְשָׂדְךָ אֲנִי לוֹקֵחַ בֵּין בְּנֵדֶר בֵּין בִּשְׁבוּעָה וּמֵת אוֹ מְכָרָן לְאַחֵר הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס לַבַּיִת וְלִקַּח הַשָּׂדֶה מִן הַיּוֹרֵשׁ אוֹ מִן הַלּוֹקֵחַ. שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן זֶה אֶלָּא כָּל זְמַן שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לַבַּיִת הַזֶּה אֵינִי נִכְנָס וְשָׂדֶה זֶה אֵינִי לוֹקֵחַ וּמֵת אוֹ מְכָרָן לְאַחֵר הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר:
כסף משנה
11.
When a person takes a vow or an oath, telling a colleague: "I will never enter your house" or "...buy your field," and [that colleague] dies or sells [the property] to someone else, [the person who took the vow] is permitted to enter the house or purchase the field from the heir or from the purchaser.24For it is no longer the colleague's house or field (Siftei Cohen 216:10). His intent [when establishing the prohibition] was only for the time they belonged to [the original owner].25As emphasized by the fact that he said: "Your house" and "Your field."
If, by contrast, he said: "I will never enter this house" or "I will never purchase this field," even if [the original owner] dies or sells [the property] to someone else, [the person who took the vow] is forbidden.26For in this instance, the vow was not associated with the owner of the property, but with the property itself. Compare to Chapter 5, Halachot 4-5.

הלכה יב
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ הַשְׁאִילֵנִי פָּרָתְךָ אָמַר לוֹ אֵינָהּ פְּנוּיָה נִשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר וְאָמַר קוֹנָם שָׂדִי אֵינִי חוֹרֵשׁ בָּהּ לְעוֹלָם. אִם הָיָה דַּרְכּוֹ לַחְרשׁ בְּיָדוֹ הוּא אָסוּר וְכָל אָדָם מֻתָּרִין לַחְרשׁ לוֹ בָּהּ. וְאִם אֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לַחְרשׁ בְּיָדוֹ הוּא וְכָל אָדָם אֲסוּרִין. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בִּדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ:
כסף משנה
12.
[The following laws apply when a person] asks a colleague: "Lend me your cow," he answers him: "She is not free," and [the first person] takes an oath or a vow,27As an expression of resentment for the owner's refusal (Kessef Mishneh). saying: "I will never plow my field with it." If he is accustomed to plowing his field himself, he is forbidden to plow [his field with that cow], but any other person is permitted to plow [his field] with it.28Since he is accustomed to plowing his field himself, we assume that his vow applied only to his own actions. If he is not accustomed to plowing his field himself, both he and everyone else is forbidden to plow [his field] with it.29Since he is not accustomed to plowing his field himself, we interpret his vow as meaning that he would never have another person plow the field with it. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה יג
מִי שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע אוֹ נָדַר שֶׁיִּשָּׂא אִשָּׁה אוֹ שֶׁיִּקְנֶה בַּיִת אוֹ שֶׁיֵּצֵא בְּשַׁיָּרָא אוֹ יִפְרשׁ בַּיָּם אֵין מְחַיְּבִין אוֹתוֹ לִשָּׂא אִשָּׁה אוֹ לִקְנוֹת אוֹ לְצֵאת מִיָּד אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁיִּמָּצֵא דָּבָר הֶהָגוּן לוֹ. מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּדְרָה שֶׁכָּל מִי שֶׁיִּתְבַּע אוֹתָהּ תִּנָּשֵׂא לוֹ וְקָפְצוּ עָלֶיהָ בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁאֵינָן הֲגוּנִין לָהּ. וְאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים לֹא נִתְכַּוְּנָה זוֹ אֶלָּא לְכָל מִי שֶׁיִּתְבַּע אוֹתָהּ מִן הַהֲגוּנִין לָהּ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
13.
When a person takes an oath or a vow that he will marry a woman, purchase a house,30Although the standard published text of Bava Kama 80a mentions purchasing a house or marrying a woman in Eretz Yisrael, the commentaries [nor the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 219:1)] see no reason why the Holy Land is different from other places in this regard. depart with a caravan, or set out to sea, we do not obligate him to marry, make the purchase, or set out immediately. Instead, he may wait until he finds something appropriate for himself.
An incident occurred concerning a woman who took a vow that she would marry anyone who asked her to marry him. Men who were not appropriate for her jumped at the opportunity. Our Sages ruled that her intent was [to marry] anyone from among those appropriate for her who asked her. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הלכה יד
הַמַּדִּיר אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע וְאָמַר לוֹ שֶׁתָּבוֹא וְתִטּל לְבָנֶיךָ כּוֹר אֶחָד חִטִּים אוֹ שְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן הֲרֵי זֶה יָכוֹל לְהַתִּיר נִדְרוֹ בְּלֹא שְׁאֵלָה לְחָכָם. וְיֹאמַר לוֹ כְּלוּם נִתְכַּוַּנְתָּ אֶלָּא לְכַבְּדֵנִי כְּבוֹדִי שֶׁלֹּא אֶטּל וּכְבָר הִגִּיעַ אֵלַי כָּבוֹד שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ בִּשְׁבִילִי. וְכֵן הַנּוֹדֵר אוֹ הַנִּשְׁבָּע שֶׁאֵין אַתָּה נֶהֱנֶה לִי אִם אֵין אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לִבְנִי כּוֹר שֶׁל חִטִּים וּשְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן. הֲרֵי זֶה יָכוֹל לְהַתִּיר נִדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁאֵלַת חָכָם וְיֹאמַר הֲרֵינִי כְּאִלּוּ נִתְקַבַּלְתִּי וְהִגִּיעוּ לְיָדִי. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
כסף משנה
14.
When a person administers a vow to a colleague or takes an oath telling him to come and take a kor of wheat or two barrels of wine for his son, [the colleague] can release the vow without asking a sage to do so. [He need only] say: "Your intent was only to honor me.31By giving me a present in public.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 332:20) states that the person who administered the vow need not explicitly agree to this interpretation. Even if he remains silent, we accept it. The Siftei Cohen 332:46 states that if the person specifically says that he administered the vow so that he would receive honor by having the other person receive a gift from him, his word is accepted and a sage must be approached to have the vow released.
It is a greater token of respect for me not to take [the gift].32For people seeing that I demur will respect me more. I already received the honor that you desired to give me through your vow."
Similarly, if one took an oath or a vow: "You may not derive any benefit from me until you give my son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine, he can release the vow without asking a sage to do so. [He need only] say: "It is as if I received them and they reached my hand." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

הפלאה הלכות נדרים פרק ח
Haflaah Nedarim Chapter 8