Halacha
הלכה א
הָאוֹפֶה כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת חַיָּב. אֶחָד הָאוֹפֶה אֶת הַפַּת אוֹ הַמְבַשֵּׁל אֶת הַמַּאֲכָל אוֹ אֶת הַסַּמְמָנִין אוֹ הַמְחַמֵּם אֶת הַמַּיִם הַכּל עִנְיָן אֶחָד הוּא. שִׁעוּר הַמְחַמֵּם אֶת הַמַּיִם כְּדֵי לִרְחֹץ בָּהֶן אֵיבָר קָטָן. וְשִׁעוּר מְבַשֵּׁל סַמְמָנִין כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּהְיוּ רְאוּיִין לְדָבָר שֶׁמְּבַשְּׁלִין אוֹתָן לוֹ:
כסף משנה
1.
A person who bakes [an amount of food] the size of a dried fig is liable. Just as a person is liable for baking bread, he is liable for cooking food or herbs, or for heating water. These are all one type [of activity].1According to the opinion that reckons only the labors necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary, cooking - and not baking - was the labor performed. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the commentary on Chapter 7, Halachah 1, the Mishnah (and, therefore, the Rambam) mentioned these activities in the order associated with the preparation of bread, for this was more common (Shabbat 74b).The minimum amount of water for which one is liable for heating2As obvious from the continuation of the halachah, the intent is not to boil the water, but to warm it enough so that it is comfortable to use for washing. is an amount sufficient to wash3The Mayim Chayim states that generally water was heated for the purpose of washing. (Although hot drinks were served in that age as well, the "cooking" of these beverages involves mixing in other ingredients.) Note the S'dei Chemed (Vol. III, Section 1, Chapter 230), which questions whether heating water (for purposes other than washing) is prohibited by the Torah. a small limb.4As stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 2, this refers to the amount of water necessary to wash the small toe of a newborn baby. The minimum amount of herbs for which one is liable is the amount required to serve the purpose for which they are being cooked.5The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's statements, stating that our Sages (Tosefta, Shabbat, Chapter 10) mentioned a minimum measure, the amount necessary to dye a small cloth used as a hair-net. The Lechem Mishneh attempts to resolve the difference of opinion, explaining that the Rambam also recognizes that measure (as reflected in Chapter 18, Halachah 2). Depending on the nature of the dye used, however, there is a difference in the amount of cooking necessary to dye the cloth.
Rav Kapach accepts the principle stated by the Lechem Mishneh, but notes that the minimum measure for dyeing is specifically stated by the Rambam in Halachah 14 of this chapter as "enough to dye a thread four handbreadths long."
הלכה ב
הַנּוֹתֵן בֵּיצָה בְּצַד הַמֵּיחַם בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתִּתְגַּלְגֵּל וְנִתְגַּלְגְּלָה חַיָּב. שֶׁהַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּתוֹלֶדֶת הָאוּר כִּמְבַשֵּׁל בָּאוּר עַצְמָהּ. וְכֵן הַמֵּדִיחַ בְּחַמִּין דָּג מָלִיחַ הַיָּשָׁן אוֹ קוּלְיָיס הָאִסְפָּנִין וְהוּא דָּג דַּק וְרַךְ בְּיוֹתֵר הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. שֶׁהֲדָחָתָן בְּחַמִּין זֶה הוּא גְּמַר בִּשּׁוּלָן. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן:
כסף משנה
2.
A person who places an egg next to a kettle so that it will become slightly cooked6In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 3:2), the Rambam translates the Hebrew תתגלגל as referring to "mixing" or to "becoming slightly cooked." is liable if the egg becomes cooked, for a person who cooks with a derivative of fire7In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that the kettle had already been removed from the fire. Nevertheless, because it remained hot from the fire's heat, it is considered a "derivative of fire." is considered as if he cooked with fire itself.Similarly, a person who washes aged salted fish8Before the era of refrigeration, salt was used a preservative. Rashi (Shabbat 145b) states that this refers to fish that was preserved by salt for over a year. or sole9Our text is based on Rav Kapach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Machshirin 6:3. Other commentaries offer different translations.- a very thin, soft fish - with hot water is liable. Washing them with hot water completes the cooking process they require.10Note Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:4, where the Rambam mentions small fish whose cooking is completed by washing them with hot water. Perhaps there he is also referring to sole. Alternatively, perhaps even large sole can be prepared merely by pouring hot water over them. The same principles apply in other similar situations.
הלכה ג
הַמַּפְקִיעַ אֶת הַבֵּיצָה בְּבֶגֶד חַם אוֹ בְּחוֹל וּבַאֲבַק דְּרָכִים שֶׁהֵן חַמִּים מִפְּנֵי הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּצְלֵית פָּטוּר. שֶׁתּוֹלְדוֹת חַמָּה אֵינָם כְּתוֹלְדוֹת הָאֵשׁ. אֲבָל גָּזְרוּ עֲלֵיהֶן מִפְּנֵי תּוֹלְדוֹת הָאוּר. וְכֵן הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּחַמֵּי טְבֶרְיָה וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם פָּטוּר. הַמְבַשֵּׁל עַל הָאוּר דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה מְבֻשָּׁל כָּל צָרְכּוֹ אוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ בִּשּׁוּל כְּלָל פָּטוּר:
כסף משנה
3.
A person who breaks open an egg over a warm cloth, over sand, or over the dust of the roads that are heated by the sun is not liable11Even if the food cooks thoroughly, one is not liable, because this is not the ordinary way food is cooked. even though it becomes roasted, for the derivatives of the heat of the sun are [governed by] different [laws than those governing] the derivatives of fire. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted a decree forbidding cooking with [the derivatives of the heat of the sun], lest [one cook with] the derivatives of fire.12Were one to be allowed to cook by using substances warmed by the sun, one might err and cook using substances warmed by fire. It is, however, permitted to leave food to be cooked by the sun itself (Shabbat 39a; Hilchot Shabbat, Chapter 22, Halachah 9). Similarly, a person who cooks using the [hot] springs of Tiberias and the like is not held liable.13Although one of the Sages states that a person who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias is liable, the Talmud immediately clarifies that the intent is "liable for 'stripes for rebelliousness,' the punishment given for violating a Rabbinic ordinance (Shabbat 40b).A person who cooks food that has been completely cooked, on a fire,14This statement implies that until the food is completely cooked, one is liable for cooking. This relates one of the points of difference between the Rambam and the Ashkenazic halachic authorities who were cited in our commentary on Chapter 3, Halachah 4. The latter maintain that since food that is one-third or one-half cooked is fit to be eaten, there are leniencies with regard to the laws governing leaving food to warm on the Sabbath and returning food to a fire on the Sabbath. The Rashba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) develops this view further and maintains that once food has reached this stage of being cooked, one is not liable for cooking it further.
The Rambam (Chapter 22, Halachah 8), however, maintains that if food has been completely cooked one may place it in hot water on the Sabbath to warm. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:4), however, follows the view of the Ashkenazic authorities who accept this leniency only when the food is dry. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:5) also questions if this leniency also applies with regard to food that was baked or roasted. or who cooks food that does not need to be cooked15Shabbat 40b mentions this principle with regard to oil. Other examples are fresh fruits and vegetables that are usually eaten raw (Rabbi Akiva Eiger). at all is not liable.16As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the term "not liable," פטור in Hebrew, also implies that this activity is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree. Thus, recooking food or cooking fresh produce on the Sabbath is definitely forbidden.
הלכה ד
אֶחָד נָתַן אֶת הָאוּר וְאֶחָד נָתַן אֶת הָעֵצִים וְאֶחָד נָתַן אֶת הַקְּדֵרָה וְאֶחָד נָתַן אֶת הַמַּיִם וְאֶחָד נָתַן אֶת הַבָּשָׂר וְאֶחָד נָתַן אֶת הַתַּבְלִין וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֵגִיס כֻּלָּם חַיָּבִים מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל. שֶׁכָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר מִצָּרְכֵי הַבִּשּׁוּל הֲרֵי זֶה מְבַשֵּׁל. אֲבָל אִם שָׁפַת אֶחָד אֶת הַקְּדֵרָה תְּחִלָּה וּבָא אַחֵר וְנָתַן אֶת הַמַּיִם וּבָא אַחֵר וְנָתַן אֶת הַבָּשָׂר וּבָא אַחֵר וְנָתַן אֶת הַתַּבְלִין וּבָא אַחֵר וְנָתַן אֶת הָאוּר וּבָא אַחֵר וְנָתַן עֵצִים עַל הָאוּר וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֵגִיס. שְׁנַיִם הָאַחֲרוֹנִים בִּלְבַד חַיָּבִין מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל:
כסף משנה
4.
When one person brought fire, another brought wood,1The Rambam's ruling is based on Beitzah 34a and the Tosefta, Shabbat 12:4. There are, however, slight differences between the wording chosen by the Rambam and the wording of those sources. Furthermore, the Talmud implies that the person who brought the fire is liable, not for performing a derivative of the labor of cooking, but for the labor of kindling. (See Rashi, loc. cit.) This is definitely not the Rambam's intent.In resolution of this difficulty, the Kessef Mishneh quotes his teacher, Rav Ya'akov bei Rav, who explains that the first clause describes a situation in which all the individuals performed their act virtually simultaneously, with a shared intent. Hence, since the end result of their activity is the performance of a forbidden labor, all are held liable as if they had performed the labor themselves. another brought a pot,2As the Ra'avad mentions, Beitzah (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to a situation where a new pot is used. Thus, heating the pot hardens it as would heating in a kiln. This is is also a derivative of the labor of cooking. (See Halachah 6 and Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:11.)
According to the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh mentioned above, this is unnecessary. Since the pot was brought together with the other elements for the sake of cooking, the person bringing it is liable, even if it is an old pot. another added water,3Even those who do not accept the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh would hold such a person liable, since a person is liable for heating water, as explained in Halachah 1. another put in meat,4Here too, the obligation is clear, for the person is cooking food. another put in spices,5Since the spices contribute flavor to the food, adding them to the pot is sufficient to make one liable for cooking, even according to the opinions that do not accept the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh. and another stirred it,6for stirring hastens the cooking process. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:18) emphasizes that one is liable for stirring only when the food is not completely cooked. Once it is cooked, there is no prohibition against stirring.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that even after food is completely cooked, one should not stir it. The later authorities emphasize that although there is reason to follow this stringency with regard to stirring, there is no difficulty in removing food from the pot if it is already cooked and removed from the fire. (While the pot is cooking this is forbidden, for in the process of taking out the food, one will stir the remaining food.) See Chapter 3, Halachah 11. all are liable for cooking. For anyone who performs an activity that is necessary for cooking is considered as [having performed that forbidden labor].
If, by contrast, one put down the pot, another came7According to the Kessef Mishneh, this is the key phrase in understanding the difference between the first clause and the second. "Another came" - i.e., he came after, and without any connection, to the first individual. Hence, the responsibility is not shared by the entire group. Accordingly, since the actions of the persons mentioned first could not bring about cooking in their own right, they are not held liable. and added water, another came and added meat, another came and added spices, another came and brought fire,8The person bringing the fire would probably be liable for kindling, but that is not the Rambam's concern in this halachah. He is not liable for cooking, for without the wood the flame would burn out in the near future. another came and placed wood on the fire,9Once the wood begins to burn, the fire will have the potential to cook the meat. Hence, the person who brings it is liable. and another came and stirred,10Since the person stirred the food after it began to cook, he is liable. Although he acted independently of the others, the act he performs in its own right is sufficient to incur liability. it is only the latter two who are liable for cooking.
הלכה ה
הִנִּיחַ בָּשָׂר עַל גַּבֵּי גֶּחָלִים אִם נִצְלָה בּוֹ כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת אֲפִלּוּ בִּשְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת חַיָּב. לֹא נִצְלָה בּוֹ כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת אֲבָל נִתְבַּשֵּׁל כֻּלּוֹ חֲצִי בִּשּׁוּל חַיָּב. נִתְבַּשֵּׁל חֲצִי בִּשּׁוּל מִצַּד אֶחָד פָּטוּר. עַד שֶׁיַּהֲפֹךְ בּוֹ וְיִתְבַּשֵּׁל חֲצִי בִּשּׁוּל מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין. שָׁכַח וְהִדְבִּיק פַּת בַּתַּנּוּר בְּשַׁבָּת וְנִזְכַּר מֻתָּר לוֹ לִרְדוֹתָה קֹדֶם שֶׁתֵּאָפֶה וְיָבוֹא לִידֵי מְלָאכָה:
כסף משנה
5.
When a person places meat over coals, and a portion the size of a dried fig becomes [thoroughly] roasted, he is liable even when the portions that are roasted are [separate, and located] in two or three portions [of the piece of meat].17Although the places where the meat cooked are separate, their size is combined, and the person is held liable if the sum reaches the size of a dried fig.When there is not a portion the size of a dried fig that has become [thoroughly] roasted, but the entire [piece of meat] becomes half-cooked,18This is the Rambam's definition of the term used by our Sages' כמאכל בן דרוסאי, "like the food of ben D'rosai." Rashi (Shabbat 20a) relates that ben D'rosai was a wanted bandit who would eat his food hurriedly because he was always running to avoid detection.
Significantly, Rashi interprets כמאכל בן דרוסאי as being only one-third cooked. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:2) and many later authorities quote the Rambam's view. The Mishnah Berurah 253:38, however, states that in a difficult situation, one may rely on Rashi's opinion. one is liable.19Since the meat can be eaten in its present state, one is liable for cooking it. If, however, it is half-cooked from one side only, one is not liable until one turns it so that it becomes half-cooked on both sides.
If a person forgot20The addition of this term is significant. Shabbat 4a also mentions this law in an instance when one purposely violated the Sabbath laws. The Rambam explains that this leniency applies even when one performed such an activity בשוגג. (See the Maggid Mishneh; note also the Lechem Mishneh's objections.) and attached a loaf to an oven on the Sabbath, but remembered [the prohibition involved afterwards], he21But not a colleague (Magen Avraham 254:21). Since removing the loaf from the wall of the oven in previous eras involved a Rabbinic prohibition (as mentioned in Chapter 22, Halachah 1), this was forbidden. A person is not allowed to sin so that his colleague will merit. may remove it22The Rabbis explain that it is desirable to remove the bread in an abnormal manner, because of the prohibition mentioned above. Nevertheless, if it is impossible to do so before the loaf bakes, one may remove it in the ordinary fashion so that one does not transgress the prohibition against baking (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 254:12; Mishnah Berurah 254:41).
It must be emphasized that the baking procedure followed today is different from that referred to by the Rambam. At present, there is no prohibition involved in removing a loaf placed in the oven to bake. before it bakes23The commentaries question when a person becomes liable for baking. Is it when a crust forms (see Chapter 3, Halachah 18), or must the loaf bake thoroughly? (See Tosafot, Menachot 57b, which compares the forming of a crust to food cooking to the point of being כמאכל בן דרוסאי.) and causes [him to be liable for performing a forbidden] labor.
הלכה ו
הַמַּתִּיךְ אֶחָד מִמִּינֵי מַתָּכוֹת כָּל שֶׁהוּא אוֹ הַמְחַמֵּם אֶת הַמַּתָּכוֹת עַד שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה גַּחֶלֶת הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מְבַשֵּׁל. וְכֵן הַמְמַסֵּס אֶת הַדּוֹנַג אוֹ אֶת הַחֵלֶב אוֹ אֶת הַזֶּפֶת וְהַכֹּפֶר וְהַגָּפְרִית וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מְבַשֵּׁל וְחַיָּב. וְכֵן הַמְבַשֵּׁל כְּלֵי אֲדָמָה עַד שֶׁיֵּעָשׂוּ חֶרֶס חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר בֵּין שֶׁרִפָּה גּוּף קָשֶׁה בָּאֵשׁ אוֹ שֶׁהִקְשָׁה גּוּף רַךְ הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מְבַשֵּׁל:
כסף משנה
6.
A person who melts even the slightest amount of metal or who heats a piece of metal until [it glows like] a coal24The commentaries question the difference between this point and the ruling of Chapter 12, Halachah 1, that a person who heats iron is liable for kindling. Rav Kapach explains that the difference depends on the nature of the metals involved. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. Iron, in contrast, becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, its processing is associated with the labors of kindling and extinguishing, which have to do with making charcoal. (See the commentary on that halachah.) performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of cooking.25This halachah emphasizes that the forbidden labor of cooking applies to substances other than food. The Rambam explains this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) when defining the nature of the forbidden categories of labor. Similarly, a person who melts wax, tallow, tar, brown tar, or pitch, and the like performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of cooking and is liable.Similarly, a person who heats an earthenware utensil until it becomes hard clay is liable for cooking. The general principle is: Whether one softens a firm entity with fire or hardens a soft entity, one is liable for cooking.
הלכה ז
הַגּוֹזֵז צֶמֶר אוֹ שֵׂעָר בֵּין מִן הַבְּהֵמָה בֵּין מִן הַחַיָּה בֵּין מִן הַחַי בֵּין מִן הַמֵּת אֲפִלּוּ מִן הַשֶּׁלַח שֶׁלָּהֶן חַיָּב. כַּמָּה שִׁעוּרוֹ כְּדֵי לִטְווֹת מִמֶּנּוּ חוּט שֶׁאָרְכּוֹ כְּרֹחַב הַסִּיט כָּפוּל. וְכַמָּה רֹחַב הַסִּיט כְּדֵי לִמְתֹּחַ מִן בֹּהֶן שֶׁל יָד עַד הָאֶצְבַּע הָרִאשׁוֹנָה כְּשֶׁיִּפְתַּח בֵּינֵיהֶן בְּכָל כֹּחוֹ וְהוּא קָרוֹב לִשְׁנֵי שְׁלִישֵׁי זֶרֶת. הַתּוֹלֵשׁ כָּנָף מִן הָעוֹף הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת גּוֹזֵז. הַטּוֹוֶה אֶת הַצֶּמֶר מִן הַחַי פָּטוּר שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ גְּזִיזָה בְּכָךְ וְאֵין דֶּרֶךְ נִפּוּץ בְּכָךְ וְאֵין דֶּרֶךְ טְוִיָּה בְּכָךְ:
כסף משנה
7.
One who shears wool26The Rambam has concluded his description of the eleven categories of forbidden labors associated with the preparation of food, and with this halachah begins discussion of the categories of forbidden labors associated with the preparation of clothing. or hair from an animal or a beast - whether alive or dead - is liable. [This applies even when he] removes [these substances] from skin.27I.e., a surface where hair or wool that would be useful for making a garment does not grow.What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? Enough to spin a thread that is twice the length of a width of a sit from it.28This is the minimum measure for which one is liable for performing the labors associated with making thread. How long is the width of a sit? The distance from the thumb to the first finger when they are extended as far as possible.29In three different places in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam defines the term "the width of a sit": Orlah 3:2, Shabbat 13:4, and Keilim 13:4. In these sources, he defines the width of sit as he does in this halachah. (See also Halachah 10 where the Rambam states that twice this measure is equivalent to four handbreadths.)
In the sources mentioned above, and similarly in Halachah 18, the Rambam differentiates between the terms sit and "the width of a sit." Note that Rashi defines both these measures differently. This is approximately two thirds of a zeret.30A zeret is defined as the distance between one's thumb and pinky when one's hand is fully extended. This is understood to be half a cubit, three handbreadths (24 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, 30 centimeters according to Chazon Ish).
A person who tears off the wing of a bird [is liable for performing] a derivative of shearing. One who spins wool from a living animal31Although the women preparing the goats' hair for the Sanctuary spun it while it was on the goats themselves (see commentaries to Exodus 35:26 , one is not liable for performing such an activity on the Sabbath, for this is not the ordinary manner in which one spins thread (Shabbat 74b). is not liable, for this is not the ordinary manner of shearing, nor is this the ordinary manner of beating, nor is this the ordinary manner of spinning.
הלכה ח
הַנּוֹטֵל צִפָּרְנָיו אוֹ שְׂעָרוֹ אוֹ שְׂפָמוֹ אוֹ זְקָנוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת גּוֹזֵז וְחַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁיִּטּל בִּכְלִי. אֲבָל אִם נְטָלָן בְּיָדוֹ בֵּין לוֹ בֵּין לְאַחֵר פָּטוּר. וְכֵן הַחוֹתֵךְ יַבֶּלֶת מִגּוּפוֹ בֵּין בְּיָד בֵּין בִּכְלִי פָּטוּר בֵּין לוֹ בֵּין לְאַחֵר. וּמֻתָּר לַחְתֹּךְ יַבֶּלֶת בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ בְּיָד אֲבָל לֹא בִּכְלִי. וְאִם הָיְתָה יְבֵשָׁה חוֹתְכָהּ אַף בִּכְלִי וְעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה:
כסף משנה
8.
A person who cuts his nails, his hair, his mustache, or his beard [performs a] derivative [of the forbidden labor] of shearing and is liable.32As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, the Rambam holds one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, a forbidden labor for a purpose different from the purpose for which the labor was performed in the Sanctuary. In the notes on that halachah, it is explained that this decision is not shared by all authorities.According to the authorities who differ, there is a difference of opinion whether or not one is liable for cutting one's hair and nails. Tosafot (Shabbat 94b) maintains that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the labor of shearing was performed for the sake of the wool. Therefore, unless a person had a need for his hair or nails, he would not be held liable. The Rivash (Responsum 394), however, explains that before they were used, the tachash skins were shaved to remove the hair. Hence, if one cuts off one's hair or nails for cosmetic purposes, one is liable. (See, however, the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 5, which differentiate between the forbidden labor of shearing and the forbidden labor of smoothing.) [This applies] provided one cuts them using a utensil. If one removes them by hand, one is not liable.33Since this is not the usual way of cutting hair or nails, one is not liable. (See also Chapter 22, Halachot 13-14, which discuss the Rabbinical prohibitions involved with cutting hair.) [The above applies regarding both] one's own [nails and the like] and those of a colleague.34The popularly accepted text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:7) states that one who removes a colleague's hair or nails is liable even if he does so by hand. Rav Kapach maintains that the original text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah in fact makes such a statement, but that the Rambam amended the text, and the final version resembles the rulings of this halachah.
Similarly, a person who cuts a wart from his body, whether using a utensil35The Maggid Mishneh protests the decision that a person who cuts off a wart with a utensil is not liable, pointing to Eruvin 103a, which appears to obligate one for such an activity.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1521) explains the Rambam's ruling, stating that this applies only in the Temple. A wart is considered a blemish that makes an animal unfit for sacrifice and a priest unfit for service (see Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 7:10), and by removing the wart one becomes fit for service. Thus, one is liable, not for performing the forbidden labor of shearing, but for the labor of מכה בפטיש, making an entity ready for use. (See also the Tzafenat Paneach, who offers a similar interpretation.)
Note, however, Shulchan Aruch Harav 340:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 340:6, which state that the liability for cutting a wart stems from the forbidden labor of shearing. or by hand is not liable. [The above applies regarding both] one's own [warts] and those of a colleague.
It is permitted to remove a wart in the Temple by hand,36Not only is one freed of liability, but doing so is permitted, because this is not the ordinary process. Although outside the Temple, this would be forbidden as a sh'vut (Rabbinic decree), there are no such restrictions in the Temple. but not with a utensil. If it is dry, one may cut it off with a utensil,37Note the Ma'aseh Rokeach, which states that since the wart was dry and shriveled, it is considered as if it had been removed already. Nevertheless, as Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc cit.) and the Mishnah Berurah (loc cit.) state that outside the Temple it is forbidden to remove a wart even if it is dry and shriveled. [in order to] take part in the Temple service.
הלכה ט
הַנּוֹטֵל שְׂעָרוֹ בִּכְלִי כַּמָּה יִטּל וְיִהְיֶה חַיָּב. שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת. וְאִם לִקֵּט לְבָנוֹת מִתּוֹךְ שְׁחוֹרוֹת אֲפִלּוּ אַחַת חַיָּב. צִפֹּרֶן שֶׁפֵּרְשָׁה רֻבָּהּ וְצִיצִין שֶׁל עוֹר שֶׁפֵּרְשׁוּ רֻבָּן אִם פֵּרְשׁוּ כְּלַפֵּי מַעְלָה וּמְצַעֲרוֹת אוֹתוֹ מֻתָּר לִטּל אוֹתָן בְּיָדוֹ אֲבָל לֹא בִּכְלִי. וְאִם נְטָלָן בִּכְלִי פָּטוּר. וְאִם אֵינָן מְצַעֲרוֹת אוֹתוֹ אֲפִלּוּ בַּיָּד אָסוּר. וְאִם לֹא פֵּרְשׁוּ רֻבָּן אֲפִלּוּ מְצַעֲרוֹת אוֹתוֹ אָסוּר לְנָטְלָן בְּיָדוֹ וְאִם נְטָלָן בִּכְלִי חַיָּב:
כסף משנה
9.
How much hair is it necessary for a person to remove with a utensil to be liable? Two hairs.38Two hairs are significant, and, therefore, one who cuts them off is held liable. If one removes a grey hair from dark ones, one is liable for removing even one.39Since one desires to appear young, removing even a single grey hair is significant. This applies to both men and women. Note also the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:10, which prohibit a male from doing this even during the week, since by doing so, he would be adorning himself as a woman does.[The following rules apply to] a nail when the majority of it has been split, or to strips of flesh that have begun to peel: If they have split upward40Note the gloss of Rav David Arameah and also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:31), which questions whether "upward" means towards the end of the finger or towards the body. Since there is no clear cut answer, one must act stringently; in practice, it is forbidden to remove such a nail at all (Mishnah Berurah 328:99). and annoy the person, one may remove them by hand, but not with a utensil. If, however, one removes them with a utensil, one is not liable.41Since the majority of the nail has split or the skin has peeled, the remainder is considered as if it has already been removed according to the Torah. The prohibition against removing it is merely Rabbinic in nature and is waived because of the annoyance the person is suffering when he removes them by hand - i.e., in an abnormal manner (Mishnah Berurah 328:96).
If they do not annoy the person, it is forbidden to remove them even by hand. If the majority has not been split [nor has begun to peel], it is forbidden to remove them even by hand, and one who removes them with a utensil is liable.
הלכה י
הַמְלַבֵּן אֶת הַצֶּמֶר אוֹ אֶת הַפִּשְׁתָּן אוֹ אֶת הַשָּׁנִי. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן מִמַּה שֶּׁדַּרְכָּן לְהִתְלַבֵּן חַיָּב. וְכַמָּה שִׁעוּרוֹ כְּדֵי לִטְווֹת מִמֶּנּוּ חוּט אֶחָד אָרְכּוֹ כִּמְלֹא רֹחַב הַסִּיט כָּפוּל שֶׁהוּא אֹרֶךְ אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים:
כסף משנה
10.
A person who whitens wool, linen, wool to be dyed crimson,42Our translation follows the Biblical meaning of the word שני. There is, however, a difficulty - what is the difference between this fabric and ordinary wool. The Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 157) explains that this refers to wool that has already been dyed crimson. Others note that at times שני can also refer to silk. See Rav Kapach's notes to Hilchot Sefer Torah 9:3. or any other fabrics that are ordinarily whitened is liable.What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? [An amount of fibers large enough] to produce a thread as long as twice the width of a sit - i.e., four handbreadths.43See Halachah 7.
הלכה יא
הַמְכַבֵּס בְּגָדִים הֲרֵי הוּא תּוֹלֶדֶת מְלַבֵּן וְחַיָּב. והַסּוֹחֵט אֶת הַבֶּגֶד עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא הַמַּיִם שֶׁבּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מְכַבֵּס וְחַיָּב. שֶׁהַסְּחִיטָה מִצָּרְכֵי כִּבּוּס הִיא כְּמוֹ שֶׁהַהֲגָסָה מִצָּרְכֵי הַבִּשּׁוּל. וְאֵין סְחִיטָה בְּשֵׂעָר וְהוּא הַדִּין לְעוֹר שֶׁאֵין חַיָּבִין עַל סְחִיטָתוֹ:
כסף משנה
11.
Laundering clothes is a derivative of the [forbidden] labor of whitening and causes one to be liable.A person who wrings out a garment until the water44Note the Kessef Mishneh, who states that according to the Rambam, this prohibition applies also to liquids other than water.
This is a matter of question. Tosafot (Ketubot 6a) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 320), differ, and maintain that one is liable only for wringing out water. [absorbed] in it is discharged is considered as one who launders45The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rashba and others view wringing out liquids as related to two different forbidden labors. According to these authorities, wringing out water is a derivative of laundering, while wringing out other liquids relates to the forbidden labor of threshing.
The Ramban, however, states that although squeezing juice from fruits is considered to be a derivative of threshing, squeezing liquids other than water from garments is not. Some commentaries have associated this with the principle mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 7, "[The forbidden labor of] threshing applies only with regard to the earth's produce."and is held liable.46See Chapter 22, Halachah 15, which mentions the Rabbinic prohibitions enacted as safeguards for the Torah prohibition against wringing out liquid. Wringing out [a garment] is one of the activities necessary for laundering, as stirring is one of the activities necessary for cooking.
There is no concept of wringing out hair.47Rashi (Shabbat 128b) explains that hair never absorbs water. Similarly, one is not liable for wringing out leather.48The Avnei Nezer (Responsum 157) explains that since the Rambam considers wringing out liquids as a derivative of whitening, this will apply only when wringing out the liquid will affect the color of the entity from which one is extracting it. This will not happen with regard to hair or leather.
It must be noted that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:9) forbids rubbing leather to clean it. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:19 states this is merely a Rabbinic prohibition (thus following the Rambam's view). The Mishnah Berurah 302:39,42, however, differs and maintains that one is liable for such an act.
הלכה יב
הַמְנַפֵּץ אֶת הַצֶּמֶר אוֹ אֶת הַפִּשְׁתָּן אוֹ אֶת הַשָּׁנִי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן חַיָּב. וְכַמָּה שִׁעוּרוֹ כְּדֵי לִטְווֹת מִמֶּנּוּ חוּט אֶחָד אָרְכּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים. וְהַמְנַפֵּץ אֶת הַגִּידִים עַד שֶׁיֵּעָשׂוּ כְּצֶמֶר כְּדֵי לִטְווֹת אוֹתָן הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מְנַפֵּץ וְחַיָּב:
כסף משנה
12.
One who beats49Our translation of the Hebrew נפץ is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2). Since these fabrics are natural, beating them makes them more pliable. Other authorities translate נפץ as "comb" - i.e., comb impurities from the fibers. wool, linen, wool to be dyed crimson, or any other similar fabrics is liable. What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? [An amount of fibers large enough] to produce a thread four handbreadths long.A person who beats animal sinews until they become like wool, so that [cord]50Cord made from animal sinews is used to sew Torah scrolls and tefillin. can be spun from them, is liable for performing a derivative of beating.
הלכה יג
הַצּוֹבֵעַ חוּט שֶׁאָרְכּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים אוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לִטְווֹת מִמֶּנּוּ חוּט כָּזֶה חַיָּב. וְאֵין הַצּוֹבֵעַ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא צֶבַע הַמִּתְקַיֵּם. אֲבָל צֶבַע שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְקַיֵּם כְּלָל כְּגוֹן שֶׁהֶעֱבִיר סָרָק אוֹ שָׁשַׁר עַל גַּבֵּי בַּרְזֶל אוֹ נְחשֶׁת וּצְבָעוֹ פָּטוּר. שֶׁהֲרֵי אַתָּה מַעֲבִירוֹ לִשְׁעָתוֹ וְאֵינוֹ צוֹבֵעַ כְּלוּם. וְכָל שֶׁאֵין מְלַאכְתּוֹ מִתְקַיֶּמֶת בְּשַׁבָּת פָּטוּר:
כסף משנה
13.
A person who dyes a thread that is four handbreadths long or fabric from which a thread of this length can be spun is liable.A person is not liable unless the dye he uses will make a permanent [change in the article's color]. When the application of color will not have a permanent effect - e.g., one who applies red clay or vermilion to iron or brass and colors it is not liable, for it can be removed immediately without dyeing it at all. Whenever a person performs a labor that does not have a permanent effect on the Sabbath,51We have translated the Rambam's wording literally, although it appears somewhat clumsy, because of a concept that can be derived from it. Permanence is a relative concept in our world. Hence, when a person performs an activity that appears permanent on the Sabbath itself, he can be held liable for it although later there is a possibility for change (Rav Kapach). he is not liable.52Shabbat 12:1 states, "Anyone who performs a labor - and that labor has an enduring effect on the Sabbath - is liable."
הלכה יד
הָעוֹשֶׂה עֵין הַצֶּבַע הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת צוֹבֵעַ וְחַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּתַן קַנְקַנְתּוֹם לְתוֹךְ מֵי עַפְּצָא שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה הַכּל שָׁחוֹר. אוֹ שֶׁנָּתַן אִיסְטִיס לְתוֹךְ מֵי כַּרְכֹּם שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה הַכּל יָרֹק. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְכַמָּה שִׁעוּרוֹ כְּדֵי לִצְבֹּעַ בּוֹ חוּט שֶׁאָרְכּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים:
כסף משנה
14.
A person who creates a color is liable [for performing] a derivative of the labor of dyeing.53The source for the Rambam's ruling is a matter of question. The Maggid Mishneh mentions Shabbat 18a, which states that a person who mixes a concentrate of ink with water is liable.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, noting that although in the construction of the Sanctuary, the dyes were made by cooking the herbs in water, the Talmud states that one is liable only for cooking and does not mention the dyeing of the water.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in truth, a person would be liable for two transgressions by cooking dyes: for cooking and for dyeing the water. The Talmud mentions cooking only, because that is the subject of the discussion. Rav Kapach offers a unique explanation, stating that the Rambam is not speaking about instances when water is dyed through cooking, but when two liquids of different colors are mixed to cause a new tint.
There are authorities [Ginat Veradim (Section 3, Chapter 9) and HaElef Lecha Shlomo] who accept the Rambam's ruling and on this basis state that one should not make tea or coffee on the Sabbath, for one is coloring the water. The Mishnah Berurah 318:39 and the K'tzot HaShulchan state emphatically that there is no concept of dyeing foods. What is implied? One mixed gallnut juice into vitriol54Vitriol is produced by the rusting of metals. As mentioned in Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, when both these substances are mixed together, a black ink which leaves a permanent mark is produced. until the entire mixture turned black, or mixed isatis55A plant producing a deep blue dye. into saffron water56Which is yellow. until the entire mixture turned green and the like.
What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? [An amount of dye large enough] to dye a thread four handbreadths long.
הלכה טו
הַטּוֹוֶה אֹרֶךְ אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים מִכָּל דָּבָר הַנִּטְוֶה חַיָּב. אֶחָד הַטּוֹוֶה אֶת הַצֶּמֶר אוֹ אֶת הַפִּשְׁתָּן אוֹ אֶת הַנּוֹצָה אוֹ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר אוֹ אֶת הַגִּידִין. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. הָעוֹשֶׂה אֶת הַלֶּבֶד הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת טוֹוֶה וְחַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּלַבֵּד דָּבָר שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לִטְווֹת מִמֶּנּוּ חוּט אֹרֶךְ אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים בְּעֹבִי בֵּינוֹנִי:
כסף משנה
15.
A person who spins a thread four handbreadths long from any fibers [from] which [thread] is spun is liable. This includes spinning wool, linen, [camel] hair, goat's hair,57Others render the Hebrew notzah as "down." animal sinews, and any other fibers of this nature.A person who makes felt is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of spinning if he makes felt from fibers that could be used to spin a thread of ordinary thickness that is four handbreadths long.58The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling. Rav Levi ibn Chaviv supports the Rambam's position, explaining that the intertwining of fibers necessary to make felt resembles spinning.
הלכה טז
הָעוֹשֶׂה שְׁנֵי בָּתֵּי נִירִין חַיָּב. הָעוֹשֶׂה נָפָה אוֹ כְּבָרָה אוֹ סַל אוֹ סְבָכָה אוֹ שֶׁסָּרַג מִטָּה בַּחֲבָלִים הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת עוֹשֶׂה נִירִין וּמִשֶּׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שְׁנֵי בָּתִּים בְּאֶחָד מִכָּל אֵלּוּ חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה שְׁנֵי בָּתֵּי נִירִין בְּדָבָר שֶׁעוֹשִׂין אוֹתוֹ בָּתִּים בָּתִּים כְּגוֹן אֵלּוּ חַיָּב:
כסף משנה
16.
A person who makes two heddles is liable.59The Hebrew בתי נירין is generally translated as "houses of string." In the weaving process, it refers to the following practice: Weaving involves passing the threads of the woof over and under each of the consecutive threads of the warp. In order to facilitate this process, two frames are made, each possessing many threads with a loop (referred to as a "heddle") in the middle of these threads. The threads of the warp are passed through these loops, one from one frame, and next from the other consecutively. (See also Rav Kapach's commentary, which explains that nir in Arabic means woof. Thus בתי נירין would mean "houses for the woof" - i.e., holes through which the woof thread is passed.)When this is completed, the weaver lifts the two frames alternately. As he raises one up, he passes the woof through. In this manner, he is able to thread the woof through the entire warp at one time. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:2 and Keilim 21:1.)
A person who makes a sifter, a strainer, a basket, a hairnet, or one who weaves a rope bed [performs] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of making heddles;60All these objects are made by weaving materials other than thread. It is questionable why the Rambam considers them as derivatives of this category of forbidden labor and not the labor of weaving. when he makes two frames of any one of the above, he is liable. Similarly, a person who makes two frames of any object that is made frame by frame like the above is liable.
הלכה יז
דֶּרֶךְ הָאוֹרְגִין שֶׁמּוֹתְחִין הַחוּטִין תְּחִלָּה בְּאֹרֶךְ הַיְרִיעָה וּבְרָחְבָּהּ וּשְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין זֶה מִכָּאן וְזֶה מִכָּאן וְאֶחָד שׁוֹבֵט בְּשֵׁבֶט עַל הַחוּטִין וּמְתַקֵּן אוֹתָן זֶה בְּצַד זֶה עַד שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה כֻּלָּהּ שְׁתִי בְּלֹא עֵרֶב. וּמְתִיחַת הַחוּטִין כְּדֶרֶךְ הָאוֹרְגִין הִיא הַנְסָכַת הַמַּסֶּכֶת וְזֶה הַמּוֹתֵחַ נִקְרָא מֵסֵךְ. וּכְשֶׁכּוֹפְלִין אוֹתָהּ וּמַתְחִיל לְהַכְנִיס הַשְּׁתִי בָּעֵרֶב נִקְרָא אוֹרֵג:
כסף משנה
17.
Weavers generally stretch out the threads [of the warp] to the desired length and width of the fabric. Two people hold [the beams to which the ends of the threads are connected], one from one side and one from the other side. A person beats the threads with a rod and aligns them so that they lie one next to the other, [all of the] warp threads without the woof.Extending the threads as the weavers do is called mounting the warp. A person who [extends these threads] so they are taut is called one who sets the warp. Bending [the loom] and inserting the woof between the warp [threads] is called weaving.
הלכה יח
הַמֵּסֵךְ חַיָּב וְהִיא מְלָאכָה מֵאֲבוֹת מְלָאכוֹת. וְהַשּׁוֹבֵט עַל הַחוּטִין עַד שֶׁיִּפָּרְקוּ וִיתַקְּנֵם הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מֵסֵךְ. וְכַמָּה שִׁעוּרוֹ מִשֶּׁיְּתַקֵּן רֹחַב שְׁתֵּי אֶצְבָּעוֹת. וְכֵן הָאוֹרֵג שְׁנֵי חוּטִין בְּרֹחַב שְׁתֵּי אֶצְבָּעוֹת חַיָּב. בֵּין שֶׁאֲרָגָן בַּתְּחִלָּה בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה מִקְצָת הַבֶּגֶד אָרוּג וְאָרַג עַל הָאָרוּג שִׁעוּרוֹ שְׁנֵי חוּטִין. וְאִם אָרַג חוּט אֶחָד וְהִשְׁלִים בּוֹ הַבֶּגֶד חַיָּב. אָרַג בִּשְׂפַת הַיְרִיעָה שְׁנֵי חוּטִין בְּרֹחַב שְׁלֹשָׁה בָּתֵּי נִירִין חַיָּב. הָא לְמָה זֶה דּוֹמֶה לְאוֹרֵג צִלְצוּל קָטָן בְּרֹחַב שְׁלֹשָׁה בָּתֵּי נִירִין:
כסף משנה
18.
The person who mounts the warp is liable. This is one of the [39] primary categories of [forbidden] labor. The person who beats the threads until they separate and then aligns them performs a derivative of mounting the warp.61This halachah presents a unique question with regard to the authenticity of the different versions of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2). The popular version of the text cites Shabbat 75b, which relates that the number of categories of forbidden labor, "forty minus one," is repeated at the conclusion of the Mishnah to negate the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that beating the threads of the warp and straightening them (see Halachah 19) should be considered as categories of forbidden labor. Instead, they are derivatives of the labors of mounting the warp and weaving.In his version of the Commentary on the Mishnah, which is based on authoritative manuscripts, Rav Kapach states that these two activities are derivatives of מכה בפטיש , "completing a task." (See Chapter 10, Halachah 16.) According to this version of the text, originally the Rambam relied on another source and later, when authoring the Mishneh Torah, he changed his opinion based on the Talmud. What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? Preparing a fabric that is two fingerbreadths wide.62Shabbat 13:4 states that a person is liable for weaving the fullness of a sit. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam differentiates between "the width of a sit" as defined in Halachah 7, and "the fullness of a sit." The latter term refers to the distance between the thumb and the index finger when open, but not stretched. This is two fingerbreadths. [Note Rashi (Shabbat 105b) who offers a different interpretation.]
Similarly, a person is liable for weaving two threads [of a fabric] two fingerbreadths wide. [The above applies] whether one began the weaving [of a garment] or whether one wove two additional threads on a garment that had already been begun by another weaver. If one wove only a single thread, but completed the garment by doing so, one is liable.63Since one completes the garment with this thread, one's actions are significant despite being slight.
If one weaves two threads a width of three frames at the end of a fabric, one is liable.64Here also, although the weaving does not have the width normally required, since it is significant (for it makes a hem), one is held liable. To what can this be compared? To weaving a thin belt, three frames wide.
הלכה יט
הַמְדַקְדֵּק אֶת הַחוּטִין וּמַפְרִידָן בְּעֵת הָאֲרִיגָה הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת אוֹרֵג. וְכֵן הַקּוֹלֵעַ אֶת הַנִּימִין הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת אוֹרֵג וְשִׁעוּרוֹ מִשֶּׁיַּעֲשֶׂה קְלִיעָה בְּאֹרֶךְ שְׁתֵּי אֶצְבָּעוֹת:
כסף משנה
19.
A person who straightens the threads and separates them in the midst of the weaving process [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of weaving.65See the notes on the previous halachah, which discuss the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2).Similarly, one who braids hair [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of weaving.66This refers to hair that has been cut already. Braiding hair that is still attached to a person's head is forbidden by the Rabbis. (See Chapter 22, Halachah 26.) The measure for which one is liable is making a braid two fingerbreadths long.
הלכה כ
הַבּוֹצֵעַ שְׁנֵי חוּטִין חַיָּב. וּבוֹצֵעַ הוּא הַמַּפְרִישׁ אֶת הָאָרוּג. בֵּין שֶׁהוֹצִיא הָעֵרֶב מִן הַשְּׁתִי אוֹ שֶׁהֶעֱבִיר הַשְּׁתִי מֵעַל הָעֵרֶב הֲרֵי זֶה בּוֹצֵעַ וְחַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא מְקַלְקֵל אֶלָּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לְתַקֵּן כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁעוֹשִׂין אֵלּוּ שֶׁמְּאַחִין אֶת הַבְּגָדִים הַקַּלִּים בְּיוֹתֵר שֶׁבּוֹצְעִין וְאַחַר כָּךְ מְאַחִין וְחוֹזְרִין וְאוֹרְגִין חוּטִין שֶׁבָּצְעוּ עַד שֶׁיֵּעָשׂוּ שְׁנֵי הַבְּגָדִים אוֹ שְׁנֵי הַקְּרָעִים אֶחָד. וְהַסּוֹתֵר אֶת הַקְּלִיעָה לְתַקֵּן הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת בּוֹצֵעַ וְשִׁעוּרוֹ כְּשִׁעוּר הַבּוֹצֵעַ:
כסף משנה
20.
One who is בוצע two threads is liable. בוצע refers to the separation of woven fabric.67The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's definition of this activity. He offers a definition similar to that of Rashi, Shabbat 73a, stating that בוצע resembles פוצע and refers to cutting off the remaining unwoven threads after the weaving process is completed. One is liable for [the labor of] בוצע whether one removes the woof from the warp or the warp from woof.[The above applies provided that] one is not acting with a destructive [intent], but rather with the intent to improve [the garment]. For example, there are people who mend [tears in] very light garments. First, they undo the weave. Afterwards, they mend the garment, and then reweave the threads that they undid.68When a garment is mended in this fashion, the mending is hard to detect, because it is rewoven. [In this manner,] they join two garments or two tears together.
A person who undoes a braid for the sake of fixing it [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of בוצע.69As mentioned previously, every category of labor has a derivative. If braiding is a derivative of weaving, one may assume that unbraiding is a derivative of unweaving. The minimum measure for which one is liable is the same as the minimum measure for בוצע.